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ABSTRACT
An oral history compiled from recollections of fourteen combat veterans,
documented by over forty hours of tape-recorded interviews, the paper recreates
Gls' mentality upon eritering combat. The formation of the collective mentality is
examined by exploring the attitudes, motivations, and historical circumstances
determining thought and actions of these reluctant, yet dedicated soldiers. The
collective mentality, defined as the way of thinking allowing the majority to best
cope with their predicament, answers why men fought and how they persevered
once in combat. Explaining sustained combat performance the paper proves how
the collective mentality gave Gls the will and ability to withstand war's brutal and
unforgiving reality.
Describing the salient characteristics of the infantrymen's war, the
participants' experiences reveal the whole story of what really happened; with the
ugly truths some sources chose to omit. Veterans' recollections provide the Gls
relation to his own mortality, how this changed with time, and how this change
affected their way of thinking. Accordingly, special care is given to how soldiers
were influenced by what they had to endure in combat. This includes emphasis
on the adjustment facilitating Gls ability to tolerate and accept what transpired.
This adjustment amounted to a moral and emotional insensitivity resulting from
Gls' understanding they withstand, or "take" in their words, all combat could

possibly have in store. With survival and the successful completion of their duty
their foremost concerns, their moral and ethical lapse also explains the ruthless
actions of some Gls in combat, including atrocities.
Gls had the determination and self-pride not to quit and give up the fight,
but there was another significant element of successful perseverance. The
collective mentality gave soldiers the ability to laugh and enjoy situations normaly
not associated with humor. Fixating on the positive aspects of life gave soldiers
the uncanny ability to look past their problems and bear with the misery. Men
discovered the simple feeling of life was overpowering when one became aware
of how abruptly it could be cut short.
Veterans' fond and pleasurable memories reveal what soldiers actually
found humorous and what activities kept them amused. When enjoying friendships
and camaraderie, and the other startling actions that kept soldiers occupied,
soldiers were distracted from excessive worry over the terrible fear and deprivation
of war. Distractions and diversions had the benefit of fostering a positive fighting
spirit while facilitating soldiers' ability to cope.

Accordingly, the "good times"

veterans experienced performed a vital role in sustaining individual efforts.

ii

INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship on American military involvement in the war against
Nazi Germany departs from histories of prominent leaders, strategy, and
circumstances of key battles.

Emphasis now rests on the experiences of the

individuals who actually did the fighting and made the sacrifices. 1 This new focus
is not meant as a tribute to the fortitude of these brave but often terrified men, but
due to the paramount importance of the human element in warfare. 2 It can be
stated justifiably that the most meticulously prepared plans and immense logistical
support would have been meaningless if the Gls themselves were not motivated
to repeatedly place their lives at risk (see Appendix A).
Nevertheless a sufficient number of men, those who did not first become a
victim of the vast variety of casualties, defied the natural urge to flee danger and
fought on until Germany was defeated. The paper illustrates that Gls thought and
acted in the manner in which they did due to the mentality they took into combat. 3
This makes it possible to demonstrate how this mentality accounts for the success
of the traditionally accepted principles of combat motivation. 4
To demonstrate how one's mentality permitted sustained combat
performance, it is necessary to explore the circumstances that determined thought
and actions; the reasons why men fought.

This requires examining attitudes

specifically relating to individuals role as infantrymen prior to combat.
1

Oral

2
histories from the men with firsthand knowledge provided this information,
supplemented with the helpful, but limited, literature dealing with this subject. 5 Due
to the fact soldiers' attitudes underwent a change during combat, it is also
necessary to determine what an individual was forced to perform and endure if he
was to survive in his new turbulent world. It would seem that literature chronicling
the events of battles would be a helpful supplement to ascertain this change.
However, compared against the information collected in oral histories, certain
accounts of the war contain considerable drawbacks. 6
The sources in question not only fail to address the attitudes of the men
who actually determined the outcome of battles, but more importantly some of the
unpleasant incidents which profoundly influenced soldiers attitudes were omitted.
It is vital to point out that this literature is accurate in its portrayal of events but "it
is in the things not mentioned that the untruth lies. "7 There is no contention that
key facts of the terrible conflict were "sanitized" 8 in what has been labeled the
"domestification" 9 of the war. However oral histories that reveal the missing truth
can redress this problem. 10 Without the entire story it is not possible to judge
correctly how individuals attitudes changed while they participated in the "real
war." 11 Therefore, to first gain a holistic understanding of how Gls continued to
fight it is necessary to ascertain the "actuality" of combat. 12
Combat veterans continually voice the opinion that people without personal
experience can never know what combat was actually like. One individual,
representing the outlook of several of his comrades, insisted "you have to
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experience it to really understand it.

.

You can have an intellectual

understanding but you can't have much of an emotional understanding until you've
experienced it. "13 Considering soldiers were officially forbidden to keep wartime
diaries or journals (although some did), and the paucity of veteran's personal
biographies, oral histories are invaluable in documenting what men experienced.
Personal insights and details only combat veterans could provide will demonstrate
how they had to overcome several shortcomings in military hardware, despite the
popular notion that America fielded the "best equipped army in the world. "14
Assuming no two men are completely alike and every GI had his own
unique wartime experience, it must be stipulated there was no "average" Gl. 15
However despite the inherent differences in men (such as age, marital status,
intelligence, physical ability, etc.), all combat veterans experienced similar
situations and the majority felt compelled to act for similar reasons. 16 Combat
infantrymen had such a distinctive experience when compared to other U.S.
servicemen 17 that it is permissible to state that infantrymen have their own
"collective experience. "18 The collective experience is best defined as an
experience, attitude, and motivation common to the highest number of men within
a specific sample and not a definitive experience true to all men.
To refine the concept of the collective experience this paper will
demonstrate when a sample is better defined, the collective experience will be
more distinct. To illustrate this premise, fear afflicted all World War II combatants
wishing to avoid bodily harm no matter which branch of service or nation for which
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they fought. 19 However, if one were to delve into the experiences of the men in
the different branches of each of the different nations involved, one would naturally
find that men in these different groups possessed different fears and were exposed
to different levels of danger. Obviously, when studies focus on analogous samples
findings will be more explicit. Therefore this study will concentrate on the U.S.
infantryman in the last eleven months of the struggle against Nazism in western
Europe. 20
Not surprisingly those who lived through the hellish reality of combat
espouse one general conclusion: an abhorrence of war. 21

Men who had their

unwanted share of warfare deem the violence and bloodshed a "shame"22 or a
"waste. "23

Combat was so terribly appalling that many veterans, given the

opportunity, will not even discuss their experience. 24 Reticence among men that
agreed to reminisce about their ordeal indicates even after nearly fifty years,
certain issues are still too sensitive to openly discuss.

Some veterans felt

fortunate to suppress some of their worst memories, but at the same time, certain
disturbing memories persist no matter how hard they try to forget. 25
Thus it would seem apparent war is inimical to anything delightful, but just
as men could not forget the horrors of war, they also have indelible impressions
of the good things they experienced. 26 Every veteran interviewed stressed the
horrible characteristics of war, but it is also true every man found something to
laugh and joke about.

Two contradictory statements introduce an ill-explored

paradox this paper confronts. "It was a brutal experience from beginning to end. "27
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"It was a wonderful experience. I wouldn't take anything for it." 28
Without question there was an overabundance of terror and misery in war,
but how can war truly be associated with anything closely resembling "wonderful"?
It is possible to gain an answer to this question by positing the mentality the
majority shared. What can appropriately be termed the collective mentality was
an integral part of the collective experience. It is essential to note the collective
mentality had nothing to do with individual's ability to reason. Instead it is best
defined as the collective way of thinking; how the majority thought and acted to
best cope with their predicament.

After the circumstances of war determined

men's situation the affinity of human nature played a significant role in the
development of their way of thinking. All men had similar aspirations, and their
way of thinking was how they planned to achieve both their own goals and what
was expected of them.

CHAPTER ONE
Dearest Mom and Dad:
Aboard ship somewhere in the ocean. . . . There isn't much I can
tell you, except about myself. I am alright but have been seasick,
homesick, and Mad . . . . It looks like I'm getting stuck with all the
bad deals. I'll just have to take it, that's all. Easy or hard I'm coming
back, no doubt. I will see a lot of sights, but the sight of home with
Erma and Ronnie [wife and son] will be the best of all. Loving son,
Willis. [late November, 1944] 1
The letter implicitly expresses the fear of the dangers war posed to the
author's well-being.
"Mad."

It was the element of fear that made this GI emphatically

Displeased with his situation, the soldier was nevertheless there,

reluctantly heading towards what he expected to face. To explain his predicament
a euphemistic phrase was used which, in effect, illustrates the collective mentality.
"I'll just have to take it, that's all.

Easy or hard I'm coming back, no doubt."

Preparing himself to endure the supreme emotional and physical tests of combat,
he made the decision "I'll just have to take it, that's all." This was a natural
rationalization considering he was motivated by his explicitly stated desire of
getting home to his wife and child, for whom he was already "homesick."
The euphemism's conclusion, "easy or hard I'm coming back, no doubt"
allowed this man a means to avoid the negative thoughts war produced by
concentrating on positive optimistic thoughts. This wishful thinking is indicative of
a generation of Americans who in the midst of war had the tendency to
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"accentuate the positive." 2 The author's conviction he would survive, "no doubt",
best shows this optimism. Because there was always the chance he would not
survive this was a symbolic reassurance to convince himself (and his family) he
would make it home alive. Pointing out anything good that might be found, like the
"sights", illustrates how Gls suppressed adversity by focusing on the bright side
of bad situations.
Because men subject to similar situations reacted in similar ways it is
possible to demonstrate that the way of thinking expressed in the letter illustrates
the collective mentality. The factors that determined the formation of the collective
mentality transcended the inherent differences in men because men based their
thought and actions on the same key facts of life.
One fact determining Gls' attitudes was that the United States was forced
to go to war as a matter of self-defense. Pearl Harbor and Adolf Hitler's decision
to declare war four days later put an abrupt end to the isolationist notion the U.S.
could remain out of the global conflict. 3

Judging from the history of Nazi

aggression and subjugation, the American public realized war was a "necessity"
for national self-preservation. 4 Faced with a direct threat, all men contemplated
the same reality: Germany was the aggressor that had to be defeated. 5 Americans
made this conclusion due to the message all means of communication conveyed
as if "with one voice. "6 The American public understood the need to defend their
own liberties, while simultaneously defending and restoring the liberties of the
other victims of the Nazi onslaught. As a result American citizens were imbued
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with a belief in the righteousness of their "cause." 7

One man reasoned the

Germans "did what they were made to do, and we Americans did what we knew
was right. "8
The sentiment that anything citizens were called on to perform was just and
necessary alludes to another determining factor of the collective mentality: the
obligation to serve in the armed forces according to the Selective Service Act and
the Articles of War. 9 Even before America was at war popular attitudes expected
men to faithfully perform their duty anytime they were selected by the draft. The
opinion of an individual drafted in April of 1941 exemplifies the national mind set.
"I wanted to go .... It was a different attitude than it is now. Everything was
different. . . . You knew that you had to go." 10 This individual knew he "had to"
serve since it was unthinkable for him to break the law. Furthermore, by refusing
service he would ruin his reputation by failing to live up to his fellow citizens'
expectations.
Apparent in another individual's opinion, who was drafted in May 1941, is
the same feeling of the citizen's obligation. It also introduces another aspect which
influenced men's attitudes: the Depression.
We [a group of friends from rural Missouri] were taken
in for this one year of Selective Service that Roosevelt
was doing. Building up the army a little bit and kind of
giving some guys something to do .... There was no
jobs hardly, however I did have a job and I went. 11
Another man could not find a job so he found it beneficial to enlist. The man
recalled that it was
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hard times and I couldn't find a job. I worked around on a farm and
baled some hay and stuff like that for a dollar a day. By fall [of
1940] a couple of us in Toledo [IL] decided we'd go into the army,
enlist for four years. And that's the reason I went into the Army. I
can't say that I was patriotic. . . . I just enlisted because I didn't
have a job. 12
References to the Depression suggest that attitudes created in that era
facilitated the acceptance of enlistees and draftees new role.

Members of the

generation with personal memory of the Depression were already hardened and
conditioned to deal with adversity. 13 Accordingly, the majority of men serving
before December 7, 1941, tolerated, even appreciated their situation. 14 For these
men, rather than focus on the worst possible scenario, they tried not to think about
having to fight in a war that was already raging in Europe and Asia. 15 Instead they
were much more concerned with when they were going to finish their one-year
term. 16 How these men made their situation agreeable with the aid of humor and
newly created friendships reflects the developing collective way of thinking. 17
When an individual contemplated his role as a soldier, his decisions always
fell under the sway of the instinct of survival.

The instinct of survival was a

preeminent factor determining thought. "Survival is number one ... the main
objective", one veteran recalled. 18

Because a soldier's survival was in fact

questionable, the ensuing fear of death provoked an underlying dread of the
possibility of becoming a martyr. 19 Men already in the service at the outset of the
war were just the first in a long line of men made to accept it was mandatory to
fight despite fear. These men, mostly federalized National Guardsmen and oneyear draftees, never seriously questioned the issue.

Once America was
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threatened, they "naturally" concluded that to prevent suffering the consequences
of the Articles of War, they were obligated to enter harms way any time the army
saw fit. 20 As war progressed military service became so ingrained in the national
consciousness that the draft was viewed as an "accepted fact", "automatic", or the
"normal thing to do. "21
Men obediently reported to induction centers with no substantial objections,
but this was done only with a sense of "reluctant obedience. "22 This generation
went off to war with very little "war fever" or dreams of adventure. 23 Raised in an
isolationist, pacifist era, the majority desired only peace and were aware, in one
man's words, there was "no glory to war at all. "24 Compounding the apprehensions
induced by war, the influence of anti-war sentiment following the disillusionment
of WW I actually created in many an aversion to the concept of war. The following
statement illustrates the prevalent attitudes when civilians were forced to war.
I was kind of a pacifist really. After all war is about killing people
and I think it is a reprehensible activity on the part of the human
race. I think it should be undertaken only in the case of defense. 25
Some men chose to take this view one step further and refused service on
the basis they would not kill even in self-defense. However, only a minuscule
number of men declared themselves conscientious objectors. 26 Considering the
consequences of not countering the Axis threat men were forced to view the war
as a "necessary evil. 27 Men fought in one man's words: "whether we liked it or
not." 28 In addition to defending their nation men felt obligated to uphold the law
and thus the respect of their fellow citizens. 29
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With all aspects of American life devoted to victory, there was a constant
personal and communal "urging" 30 that all citizens play some "part" 31 in the war
effort. It was socially unacceptable for men to refuse service and those very few
that did were effectively ostracized. 32 One man had this to say about conscientious
objectors. "We thought if we had to go, why shouldn't they go too." 33
The underlying reason men knew they "had to go" alludes to another
constant determining factor of attitudes, individuals' pride in upholding their honor
and reputation. The interaction of the social imperative of service added great
pressure to the natural urge to "belong." Men were driven by the desire, "you want
to belong, you want to succeed, . . . you do not want to fail. "34

Despite their

reluctance, self-pride compelled men to fulfill the obligations expected of them,
their future reputation was on the line.
Due to the enormity of the war effort, all men sampled had friends, relatives,
and family members who made their own contribution and sacrifices. Therefore,
the bottom line was the only way men could "belong" was to serve like everyone
else with whom they were associated. 35 This imparted in individuals a great
"sense of duty", the traditional American belief that it was merely the citizen's
obligation to serve in time of crisis. 36 One individual's experience illustrates how
powerful the need to "belong" actually was. This man decided he would enlist
because:
it was just the thing to do. Most of the people that I knew had
enlisted. At that age [20] you start paying attention, you become a
little more knowledgeable of what's going on. And you follow the
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lead of some of your other students, because other guys were doing
it. Everybody wants to be in the ball game at that age. 37

This man felt it necessary to enlist so he could keep up his reputation within his
circle of friends. Peer pressure and the coercive influence of group decisions was
another constant factor of men's decision making process. 38
"I knew the draft would get me sooner or later. . . . I didn't go until I had
to, but I'm proud I went. "39 Considering the imperative of military service, how was
it possible that the minority enlisted, while the majority stayed out until they were
drafted like the man above? The reason was American opinion never wavered
and was always assured of ultimate victory. One individual reflecting the attitude
of the masses stated: "we went in with the fact that we were going to win the
damn thing. "40 This allowed men to make the decision they would fight, but only
when it became absolutely necessary. 41
Fear not only influenced men to stay out of the service, but oddly enough
it also influenced men to enlist. Figuring the infantry was the most dangerous duty,
it was not uncommon for single men, being prime candidates for the draft, to enlist
before they were called up.

Men did this reasoning, if they enlisted, it was more

likely they would obtain a preferable duty in either another arm of the army, or
another branch of service. 42 Men in this situation knew they were going to have
to serve and in their minds were trying to avoid future danger by avoiding the
infantry.
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Nevertheless, the majority decided to sit by and wait for the draft. Those
with the shortest time to savor civilian life were single men. A major topic of
discussion by these men was their draft status and when they needed to report for
duty. It is important to note that when they would go was the main issue, not if
they would go, or how they could get out of going. 43 One individual, twenty-seven
and single, knew he would serve and even planned on enlisting.

This man

recalled the situation in April 1942.
I was going to enlist in the navy. I had a friend here in Neoga [IL]
that told me if I'd enlist in the navy he'd go enlist with me. So I went
down to Effingham [IL] and took the physical and passed it and I
came back . . . and said, 'you ready to go, I took my physical.'
We'd go right away so he said, 'the draft is not but two weeks away,
we might as well wait now.' So that's what I did too then, I just
waited for the draft. 44
These two individuals reasoned it was not necessary to jump right into
uncertainty. This led to the common decision that it was better to enjoy the normal
life while one still could. True these men only had two weeks to sit out, but that
was better than going right in.

In another case, an eighteen year old college

student was an "indifferent student" due to the understanding that "you weren't
going to be around all that long because you were going to be called up." Since
he knew what was soon to be in store for him, he purposely lived life to the fullest
which resulted in a less than satisfactory first year of college. "I have to say I was
partying. 45

This illustrates how men accentuated the positive by enjoying

themselves and staying out of danger while they still could.
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As American involvement in the fighting increased during 1943 and 1944
it was impossible to fill the ranks without drawing on draftees who were husbands
and fathers. For the most part these men were even more reluctant to fight than
their predecessors. Nevertheless, these men knew they "had to" serve as well.
One individual inducted in July of 1943 who was married but had no children
recalled.
I knew I would be going in. . . . I didn't know exactly when, but I
knew I was going. I wasn't particularly thrilled about going, but I
knew that somebody had to go, and I happened to be one of them. 46
Apparent in this man's statement is his disfavor and reluctance,
overpowered by his cognizance of the Nazi threat and sense of obligation. The
next statement declares the same attitude, but it was possible for this individual
to stay out until June of 1944 because he was married with one child.
All you could do was sit back and wait, wait until your turn came up.
Nobody liked it. . . . it was just something that had to be done.
Most men didn't want to go as far as that goes, but they knew they
should go. It was their duty to go. . . . I figured all the other boys
ahead of me didn't want to go any worse than I. I wasn't going to
break my neck to get in it, or break my neck to keep out of the war.
When my turn came I was going to go along and try to make a big
team of it. . . . I think a lot of the boys were the same way. 47
The previous individual's judgement was correct when compared to the attitudes
expressed by others with first hand knowledge. 48 This attitude also corresponds
with that ages contemporary sources. 49
One veteran's experience, who said "nobody wants to get into it[combat]",
demonstrates how the social imperative to serve outweighed most any hesitation.
Due to the great demand for infantry replacements in September of 1944, it was
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necessary to draft a father of two young children.

Moreover, he had lost a

nineteen year old brother killed fighting the Germans in Italy in April of 1943.
Rather than going to the trouble of trying to get a deferment he decided it was
better to accept the necessity of service. "I think I could have stayed out if I'd
foug ht 1·t •

• .

.

I wen t in.
. ,,50

After a grim acceptance of the facts, there was a collective rationalization
that it was necessary to fight so as not to be viewed as a cowardly shirker. This
explains why men fought with great obedience even when so many were "very unanxious to go." 51

Like the nation itself, most Gls did not fight until it was

unavoidable, but once they did fight, they fought with the utmost dedication and
conviction.
This conviction was based on the quintessential aspect of the collective
mentality: the desire to get the unwanted task over with, and get back home to
civilian life with their honor intact. This motivation, as expressed in the soldier's
letter on page one, was shared by all of his comrades. 52 The next two statements'
illustrate how despite their displeasure men tried to keep their thoughts on the
positive side: home.
All of us were fighting to get the war over with and try to get back
home to normal life again. . . . That was in all of our minds to go
out and get it done and get it over with so we could get back to
normal life. . . . We all hated to do it but it was there. You were
just a victim of circumstance. 53
I went in to do my job and I wanted to get it over with .... You just
had to do it and you hoped to get out of it and get back home. 54
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Being impossible to send untrained civilians off to war, the army assumed
the task of preparing men for combat. Fresh recruits soon realized training was
focused on the same thing they were: survival.

The purpose of the

"transformation" from a civilian into a soldier was to teach men what they needed
to know to stay alive on the battlefield. 56 Because a soldier was only useful alive,
the army used all means at its disposal to provide him with realistic preparation.
One man recalled "through training they try to convey to you what it [combat] is
going to be like. "57
To adjust men to the reality of combat drill instructors stressed the fact men
would be killed. "Some of you boys are going overseas and some of you are
going to get killed. Some of you will get back, some of you won't. They beat that
into our heads. "58

Once men contemplated the stakes involved they often

concluded they could best benefit by learning all they could.
We were just there to get all the knowledge we could during training.
They told us right at first what we learned there was going to save
our life. They were trying to keep us alive. I thought as long as we
had to go through it we better try to absorb all the information that
we could for any further use. 59
The army set out to install in these men certain qualities and abilities which
were considered essential to produce victory. Therefore, all recruits went through
a standardized training program. Veterans sampled thought several elements of
training were useful later in combat while discipline was cited most important by
the highest number of men. 60 One veteran recalled, "one of the main things they
put into us was discipline. They wanted to make sure we did what they told us. "61
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Because combat demanded unquestioned obedience to orders any
insubordination was intolerable. Men were often forced to learn this during training
the "hard way." 62 One statement illustrates how men decided to adjust to their
situation.
They didn't want any fussing or talk back from you. . . . I found out
that that was really the best way to do. To do your best regardless
of whether you liked it or not. . . . You can make it rough on
yourself or you can get by in good shape. You belonged to them.
You just kept your mouth shut and did what you were told. . . . I
figured that was always the best thing to do. You had no say. 63
Because those who refused to follow orders were "weeded out" most
unceremoniously, men accepted that it was mandatory to act upon orders without
question. 64 This was an obvious conclusion considering men did not want to "fail"
and thus be considered maladjusted and unfit for combat. 65
When ascertaining how efforts to install teamwork and unity influenced
men's attitudes, one major distinction appears in the collective experience. This
distinction was created by the differences between replacements and men in
original outfits.

Regardless of their status all recruits were informed of the

necessity of teamwork on the battlefield. 66 However, this element of training took
on an entirely different meaning to the men in an original outfit as compared to
replacements. The reason being that a replacement went into combat for the first
time with relative strangers.

Conversely original members of a unit went into

combat with a strong sense of unit spirit. "The unit means a great deal to you,"
one veteran recalled. 67
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Men in original outfits, with one to three years of training together under
their belt, learned that peak performance required mutual dependency and
teamwork.

Of course, the development of unity went hand in hand with the

development of camaraderie between both the men, and the men and their
officers. "We were all buddy, buddy." 68 These bonds translated into great trust
and respect among men who had grown to know their fellow soldiers capabilities
and limitations. 69 The following anecdote illustrates the powerful effect of unity and
group cohesion upon individuals. One man commented that on forced marches
the men would
be so wore out we'd just be dragging along you know. Well when
your coming in everybody would be out there waiting for us. . . .
'Ok men were coming in' he said [their officer] 'lets show some
pride.' Well we would all straighten up and walk like we weren't
even tired. It gives you something down in the heart. 10
The problem was that replacements who entered combat with no personal ties had
nothing comparable "down in the heart."
With soldiers specific purpose being to "destroy the enemy" it was
mandatory for them to have the military capability to perform this task.

This

involved totally familiarizing men with the different weapons they would use in this
process. 71 It was also required that men learn modern battlefield tactics.
One of his [the drill instructor] main objectives was to tell us to learn
our military tactics. . . . To do what we were supposed to do
because it wasn't going to be too many months and we were going
to have to be over there versus the Germans. Then we would have
to know what we were doing. 72
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Proficiency in military tactics required soldiers to have the will to pull the trigger in
combat.

With the foresight to realize men might have second thoughts about

killing, the army equated killing to survival. Instructors stressed to recruits that an
enemy soldier would be intent on killing them, so therefore they had to either "kill
or get killed. "73 Determined on staying alive, men realized it was essential to kill
for self-defense, even if they did not enjoy the fact.
However, since good soldiers needed to harbor no qualms about killing,
instructors worked to impart a ruthless aggressive spirit.

To introduce a new

philosophy of life, and to suppress previous modes of fair play, men were
instructed to follow the antithesis of the Golden Rule. "Do unto others as they
would do into you, but do it first." 74 Instruction in "dirty fighting" provided men with
advice on how to survive by teaching them the various unscrupulous ways to stay
alive. 75 Army pamphlets offered Gls information concerning how to "kill quietly with
an ax" or how to use a club "to crack an enemy's skill. "76 True this seems brutal,
but these men had to be adjusted to the real facts. Combat is brutal.
Realistic preparation for combat also included exposing men to specially
designed live-fire courses. Live-fire under simulated combat conditions provided
men with their "battle inoculation" meant to acquaint them with the sight, sounds,
and some of the fear of combat. 77 The next statement exemplifies the general
attitude towards live-fire training. "I didn't enjoy it, but I did it. "78 Even when they
knew the bullets inches above their heads were intended to miss them, men
experiences fear. Regardless recruits never gained an understanding of what it
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felt like when it was the enemy actually aiming to kill, not instructors aiming to
miss.
This introduces one drawback of the army's training program. The Basic
Field Manual stated the "value derived" from training would "vary directly with the
realism with which battle conditions are simulated. " 79 Training could never entirely
simulate combat, but realism definitely increased as training procedures evolved.
This brings to light a distinction in the collective experience between soldiers in
training before 1943, as compared to men trained in the latter stages of the war.
A participant in the Louisiana maneuvers in the Fall of 1941 said this about their
woeful lack of training material.
We used signs for half-tracks. We used broomsticks for guns. We
didn't have a thing. . . . It was just like kids out there playing with
sticks. People don't realize that. . . . We weren't prepared. 80
On the other hand men had considerable praise for the realistic training aids
instituted during and after 1943. In addition to having adequate weaponry, these
men had access to mock village training courses, targets resembling tanks pulled
on railroad tracks, remote controlled airplanes used for machine gun practice, to
name just a few of the material advantages. 81 Unfortunately added realism also
created accidents. Ironically, out of the veterans sampled, the soldier who went
through training last, and was thus exposed to the greatest realism, was the only
individual who experienced a live-fire casualty. Casualties were avoided at all
costs, but sometimes could not be avoided. 82 Injury or death was a tragically
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undesirable outcome of training, although not much more could inject as much
realism into training.
The recipients of greater realism after 1943 were more distinct as a group
because they were predominantly replacements. Replacements benefited from
advanced

training

aids and

instruction

by

seasoned

combat veterans.

Replacements repeatedly stressed the importance of the sound advice received
from instructors with combat experience. "They knew what it was really like," one
man said. 83 Even so, most men from original outfits considered their instructors
effective even when they had no combat experience. 84 However, there were also
those very unhappy with their inexperienced instructors and leaders. "Competent
officers were guys that had been in battle before and we didn't have any"85
However, this distinction had little impact upon the attitudes of either group
upon entering combat. This is true since after training most all men, replacements
and men from original outfits, believed they were adequately prepared for combat.
This is considering green troops had no real idea of what might be lacking in their
training. As far as these soldiers were concerned they had learned a great deal
about the art of warfare.
Men also knew they had learned much about themselves; feeling a sense
of accomplishment upon completing their rigorous training was the norm. Because
combat was one long "endurance test" training constantly functioned to develop
physical stamina. 86 Rigorous physical performances requirements determined if
men did, or did not have the will and physical ability to be a combat infantryman.
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In one man's words, training revealed who could not and who could "keep up with
us."87 Another man recalled how training not only "physically toughened" soldiers,
but it also "mentally toughened" them up as well. 88 There is no coincidence in
what the following two men thought training did for them.

One said, "there is

something about it that makes a man out of you." The other said, "it will make a
man out of you. I grew up pretty fast. "89
On a massive scale training had the result of producing competent soldiers
with the military ability to complete their task. Most all veterans would agree with
the following statement: "all of us thought we were pretty well trained. 90 Trainings
greatest success was instilling men with confidence in their ability as soldiers.
Confidence in the capability to defeat the enemy was an essential factor
determining the collective mentality.
No matter how confident and well-trained, the impulse of fear became more
acute the closer men got to combat. Embarkation and the trip overseas had the
effect of intensifying this pre-combat "anxiety." 91 "That's when you begin to think.
Where are you going to go? What are you going to do?" 92 While anticipating
combat, men mulled over all sorts of questions, they wondered what "it" was going
to be like, and when and where this "moment of truth" was going to take place. 93
Soldiers' peace of mind were most troubled by the uncertainty of their situation. 94
One veteran recalled his feelings, "there is fear there and a sense of anticipation.
What is going to happen, and will I be able to measure up. "95 Often greater than
the fear of injury, men had great fears of not "measuring up" to their comrades,
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thus exposing themselves as cowards.

To uphold the respect of their fellow

soldiers, men were determined to control themselves and pass the test of combat
as soldiers must. 96 This is testimony to the coercive power of wanting to belong.
Because pre-combat anxiety was such a real issue, the army took a realistic
approach to help men cope with the problem.

Men were taught fear afflicted

everyone, but it was essential soldiers have the state of mind to act regardless of
fear. Furthermore, leaders were advised to keep their men busy so they could not
dwell on their fears. 97 Gls learned to live with their fears, but at the same time
there were those very few who could not. A desperate man could find a way to
get out of going overseas if he opted to go AWOL and become a fugitive.
However, this was not an option for most. One GI, preparing to embark in the fall
of 1943 had a friend from training say to him:
'you know I'm not but just a few miles from home.' And he said
'what would you do? Would you take off to see your folks?'
Because you knew you were going to be going overseas. I said 'I'm
not recommending one way or another but I know what I'd do.' He
said 'I'm going them.' So he did, he left. I'm sure that eventually he
came over with another outfit. . . . He was like the rest of us. He
knew we had a job that needed to be done. I'm like him I wanted to
see my folks before we left because we all knew that somebody was
going to get killed. 98
Considering two other men in the sample knew of Gls who "disappeared"
during embarkation, it was not unusual for there to be AWOL's before men left for
overseas duty. 99 Growing aware that some individuals were finding ways to get
out of going overseas, the army took measures to prevent this practice. A GI who
shipped out in August of 1944 remarked that during his stay at an embarkation
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camp "it was very hard to get out. We were pretty closely watched. They were
afraid of too many AWOL's. 11100
The hundreds of thousands of Gls who never went AWOL had long
accepted the fact they were in "for the duration. "101 The fact ground soldiers had
no rotation was another major determining factor of the collective mentality. 102
Stipulated that there was no way out until the enemy was defeated, Gls had one
obsession: getting the fighting over with so they could get home.

It was a

foregone conclusion the only way this could be accomplished was to do everything
necessary for survival, no matter how undesirable. Going into their ordeal, men
understood the necessity of performing up to the high levels combat demanded no
matter how grueling. Men also understood the need stomach the brutal
characteristics of war; soldiers could not allow their nasty business trouble them.
Aware it would be no simple matter to endure, Gls prepared their mettle for
the challenge of combat.

This way of thinking started to develop when men

determined it was mandatory to accept their mostly unwanted role. "I knew when
I went in it was a dirty job, but someone had to do it. I was one of those drafted
to help." 103 Similar to all men, this man expected horrible situations ahead and he
prepared himself for this eventuality.

Past experience with living, and even

thriving, under adverse conditions facilitated men's effort to persevere. On top of
the Depression's conditioning Gls had gained a taste of how to cope with
demanding situations during their training.
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The letter at the beginning of this chapter indicates how all Gls went into
combat thinking the same thing. "I'll just have to take it, that's all." The same GI
who wrote those words recalled the mood as his unit got ever closer to the real
thing. "We knew what was coming. Why you just had to take what was in front
of you." 104 The popular word "take" was appropriately used to describe how men
planned to rely on determination, sheer guts, and physical toughness to get them
through. Even the minority who put themselves in the situation by their own will
made the same rationalization. "I had enlisted that alone already set you up to
take whatever comes. "105
The fundamental understanding that it was imperative to endure all combat
had in store, was an essential facet of the collective way of thinking. To keep up
with their fellow soldiers men knew they had to be impervious to incredible
hardships and deprivations.

Gls braced themselves for the difficult task by

securing their faculties with an emotionally defensive posture. The disposition that
one "take it" helped individuals disregard what was detrimental to their morale, and
non-essential to their survival. Gls were forced into an emotionally insensitive
state of mind. As one man described it, "you were numb. "106
The following scenario perfectly illustrates another facet of the mentality of
survival: how fear made men stay out of danger when at all possible. This incident
occurred during training while this soldier was practicing firing a machine gun.
I talked to somebody before we started shooting it and he said the
average life of a machine gunner was only seven seconds when
you're in combat . . . because that's the first one they try to get. I
thought, boy I don't want to get in on that." While he was shooting

26
he was "really going to town" and "hitting everything." He then
overheard an officer behind him say "that's going to be our machine
gunner. When I heard him say that I relaxed . . . whenever you
shoot, it wants to rise . . . the shell does. Boy, I did that while
they were around. I didn't want to be a machine gunner. . . . That
was one way of getting out of it. 11107
Purposely performing under his potential and thus hoping to better his chances of
survival, is just another example of how fear made men cautious and selfprotective. This is typical of the collective mentality since most men had no ideas
of being a hero, but instead desired to take the least risks possible. 108
Closer to the dangers of combat, despite an all out effort to disregard fear,
it never disappeared. How soldiers dealt with this illustrates another essential
facet of the collective mentality. The best way for Gls to mitigate their anxieties,
and adversity in general, was to avoid dwelling on negative thoughts by
concentrating on anything and everything positive. To distract oneself from the
pessimism which was inconsistent with an offensive spirit, one veteran recalled
how it was essential that "you always have to be optimistic. "109
To help compensate for the misery Gls knew anything that made them
laugh and feel better was very special.

As a result they learned to make a

concentrated effort on finding whatever gave them relief and indeed pleasure.
Men made the best of bad situations; relishing whatever they could enjoy, they had
to "accentuate the positive." 110 The ability to find something positive in the face of
danger facilitated efforts to cope and persevere. This way of thinking occupied the
mind at crucial times where, if men had too much time to brood, their will to fight
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would be unduly effected. As one veteran perceived the situation, "you had to
take the good with the bad." 111
The epitome of the positive thinking was the conviction one would just go
fight and do his duty and come home alive.

Soldiers' assumption they would

survive can be described as an "illusion of immortality." 112 The feeling that nothing
bad will ever happen to oneself was most associated with youth, although men of
all ages held the same belief. As one veteran recalled "at twenty-one you thought
nothing could stop you." 113 Surprisingly enough, men held these attitudes even
after their combat training emphasized men obviously would be killed.

For

example, one drill instructor, fresh from informing his recruits of this fact, still fell
under the misperception of wishful thinking.
I had no question that I'd live through it. . . . You just don't think
about those things. You don't go into a football game thinking you're
going to lose. . . . If those things enter your mind why go." 114
True many soldiers went into combat with an illusion of immortality, but men
also went in with what is more aptly labeled as a delusion of immortality. One
veteran recalled that "going into a war like that you know good and well you've got
a chance of getting shot or killed." 115 However, this was the very same soldier,
who, in his letter home to his parents at the start of this chapter, had "no doubt"
he would survive.

This is a prime indication of how men knew there was a

possibility they could be injured or killed, but they convinced themselves they
would survive. For instance, one individual on the eve of the Normandy invasion
knew men in his unit were going to die, but he just "hoped" he would be one of the
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lucky ones. 116 What has to be stressed is that since soldiers did not dwell on the
worst possible scenario they were more concerned with last minute preparations
for survival rather than the possibility of death.
This entire way of thinking hinged on the fact Gls were, one, assured of
ultimate victory, and, two, confident of their ability to produce this victory.
Furthermore, the pride that emanated from knowing they were fighting for a morally
right and winning cause buoyed men's will to fight. 117 It was also reassuring to
know the American army had ample war materiel and manpower to support
individual endeavors. One man remembered his commanding officer's speech to
his unit before battle.
Anything that takes one person to do, two are going to go. If it takes
a squad were going to send two squads. If it takes a company were
going to send two companies. We are not taking any chances on
anything. .
. That made you feel good to know. 118
How Gl's attitudes before combat varied according to the time they went in,
is another distinction of the collective experience. The first distinct group of Gls
with similar attitudes were those in England trained for amphibious operations
before June 1944. These men knew they were soon to be required to meet the
enemy.

Contemplating the assault of the formidable German defenses of the

Atlantic Wall, they prepared themselves for the worst. Because most of these men
felt that the agonizing wait, which only prolonged the anxiety, was the worst, they
were resigned to make one decision. That it was better to confront the source of
their fears and get their job over with. One GI who landed on Omaha Beach with
the 29th division recalled the mood while waiting for the invasion. "We knew what
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we had to do. We wondered why we had to wait so long." 119 For men who felt
confident and ready to go whenever ordered, getting on with their task was the
only way for them to get home.
Soldiers who had not entered the fray before September and October 1944
dealt with their situation similarly, even though they had different attitudes. Aware
that German troops had already been sent reeling in defeat, albeit with a great
cost, these men had a totally different opinion of Germany's armed might.
Consumed by their optimism, it was possible for them to question whether they
would even have to fight.

One veteran recalled the general attitude in the

beginning of October.
They were moving so fast that we thought we would never see any
action because Germany would be out of it. . . . There was a lot of
talk about being home by Christmas. In essence there was a great
deal of optimism in the air. 120
Opinions such as this were commonplace among incoming troops until the
Ardennes offensive suddenly changed the picture. This is seen in a Gl's first letter
home from the European Theater of Operations on December 15, 1944. It read:
". . . surely this war situation will clear up this year. They claim politics is all
that's holding it up now. I don't know. "121 Looking back on the time he wrote these
words, this man remembered how everyone at the replacement depot thought the
war could end at any time.
It seemed like things were moving pretty fast. Of course, you didn't
know for sure but you always hoped that way. They were fighting for
six months over there before we went over. We kind of figured that
the Germans couldn't last much longer. 122
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Assuming rumors and scuttlebutt mirrored general attitudes, the majority still
waiting to get into the fight prior to the Battle of the Bulge, continued to hope for
the best: that the war would be over before they would have to fight.
All hopes of a quick end to the war vanished as news spread of the German
advances in the desperate Ardennes fighting. Even if they were disappointed at
the time, soldiers waiting to enter combat for the first time actually benefitted from
hearing this news. These men were made to accept the fact that their foe had
recouped and there was still a war to be fought.

Soldiers were no longer

complacent and overconfident, but were again obliged to put up their guard and
prepare for the worst. 123 After the Battle of the Bulge Gls realized it was only a
matter of time before German capitulated, although they always kept in mind that
last ditch efforts to defend German soil should be expected as bitter
engagements. 124 Most importantly Germany's military potential was never again
underestimated.
It is significant to note that green troops entering combat after December
of 1944 were predominantly replacements. They largely consisted of married men
with no unit cohesion and an even greater lack of zeal that their predecessors. 125
For example, one replacement's personal attitude, "nobody wants to get into it. "126
However, it must be known there were always exceptions to the norm: some men
did find something positive about going to war.
One of these men was a twenty-one year old father of a baby girl who
before being drafted in August of 1944 had no desire to get into combat.
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Nevertheless, once caught up in the process of soldiering and war making, he
found something attractive about his situation.
You are kind of anxious even though it was dangerous. . . . You
knew you were ready to get into it. It's like a football player sitting
on the sidelines, you know he wants to get in the game. You want
to do your part. 127
What attracted this man to the fight was the personal conviction that one must
"belong" and be like everyone else. This was already illustrated by the man who
enlisted so that he could also be in the "ball game." It was this man who felt
similarly, "you wanted to get into it. You're all gung ho." 128 This is like the scant
few soldiers who were looking for war to provide them with glory and adventure. 129
These were men whose ego made it essential they do as much or more than
everyone else in America's time of need. Not coincidentally these men usually had
the strongest illusion of immortality. 130
Men who wanted to get into the fight were definitely the minority but they
do, in fact, represent the trend in the way of thinking. They made something good
out of a bad situation they did not want to be in in the first place.

Another

individual's experience again illustrates the powerful attraction of belonging to an
exclusive group. During the autumn of 1944 when the German army appeared to
be in a shambles, some men, thinking they would not see any action, actually felt
somewhat disappointed and cheated. This man, who made it a point to label
himself "naive", recalled what the men discussed while they waited for decision
day. The gist of the discussion was, "we wanted to at least be able to say we'd
been shot at. "131 This speaks for those men who rationalized there would be
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privileges in being a combat veteran like the hundreds of thousands of other young
men across the nation.

Men put their faith in the assumption they would be

regarded with respect by civilians who knew they had the moral fiber to stand up
to combat.
Considering even those few who wanted to fight did not until they were
ordered, touches on the real reason men went into combat. Men simply went into
combat whenever they were ordered to do so, thoughts of not going never
seriously entered their minds. 132 To illustrate this, one GI preparing for the
Normandy invasion in England, was convinced after a visit by General Dwight
Eisenhower, that his 28th Division was to be picked for the initial landings. When
asked if he wanted to be a part of the invasion he stated succinctly, "not really,
no." 133 The fact is, whether he wanted to go or not, he would have went if his
division was chosen. This attests to the fact men followed orders sending them
into combat with a "reluctant obedience." 134
This principle was the same for men in original outfits as it was for
replacements. A GI who landed on Utah beach with the 4th division of D-day
recalled:
you were scared [but] you knew that you had to go. They told us to
go. So what are you going to do. We had officers with us all the
time. They told us what to do. 135
This impression was the same for a replacement who recalled how you
had a bunch of officers leading you. . . . You more or less had to
follow them. If they said go down this way, you go that way.
Whatever it was you followed the officers. It didn't make any
difference how you felt. ... You belonged to the military, you
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belonged to the army.
anymore. 136

You didn't have any say of your own

Nevertheless, obedience to orders and the drive to uphold ones honor had
a far greater impact on men in original outfits as compared to replacements.
These men not only took orders from officers they knew and trusted, but also
loyalty to their unit helped to propel them into combat. The next statement reflects
the unbending loyalty to one's unit fostered by the new bonds of friendship.
You were with your unit and you were a part of that unit. Whatever
it did you did, wherever it went why you went and that's all there was
to it.137
The following statement is another example of how a pride in oneself and unit
overpowered fear.
You've got a mixed feeling. You are scared to death as far as that
goes. Anybody that says they weren't scared has something wrong
with them. . . . But I wouldn't back out. . . . We knew where we
were going. I don't know of anybody that would back out on it. We
were all geared up and reared to go. 138
Men in original units felt reassured knowing they were heading into danger
with friends who would watch their backs and take extra chances for them, while
expecting the same in return.

Replacements on the other hand, had no unit

cohesion to fall back on until they came a part of the group and were compelled
to act primarily out of orders. Replacements did have some support however due
to the fact they were around veteran soldiers who already knew the ropes and
could provide them with sound advice. 139
On the day soldiers made their way into combat for the first time they
continued to cope with fear in the same manner as always.

Not only positive
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thinking helped distract them from thinking of their fears, but focusing on a specific
chore had the same immediate effect. One example of how, before combat, all
Gls were preoccupied with soldierly preparations follows. Before one individual
with the 29th Division hit the beach at Omaha his unit had four days to pass
onboard a LST.
Whenever you got that close you didn't take nothing[sic] for granted
because you knew something was going to happen. . . . Of
course, you were polishing your gun up and being sure everything
is working just perfect and all that. 140
Immediately before combat, replacements, or men in original outfits, whether in a
ship, truck, train, or on foo were all concentrated on military priorities. Soldiers
meticulously checked and secured their equipment making sure they were totally
prepared for action. This included going over and over their objective and their
individual role in attaining the objective. This occupied soldier's thoughts with
specific details keeping them from thinking about the dangers ahead.
No matter how wrapped up with their tactical considerations, men always
found time for conversations amongst themselves. Staunchly optimistic, these
discussions were always representative of the collective mentality. A favorite topic
was home and how soon they could get home.

Men also had a passion for

discussing the women they left behind. For example, the previously mentioned
individual preparing to land on Omaha beach recalled how men helped pass the
time when not trying to sleep.
A lot of people talked about home and showed pictures to each
other. A lot of them just gambled right there on the boat. 141
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Gambling is just another example of how interests could be occupied with group
activities and discussions. Dispelling uncomfortable moments of contemplative
silence, humorous comments and banter kept the atmosphere lively, even if men
employed forced bravado. Using an intentional understatement one man said that
before combat "the humor is sometimes pretty broad to put it mildly." 142 Men also
had the tendency to say a prayer, or write a quick letter home. 143 All this kept
soldiers interested in things other than their fears.
Two recollections provide proof of how men in totally different situations
used the same means to avoid their fears: optimism and humor. One veteran of
the 4th division remarked on a big debate onboard his LST while waiting to assault
Utah Beach.

The men were caught up with how long it would take to defeat

Germany so they could get back home. The men concluded that when they
pushed the Germans back to Paris the Werhmacht would collapse and the war
would come to an end. They knew they had hard fighting ahead, but confidence
allowed them to be optimistic. 144
This same trend in the way of thinking can be seen in the situation of
replacement getting closer to the front lines in the Ruhr in early April 1945.
Advancing down a road along with his new company, a fellow replacement said
to him quite assured, "we'll never see combat." The two neophytes continued to
discuss the likelihood of seeing action while expressing the desire they would see
none. After marching for awhile longer they were stunned to hear machine gun
fire raking the front of the column. The individual relaying the story turned to his
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newly found buddy and said, "what do you think that is up there?" The other GI
put up a facade by replying, "oh, they're just up there practicing." As casualties
were carried back towards the rear, the soldier with a flair for humor and selfdelusion had to admit "well, I guess you're right." Knowing the war could end any
time, these men convinced themselves of the best, at least it was a comforting
way to cope at the time. 145
The experience of one individual who landed on Omaha Beach with the
29th Division illustrates the primary motivation of all Gls once in combat. Their
landing craft carried his unit as close to shore as possible and then dropped the
front ramp, "everybody out" their officer yelled and the journey began to the
protection afforded by the bluffs overlooking the beach. Once the unit started
forward "of course you went with the crowd then. "146 Under fire, fear influenced
soldiers to go forward because the group provided a sense of security and courage
always came with numbers. This man was then aware, in every engagement with
the enemy "survival was number one . . . the main objective. "147

CHAPTER TWO
The GI previously mentioned, who landed with the 29th Division on Omaha
Beach, experienced for the first time on that day a common characteristic of
combat: extreme confusion. After exiting the landing craft he recalled:
we had to get onshore the best we could. To this day I can't swim
and I was a block and a half away from shore. I don't know how I
got to shore, but I got to shore with everything I had on .... You're
so scared you don't know what you're doing half the time. 1
The bewilderment all soldiers experienced in the chaotic mayhem of battle is one
reason this man never retained a fully coherent memory of his first harrowing
minutes under fire.

In their deadly environment, men did not pay attention to

details, but were only concerned with protecting themselves. The instinct of
survival controlled one's actions and preoccupied the mind. Fear and intense
danger incited a mind-numbing excitement where men tried to remain calm and
rationalize actions, but they more often frantically reacted. In this frenzied state,
getting out of the perilous situation alive was one's primary aim. This man recalled
his only objective of the first day: "to keep from dying.

We were heading in

towards the beach that's all I can tell you. "2
Seeing how other men were being killed around him, this soldier had his
first shocking exposure to the cruel reality of combat.

He recalled a "spooky

feeling" encountering his first combat fatality, a dead American sailor, while he was
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still trying to get ashore. 3 Other soldiers of the 17 5th Regiment were likewise
"spooked" as they witnessed not only casualties in their own unit, but the corpses
from previous waves. 4 The man recalled what really awaited those who made it
to the perceived protection of the seawall at the base of the bluffs.
They were killing us right and left. They were just up above throwing
hand grenades us you know. That whole place along there was
bodies, dead bodies everywhere. 5
This man's baptism of fire was both a shocking and an awakening
experience. Like the overwhelming majority of Gls, he was forced to realize he
had no accurate preconception of combat.
Myself I didn't know how bad it was going to be, but it's worse than
a person could think. Whenever you see your buddies getting shot
up all around you, you wonder how come it didn't get you .... It
makes you wonder how long you're going to stay. . . . It's a scary
feeling. 6
In his first experience with enemy fire, he came to the same terrible realization
most all his fellow soldiers made at one time or another. The realization one could
be killed at any moment. In the middle of an engagement, this only intensified the
awareness of one's personal fight for survival. 7
Another veteran's recollection of his units' baptism of fire depicts a different,
yet similar situation. In this engagement two companies of infantry were ordered
across a small river unknowingly walking directly into an ambush. The Germans
allowed the Gls to cross the river unimpeded, but then laid a "curtain of fire"
across the river cutting them off from support or retreat. The trapped soldiers took
heavy shelling before German tanks and infantry stormed their positions. What
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was even worse for these men was that poor weather prevented air support, or
effective counter artillery support.

The two companies ceased to exist as

functioning units after the tanks proceeded to fire into individual foxholes. Those
still alive scattered into isolated groups in the attempt to make it back to American
lines. A GI who was fortunate to be on the secure side of the river recalled how
his battalion took "very heavy casualties .... They made mince meat out of us."8
The veteran relaying this story was a battalion runner who carried up the
order stipulating the reserve company render assistance. It was after the company
commander received this order that the captain mysteriously ended up with a
bullet through his foot. The man recalled the captain must have "felt it was an
extremely dangerous situation, which it was. . . . Now whether he shot himself,
or whether it was truly an accident I cannot tell you.

I'm not making any

allegations I can't prove." This man was averse to unjustly condemn his exsuperior, but in the interview the author could sense a very strong suspicion this
man believed this was a self-inflicted wound. Considering the circumstance, and
the suspicion of almost an entire battalion, the reader can make their own
assumption. 9
Contemplating the dangers before him, the captain could have come to the
conclusion that if he permitted himself to go forward with the attack he could, or
would, be killed. If he could not cope with this actuality of combat, his instinct for
survival took over and got him out of the situation alive. Men that went to such
drastic measures to get out of combat rationalized it was better to suffer the injury,
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and the resulting dishonor, so they at least knew they would survive.
Even if the men in this battalion did not know for certain whether the captain
had intentionally shot himself, one thing is for certain: soldiers will most always talk
contemptuously of whom they deem a slacker. Having one of their leaders betray
them in such a manner only added to the disillusionment of this battalion's fateful
baptism of fire. This veteran recalled that "as a result of this I would say there was
a deterioration in the morale of my battalion. "10 This incident is just one example
of how the series the "U.S. Army in World War II" misrepresented the situation by
failing to mention incidents that profoundly influenced soldier's attitudes. In this
case The Siegfreid Line Campaign discussed the events of the engagement, but
said nothing of the company commander's injury and its affect on the men. 11
How the U.S. Army series neglected, to a great extent, the attitudes of the
soldiers can be seen in another veteran's first encounter with the enemy. As a
member of the 4th Division his first action came on Utah Beach on June 6, 1944.
The official view found in Cross-Channel Attack was that the amphibious landing
went "virtually routine." 12 Militarily it might have been "virtually routine", however
from a soldier's perspective it was nothing of the sort. In the participant's opinion
it was just plain "rough." 13 Considering the shocking effect of one's first combat,
a green divisions first encounter with the enemy should never be considered
"virtually routine."
Every unit's baptism of fire was different and naturally soldiers who had
different experiences possessed different attitudes. The man above, who landed

41
at Utah beach on D-day, was in a headquarters company that suffered no
casualties on the first day.

"We didn't lose any men." 14 This happens to be

representative of the fighting on Utah, as compared to the much more severe
fighting on Omaha beach.

This individual's experience also differed from his

counterpart at Omaha considering that rather than first being exposed to the
dismal sight of dead Americans, he was reassured to see his first enemy fatalities.
"What helped us out was seeing some dead German soldiers. " 15 It is important
to note that under these conditions this soldier did not make the realization that he
was in imminent danger of being killed.
Despite the fact all men had different combat experiences, all were exposed
to the same general characteristics of war. All soldiers were shocked into facing
the cruel reality of the confusion, the fear induced fight for survival, and the injury
and death of fellow soldiers. One individual recalled the thoughts provoked when
his squad took their first casualties.
That's when . . . all of it comes together and then you realize what
it is all about when you see somebody you know get wounded or
killed. 16
Men realized combat was about sacrifices, suffering, and sorrow over lost
comrades, not alone the awful fear of becoming a casualty.

One trend in the

collective experience was for Gls to both come across fatalities from other units,
and sustain casualties in their own unit, before they ever encountered a German
soldier in battle. Ten out of twelve veterans sampled cited this experience with the
literature reflecting the same findings.

Out of this majority it was again most
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common for these losses to be inflicted by German artillery. 17
An essential aspect of the collective experience was that Gls had no
accurate preconception of the reality of war. Combat was so incredible worse than
they ever expected, men were forced to reassess their situation. Men were not
prepared mentally as they had thought they were. For men who feared making
the ultimate sacrifice, the specter of death was all too real.

Men who never

wanted to fight in the first place found out for themselves the real reasons why.
Even the men who felt an attraction to war soon found out they wanted nothing of
combat. One must recall from Chapter One, the man who stated men in his unit
"wanted to at least be able to say we'd been shot at." However, in the same
breath he stipulated that, "after you've been shot at you don't want to be shot at. "18
Another man made a statement, similar to other veterans, that illustrates how this
was a collective reassessment. After all his preparation and waiting when he
actually found out it was time for him to fight he was "reared to go." However,
once in combat he realized that he had thought wrong. "Well let me tell you, it's
different when the bullets start flying at you. "19
Before combat soldiers had considered themselves well trained, but their
training did not fully prepare them for combat. "We didn't realize what combat was
really like" was what most all men concluded after their first action. 20 Another
veteran observed the same. "No matter how much training you have . . . the
training will not do the job. It's just one of those things." 21 However, it must be
noted that training was beneficial and helped men in combat, but not enough. One
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individual who said a man would have been a "poor sucker" without training, felt
he at least "had a better understanding of what to do, at what time." 22 Actually in
many situations it was training that kept men alive. For example, one soldier was
checking for Germans in a cluster of homes where the "Germans had a lot of
booby traps." Walking through one of the houses, he caught sight of a Luger
pistol on top of a table. He wondered to himself,
who left that there? I stepped inside the door and I stopped and
thought about some of our training .
. [remembering] they
boobytrap that stuff. I looked real close and there was a fine little
bitty thin wire. I left that alone. 23
The problem was that combat was "entirely different" than training. 24
Collectively men were well trained, but combat was so overwhelming that "nothing
could prepare one for the real thing. "25 Another man, who thought he was well
trained, recalled, "you just took it as it comes, and tried to take care of yourself." 26
Regardless of their training, green troops had much to learn about combat. The
recollection of a replacement sergeant, who was a former drill instructor, perfectly
illustrates this.
Of course I flinched and ducked the first time I heard it [enemy fire].
They [combat veterans] didn't make fun of me or anything because
they had all been through it too. I noticed the very first time [under
enemy fire] . . . there wasn't any reaction at all on their part. . . .
I envied them a little bit because they knew a little more about what
they were doing than I did, despite the fact that I had been through
several training sessions both as a student, and as an instructor.
The game is different than reading it out of a manual. 27
The only way for green troops to learn the tricks of staying alive was with
combat experience.

Since men often learned at others' expense one veteran
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appropriately described it as "sheer bloody experience." 28 In fact, combat was a
series of learning experiences,

men never quit learning due to constantly

changing combat conditions. For example, one veteran in combat only ten days
learned to adjust to, and fight in, several different surroundings. He experienced
combat against prepared beachhead fortifications, combat in forested areas, in
hedgerows, and urban fighting where every house and every door presented a
new problem. 29 This was the same for all soldiers who had to fight in the variety
of different conditions and terrain.

Men learned to be prepared for anything

because "everyday was out of the ordinary." 30 Another veteran similarly stated,
each day, and each situation, and each area was different and you
just had to adjust to it. . . . Each thing that happens has to be
handled differently. If there was only one or two artillery shells, and
we were in an advance, you're not expected to stop and dig in. You
go ahead. But when you run into a real barrage common sense will
tell you 'hey get your head down' and that's what you do. There are
no cut and dried different rules that you live by. 31
Considering the confusion of combat and soldier's jittery state of mind, it is
not surprising that they often gained knowledge through mistakes.

One man

remarked on what happened when his unit took small arms fire during their first
few days in combat.
People were shooting at us so we turned right around and sprayed
it too. We weren't shooting at any one person, but you'd make them
get down. . . . [They then found out] we were shooting at our own
people. We hadn't been in there long enough to tell who was who.
That's the first time I learned how to tell who was shooting who. .
.. You can tell the sound of an American gun, and you can tell the
sound of a German gun and it didn't take long to learn that. 32
Gls learned to improvise and adapt, but most significant was that everything
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learned was based on safeguarding their life.
You learned everyday. As the days went by you learned different
things and how to protect yourself. A person is always trying to stay
alive. 33
This can be seen in the previous situations where if one is in danger you "get your
head down" or "get down." Another man said,
when the bullets start flying you'll find the earth is your best friend .
. . . There was many a time the Germans would open up on us and
there would be a little bitty cupped place and you'd jump for that little
shallow place. It was nothing to find two or three guys hitting the
same shallow place. 34
Several men considered the most important thing learned was how to take
cover under fire.

This was not too profound of an adjustment, but it was

mandatory and effective. One man recalled,
you adapt certain techniques to survive. One of the things you
learned of course was how to take cover so you're not so exposed.
Some of the best cover you can take is something that's been
destroyed by the artillery. 35
Another man said "you learn to keep a low profile and try not to be caught out in
the open." 36 Yet another said "it doesn't take you too long to learn how to duck." 37
Because Gls had so much to learn about combat, replacements did have
some advantages over men from original units, they did not to have to learn
everything about combat from scratch.

Replacements could get advice from

veteran soldiers who already gained their experience the hard way.

One

replacement, representing the majority, recalled the sense of security he felt from
getting advice from some of the "old-timers" in his squad. In his opinion, "where
it meant your life, it's best to take somebody's word that's already been there. "38
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However, there were sorry cases where replacements were not given advice, but
actually used as cannon fodder. One man recalled how
they brought up a bunch of replacements . . . [one) night to be
distributed. And one of them's name was Joe Shot With Two
The only reason I
Arrows, obviously an [American) Indian.
remember it, of course, is because when you see a name like that
you remember it. He went up and he came back dead the next
morning. Later on I talked to somebody from that company and they
said 'yeah we just put him up front and made him point.' In other
words he's somebody we don't know, and we'll save our own as
much as possible. 39
Despite instances such as this, most veterans offered advise to
replacements, even if it was due to a self-centered motive: survival. 40 Several
veterans commented on how the men in their unit helped out replacements. One
said a major reason for this was as long as anyone remained inexperienced they
were "liable to do something wrong and endanger the lives of other people. "41
Replacements who knew more were less likely to jeopardize the safety of others
and could help out when the time came. This alludes to how survival depended
on interdependence and group survival.
Troublesome situations occurred when replacements entered units with very
poor training. This was especially true during the critical shortage of replacements
in the fall of 1944 when some men were rushed very quickly through their
training. 42 These men were bound to disrupt unit efficiency, therefore veterans felt
an even greater need to provide them with on the job training. This was the case
of one individual who was well trained, but due to a glitch in the system ended up
in a different job for which he had been trained.
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I was trained as an infantry riflemen ... [but] you get over there and
they put you wherever they need you. They put me into an anti-tank
platoon. . . . I hadn't had [sic] any training on that, and I hadn't
seen one of them guns until then. . . . It was kind of a SNAFU as
they say. 43
Another veteran of an anti-tank unit recalled problems that arose due to
poorly trained replacements. Despite this, with some help from the veterans, and
combat experience of their own he felt, "they got used to it pretty fast." 44 This
introduces replacement's rapid adjustment to combat, brought about by the
necessity of interdependence. 45

Supporting this, one replacement made the

comment "you didn't have to be there very long until you realized you were all one
unit working together. "46

The following situation illustrates how replacements

picked up the trade quickly, if they were in combat long enough to learn. 47 A onetime replacement, with less than one month of experience on the line, noticed a
new replacement who desperately needed assistance. Aware of this he decided
to "guide him a little bit and just sorta[sic] keep and eye out for him." 48 Another
replacement's experience illustrates the same principle.
I know some of the guys that had been there for awhile looked down
on guys just coming in, but it wasn't long until we were just like the
rest of them. 49
This man in particular had to make a rapid adjustment due to the exigencies of
combat. In less than one week casualties forced him into the role of assistant
squad leader. Like all soldiers he learned to make do with the situation out of
necessity. "I felt like I didn't have enough experience yet, but I guessed it didn't
matter a whole lot. "50
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One aspect of the collective experience was the fact most men encountered
combat fatalities before they ever met the enemy on the field of battle.

It is

significant that no matter if they viewed a dead German, or a dead American,
soldiers often experienced a "revulsion" after seeing such appalling sights for the
first time in their life. 51 It was even worse the longer the stricken lay, especially in
the hot summer sun as one man remembered.
I had never seen nothing like that before you know. You'd never
smelled anything like it. A human body will stink worse than
anything. 52
In the freezing cold of the Ardennes winter there was at least no nauseating
odor, but frozen bodies still had a similar effect. One veteran recalled,
it sort of upset you to a degree, not seeing anything like that in the
past. . . . But I tried not to let it bother me because I knew I was
going to see a lot more of it. So why fret over it so much. 53
Another man held a similar opinion after he viewed his first dead German soldier.
"It bothered you at first. The thing that got to me right away was well there is a
guy that will never get married or have a family ...54
As was the case in all situations, men experiencing different circumstances
held different attitudes. It is necessary to recall what one soldier thought about
seeing his first enemy fatalities.

"What helped us out was seeing some dead

enemy soldiers." 55 This illustrates how Gls could also feel satisfied with seeing
men that would no longer offer resistance. After all, dead Germans were the
outcome of an American success, and a prerequisite for victory. Thinking along
these lines one veteran had this to say about seeing dead enemy soldiers.
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It didn't bother me too much. I expected it.
satisfaction. It didn't bother me to see them. 56

It was kind of a

On the other hand, despite the fact they were the enemy, many found it
difficult to get over the grisly fact that it was a dead man. One veteran reflected,
"you've got to remember their human beings also. "57 Men who felt this way could
not help but feel compassion for those who lost their life in such a pitiful way. An
individual in a rear echelon anti-tank platoon spoke of how his unit always
discovered Germans previously killed by the rifle companies.
Its kind of a shock. We'd move up always at night into a town after
the line companies had cleared it. There would be dead bodies
laying around in the yards and in the houses. . . . It was kind of
spooky. I felt sorry for them. 58
This veteran said he felt at the same time both compassion, and satisfaction at
seeing dead German soldiers. Mixed emotions were common, men felt
compassion, but also satisfaction in knowing the enemy was no longer out to kill
them. 59
One veteran recalled the first time he observed the horrendous results of
artillery. This was again experienced before he had any contact with live enemy
soldiers.

He remarked of when he saw where a shell landed right next to a

German soldier and it
blew him in two. He was chopped in two. His legs were laying over
there, and the top torso was laying over there at the other side of the
hole. . . . Bad. Bad. 60
What this man thought when he saw this represents what went through most all
soldier's minds when they first viewed combat fatalities. "Well that old boys gone,

50

and I don't want to have to go that way." 61

Such sights naturally stimulated

thoughts about death.
Simply stated Gls "hated very bad" coming across dead American soldiers
on the battlefield. 62 Men not only felt a "revulsion", but experienced a deep sense
of hurt and loss inside with the sight of a fallen comrade. Even a man who felt
satisfied to see dead Germans stated "it didn't bother me to see them, but seeing
our own about made me sick a lot of times. "63 As long as most men were in
combat, it was difficult for them to ever get over the initial gut feeling. One veteran
recalled how dead Germans never bothered him at all, however "a GI, I never got
used to it. I could never be comfortable with that. "64 Men had trouble dealing with
this aspect because it hit far too close to home. One veteran recalled how his unit
would see them hauling truckloads back from the front
and they would have several Germans in there, and
maybe a GI or two laying on top. That was something
I could hardly take. . . . It made you think then. 65
This definitely made men think, think of the reality of life and death.
Another man recalled his units first exposure to American dead as they made their
way towards the front.
Going through St. Lo [France] we saw these army trucks loaded with
dead Gls. . . . That kind of broke you into combat. I don't know
whether they did that on purpose, or it just happened to work out
that way, but you got to see all that before you really got into
combat. It sobered everybody up pretty fast. 66
As soldiers learned with time, coming upon the carnage of battle was just
a common aspect of war. One veteran, like so many others, became aware of this
as he continued to have encounters with combat fatalities. Sadly, it was the men
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who fell who often saw some of the heaviest fighting, yet were never able to tell
their story. Working their way toward German positions in the Ardennes his unit
found what he described as a "big mess." The men discerned a group of Gls
made a last stand against an overwhelming number of attacking Germans.
Judging from the German and American dead, along with clothing and equipment
strewn all over the area, the battle ended up in hand-to-hand fighting. The man
relaying this story discovered this scene at night when he stumbled onto a
dead American boy who had been hit and then he froze. . . . A
whole bunch of boys must have had a pretty good scrap. . . . There
was one GI in a foxhole, he was [pause], yeah he was dead. 67
Reading between the lines, apparently something so awful happened to the dead
soldier in the foxhole that it could not be told. One can only assume that the
memory was too disturbing to reveal.
Several comments confirm scenes of death on the battlefield etched
indelible imprints in men's minds.
One place there were two or three tanks that were tore up, tipped
over on their side and everything. It just looked like to me that
whoever was inside tried to get out and another bomb or something
went off. You'd see a leg over here and an arm over there. Oh
gruesome. I've thought about that a lot. 68
Another man was exposed to much the same actuality of war.
You could see where the tanks had had a fight along the road and
guys had burned up. Their heads were about the size of a
grapefruit. They just shrivelled up. That was weird. And the smell.
I can't eat barbecued hamburgers yet today, if you let the grease fall
down on the fire; it reminds me of those dead bodies in the army
vehicles. 69
That was a distasteful experience which many veterans can relate. Another man
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made the statement. "I experienced the odor of burning bodies inside a tank.
You'll never forget that." 70 While another veteran made the mistake of looking
inside a knocked out tank to his own disgust. After that he decided never to look
again. 71
The following two recollections perfectly illustrate the gruesome sights Gls
had to deal with on a daily basis.

If all this seems morbid, it was. One man

commented on a very discouraging sight he witnessed as he walked closer
towards his first action in the Ardennes. What were formerly G Is run over by what
they presumed were German tanks. "If they were in the road, they'd just run over
them", the man recalled. At first, it was difficult to determine for what army they
fought, but "you could tell by the helmets" they were Americans. 72 Turning the
situation around, one veteran actually watched as American tanks ran over dead
German soldiers laying in the middle of a crossroads.

Similar to the German

tanks, the American tanks made no attempt to go around them but just went right
over the top of them. 73
Incidents like this provided all soldiers, these green troops in particular, with
at least a hint of the brutality and inhumanity commonplace in war. If all this was
not enough, discovering dead farm animals like cows, horses, pigs, etc., was very
ordinary. 74 After experiencing these scenes men were becoming aware of how
indiscriminate death was in the European Theater of Operations in the last year
of the war.
All these sights had nothing near the impact on soldiers as when their unit
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took its first casualties. No one without first hand knowledge can comprehend the
terrible feeling of seeing a man one actually knows, and is probably close friends
with, killed in full view. What only can be described with words like terror, rage,
and sorrow barely represent the kaleidoscope of negative emotions. As far as
seeing someone mortally wounded one man said, "it's a shock and that's all I'll
say." 75 This man is similar to the majority of veterans sampled. Several men
refrained from discussing the losses their unit incurred, especially the friends they
lost, because it was too upsetting to discuss. 76 Veterans that did express their
feelings relate to how these experiences did, and still do, send them to the depths
of despair. 77 Another individual's emotions only scratches the surface of the great
numbers of veterans who never forgot the anguish they felt over the loss of fellow
soldiers.
I know I've cried many a day because so many of my buddies were
killed. [pause] It's hard to talk about some of it. 78
Another reason it might be difficult to discuss certain aspects of death was
its violent and grotesque nature. Men who have lived through combat know all too
well the absurd damage that could be inflicted on human flesh. 79

One man

became aware of this during an artillery barrage. He recalled soberly how he
was sitting on the ground there and a guy was sitting on a tree
stump and he got a direct hit. That was demoralizing. 80
This situation also illustrates how Gls never knew when to expect death or
serious injury. One might be talking to an individual and seconds later he could
be hit, abruptly changing the mood for the worst. It was not unheard of for such
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incidents to be so traumatic that soldiers lost control of their emotions and possibly
cried, even vomited. 81 This is considering men even had the time to react while
they fought for their own survival.
Casualties were inflicted on American forces from a variety of different
weapons, but there were obvious trends in what weapons Gls most often faced.
By far the greatest killer, and what the soldiers hated worst was artillery. 82 After
artillery, rifle and machine gun fire was what Gls had to be concerned with most. 83
However, it was only when in close proximity to enemy soldiers were they likely
to encounter small arms fire. The possibility of confronting an enemy soldier in
person where a knife, bayonet, or fist might be employed was a truly frightening
prospect to most men. Accordingly, it was only on rare instances where Gls were
close enough to the enemy to even be involved in hand- to-hand fighting. Instead,
whenever in close quarters, men in both armies preferred to use their rifle or
possibly grenades, unless they were so close they had no choice. 84
More soldiers had more experiences with artillery bombardments because
unless they were many miles away from the front, they were never out of artillery
range. One weapon greatly despised was the "damned big old 88", the German
88 mm all-purpose artillery piece. 85 Recall the fact artillery most likely inflicted a
unit's first casualties. This was the case for one replacement who mentioned his
first experience with artillery which occurred in the Ardennes. His platoon had just
occupied a barn as the night's billet when he drew first watch on guard duty.
Standing guard outside the barn it suddenly
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took a direct hit in the hay loft. It didn't touch two of us down on the
ground. I don't know how many were killed. That one incident stuck
with me. 86
The effect of artillery never changed. It was as random and terrifying the first time
as it was every time after. One veteran, well acquainted with artillery, recalled one
incident where rounds from an 88 smashed into nearby trees resulting in even
more lethal treebursts.
Me and my buddy were right close together, right beside each other,
laying next to a hedgerow. After about the third shot or so why one
of them exploded and it hit him right in the back, a big chunk of
jagged steel about four or five inches long .... It knocked him out,
but I don't know whether it paralyzed him or not. When an 88 shoots
up into the trees, boy I'm telling you that's scary. Shrapnel goes
everywhere, they come right by you and you think, 'boy I'm lucky that
missed me.' 87
Two other veterans commented on treebursts, while one of them reflected on the
losses they caused. This man, like his fellow soldier, was brief and to the point
when he said: "it was demoralizing.''88 One horrifying aspect of artillery was what
it's explosive power and shrapnel could do to a human body.

It was not a

comforting sight to be in a foxhole and see the man in the next foxhole "blown to
bits" by a direct hit. 89
By no means did the GI only have to be concerned with German soldiers
and German artillery. Any number of weapons might suddenly create casualties
and strike fear in soldiers' hearts. For example, even with the famed air superiority
of the Allies, American forces were never immune to air attack. The majority of
men sampled had encounters with the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, these encounters
were indeed rare considering that of the men sampled most experienced only one
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attack mounted by only a single airplane. 90

However, as men found out, it

sometimes took only one plane to wreak havoc. One veteran spoke of how an
entire trainload of replacements had their baptism of fire by a German plane before
they even reached the replacement depot. They were caught unaware while
disembarked from the train queued up for food.
We were strafed while we were having a meal. . . . Some of the
fellas got killed. 91
Weapons, like aircraft, with a particularly loud and unusual sound, typically
aroused even greater fears, especially the first time men experienced them. 92 One
man recalled his experience with a large bomb dropped in his area of the Omaha
beachhead by "Bed Check Charlie."
I'm telling you it sounded like that bomb was never going to hit the
ground. It just whined and screeched. It made you just want to get
up and run. It felt like it was going to hit me in the back of the
head. 93
Another veteran mentioned an incident where a single German plane attacked a
bridge over the Ruhr River. The men near the bridge scattered for cover when
they heard the startling noise of the plane since they had no idea the plane was
not after them.
We thought he was strafing us. It sounds like they're coming at you. You
make a b-line and get out of the street. 94
Other men commented on particularly scary moments after being surprised by the
loud and previously unheard "sound" of the V-1 "Buzz Bomb", and the
Messerschmidt 262 Jet fighter. 95
The fact these men were not in any great danger from these two weapons
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illustrates how the element of fear could be unproportionate to the lethality of
weapon, primarily due to its sound. Take two forms of artillery other than the 88,
the "Screaming Meemee" and the mortar. The extreme whining sound of the
"Screaming Meemee" made at least one unit refer to it as the "morale breaker. "96
Although as men became more experienced with these weapons in comparison
with mortars, they realized they were not as accurate and were more bark than
bite.

Mortars were more dangerous because they were more common, more

accurate, and the fact they usually could not be heard before they hit and
exploded. If soldiers had even one second of a warning of an incoming shell they
at least had the opportunity to jump for cover. Mortars usually gave no warning,
"Screaming Meemees", at least, always did.

For these reasons mortars

themselves were "particularly dreaded."97
A veteran with extensive experience with a totally different weapon referred
to anti-personnel mines as the
most frightening weapon of the war, the one that made us almost
sick with fear. . . . They churned our guts. 98
This is true for those men who experienced mines, but judging from the those
sampled, exposure to injuries due to mines was not near as widespread as with
other weapons. 99

In reality Gls feared every weapon they faced, whatever

happened to be inflicting casualties at the time. Veterans did not comment on any
great fear of gas attacks, but one who experienced what he thought was a gas
attack knew it could incite fear just the same. What proved to be a false alarm
was nevertheless a real threat at the time.
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We thought we had a gas attack. Somebody hollered 'gas!'. Of
course, I was all fingers. I couldn't get the gas mask out and all that.
It scared me really .... I tried to hold my breath. My buddies were
the same way, they were scared too. 100
Infantrymen never knew what to expect because as one veteran correctly
stated, they had "infinite small threats." 101 Gls never knew when they could be
surprised by any weapon, like the real threat of a German tank, or a sniper. 102
Uncertainty could even be associated with what soldiers were well experienced
with: artillery. One man recalled how on patrol his squad suddenly took casualties
from an artillery barrage.
We lost the guy in front of me, and I was alright. The guy in back of
me was alright, but the fourth one back [was hit]. Now those two
guys were hit, and the two of us in between were not hit and there
was no way of telling whether it was a short round from us, or an
incoming round. We talked about it a lot and we didn't know. There
was no way of telling. 103
This introduces how Gls not only had to watch out for the enemy, but Allied
weapons as well. Friendly fire (short artillery rounds, small arms fire, and friendly
air attacks) was not at all uncommon. 104 One man said it was just the "law of
averages" to have men killed and injured by their fellow soldiers when they
possessed so much firepower. 105
If all this was not enough, soldiers even had to be watchful for objects
falling from the sky. One man mentioned what few would know if they themselves
did not experience it; how it was necessary to contend with falling "belly tanks"
dropped by Allied fighters. "You didn't know where those things were going to
land.

You thought they were going to land on you." 106

There were similar
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incidents throughout the war ranging from close encounters, all the way to death,
due to falling flak from anti-aircraft fire. There were even situations where men
had to scatter to avoid .50 caliber shell casings falling from dogfights above. 107
Death and injury was so random that in one man's words those who were
hit "just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time." 108 Men who
continuously saw others hit around them could not help realize luck was a
common attribute of the living. The reader should have sensed a pattern of luck
in this chapter, especially with artillery.

The men who lived through these

experiences definitely picked up on this fact. For example, what one man thought
when he saw a friend severely wounded by shrapnel directly next to him. "Boy,
am I lucky that missed me. "109

There were countless other near misses by

artillery. One veteran recalled an instance when shrapnel missed his head by only
inches. "I could have been dead as easily as that." 110 Another example originates
with a man who in his first few days in combat had as of then never seen a live
German or fired his weapon. In the process of digging a foxhole a mortar round
exploded and shrapnel clipped his shovel handle in half. Looking back on the
incident he said "I'm damn glad it was the handle on that shovel and not a hole in
my leg_ .. 111
Luck was a common fact of the collective experience, considering all men
sampled had times when they knew they could have been injured or killed. 112
Soldiers had near misses in all different situations which were not at all limited to
artillery. As one man said, "it's all luck or chance as far as that goes." 113 For
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example, one man was shot at by a sniper in his first day of combat, but was
fortunate to be able to say, "if he'd been a good shot I wouldn't have been here
today." 114 Fighting in the Normandy campaign this same individual had several
instances of luck during his combat career. This man, like all those who survived
the war, had one experience with luck after another. Another veteran, a man who
landed on Utah beach on D-Day and made it through the entire war unharmed,
reflected on his ordeal: "I'm wondering why I'm still here." 115 Another man felt the
same way. When asked if he had experiences with luck he replied,
I had a lot of them .... [When] I could hear those bullet's whistling,
I felt like I was pretty lucky then. I guess I was just one of the lucky
ones. There were a lot that weren't so lucky. 116
This same man spoke of "one time in particular" he experienced a close call
in his month and a half in combat. While his unit was capturing a German town
he needed to run across a street from the cover of a brick wall to the another wall
across the street.
I got to the end of that brick wall and I took off running as fast as I
could. I happened to stop right in front of a tank [an American
Sherman]. The tank fired into a house and the muzzle blast from
that gun knocked me down. I never knew a muzzle blast could be
so strong, but it knocked me flat. . . . I could hardly hear anything
for two or three days, but I got over it alright. 117
This illustrates again how men had to watch out for all the different dangers that
could inflict harm.

It also illustrates how cases of blast concussion often

accounted for close calls.

This was very much the case for another lucky

individual. "I was in combat for about seven months and was only knocked out
twice, but I never suffered any flesh wounds." 118 The first time this man was
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knocked unconscious was due to an artillery round that demolished a house he
occupied. The second time was after a German threw a concussion grenade
inside the room of a house he was in. Recalling that incident he said, "I was
stunned all right. It killed one guy there, but I was fortunate. " 119 Another man
remarked on the time he was shaken up when an aerial bomb landed close to his
foxhole. When the bomb hit
it was just like somebody just picked me up and threw me down.
just jarred on the ground. . . . The ground just shook like an
earthquake. 120
The explosion covered his foxhole with dirt and debris and deafened him for a
period of days. He later recovered most of his hearing, but a punctured eardrum
has plagued his hearing since. 121 Anytime an artillery shell exploded close by,
even when the shrapnel missed them, soldiers physically felt the shock waves of
the blast. One veteran, like countless others, had several incidents where shells
exploded close enough for him to feel the effect of the concussion.

In one

instance a shell exploded on the roof of a factory and the heat and pressure of the
blast knocked him and his buddy down and nearly out. After the two made it back
on their feet and brushed themselves off it still took a few minutes for them to
collect their senses. 122
In many cases luck and brushes with death forced soldiers into coming to
grips with the unforgiving reality. They could no longer continue to believe with
any confidence they would survive and no harm could come to them. Seeing in
at least one situation how they could have been killed, everything clicked in their
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minds. It was a frightening realization when men finally became cognizant of the
fact it was wholly possible for them to be killed at any moment.

This was a

traumatic experiences for some, like one veteran's experience. In the process of
occupying a small town his unit ran into the resistance of a machine gun. Trying
to locate the gun, the man knew he had to cross a street which might possible
expose him to the machine gun's line of fire.

Contemplating the dangers of

crossing, he hesitated next to a rose bush on the side of the street. He finally
gained the nerve to cross the street when
all of a sudden that machine gun cut lose and that rose bush just
looked like somebody cut it with a knife. I was just off to the side of
it. . . . After that happened I stood there against that building and
pissed my pants. I was shaking like a leaf ready to fall off a tree.
If I would have been a foot to my right I would have got my legs cut
out from under me. 123
This is the collective realization the majority went through in combat: they
were not special and could be killed just as easily as anyone else. One veteranhistorian ascribed three stages in this process he described as a "slowly dawning
and dreadful realization." Upon entering combat the first stage being the belief for
most that they would survive, and "can't" be killed.

In combat men normally

reached the second stage where they felt it was possible that it "can" happen, they
could be killed.

The third stage concluded with the conviction that one "will"

eventually be killed or injured, it's just a matter of when. 124
One veteran who felt very self-assured before combat about his prospects
for survival is an example of this collective realization. "I had no question that I'd
live through it, until I got into combat, and then there were several times I of
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course questioned whether I would or not." 125 Findings from this sample and the
literature concur that most soldiers thought sometime in their combat career that
"it was just a matter of time" before they were either wounded or killed. 126
Most men went through the different stages of this realization as they slowly
became familiar with the ubiquity of death. The process started as they came
across those who had fallen in battle. Then, the more they experienced combat,
and the resulting loss of life, they started to think more and more about their own
chances of death. Due to the misfortune of others, and close calls of their own,
men became aware of how indiscriminate death was on the battlefield.

Men

realized they could be hit anytime, it was just a matter of good luck or bad luck.
One man who agreed with this realization process recalled,
after a little while you know you'd escaped so far chiefly by luck.
. . You finally got the feeling that your luck was going to run out
someday. 127
Another veteran's experience again illustrates this realization process.
Fighting to expand the Omaha beachhead he knew his first day in combat he
could be killed. As he went on this turned into a feeling that he would be hit.
You could see a tracer bullet and you know there is five to seven
more bullets. You can just realize how many more are shot at you.
Whenever you see so many of your buddies killed right there beside
you, you know your times a comin'[sic]. You think it is coming. I
knew it would happen to me. 128
How this man believed he could and then would be hit in his first few days
of combat illustrates how the realization process was not only "slowly dawning",
some men were thrown into such intense combat they made this realization
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instantly. 129 However, there were always variations to the norm. Some men, albeit
a very low percentage, never made this realization. In their eternal optimism they
could not, or would not believe that they could be killed. 130
Most unnerving to soldier's peace of mind was the uncertainty of life and
death. One veteran made a common statement, "you didn't know from one minute
to the next technically . . . if you'd be there the next day. "131 So not to affect their
ability to soldier on men could not allow this realization to unduly affect them, it
was just something they had to endure.
Yes there are times when you think that it is possible you might get
hit . . . [but] you didn't dwell on that sort of thing. 132
Like so many other of his comrades this man distracted himself from thinking
about the worst possible scenario by being optimistic. This individual recalled how
he tried to make himself believe he would survive, convincing himself "no it can't
happen to me. " 133 Another individual knew he could be killed, but he also felt "you
couldn't dwell on it." He said one might be aware they could be killed, but one had
to go on doing their job everyday "hoping that your turn wouldn't show up." 134
Many times men could no longer make themselves believe they would not
be harmed, therefore self-delusion was not enough. Because these men believed
they would be hit, they channeled their thoughts in a different direction. They
looked on the bright side, and hoped for what they called the "million dollar
wound." 135 A wound that was not bad enough to debilitate them for life, but severe
enough to get them out of combat and possibly send them home.
It speaks for how bad the situation was and how desperate men were when
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they would hope for a wound just so they could get out alive. One veteran spoke
of a man he knew who was actually relieved when wounded. "I was right beside
a guy one day when he got hit in the leg with shrapnel." The first thing the
wounded man said was, "boys I've got a million dollar wound. "136 The same man
who witnessed this often thought about getting the same kind of wound.
Yes, I thought about that a lot. Yes, there were times I was almost
wishing for that [the million dollar wound]. It was a topic of
discussion. 137
After a "sober appraisal of the facts" the majority of men sampled contemplated
receiving the "million dollar wound" so they could at least make it out of combat
alive.

The phrase was so commonplace that it was obviously a collective

sentiment. 136 It should not be surprising, however, that some men never hoped for
the "million dollar wound." Like one veteran who said, "I didn't want to get hit.
That never entered my mind." 139
A salient aspect of the collective mentality was that men went into combat
cautious. After realizing how easily they could be harmed they made an effort to
be even more protective. However, in the reality of combat there was a huge
conflict with this intention. Being predominantly on the offensive, Gls had to take
risks everyday to win territory from the enemy. Like one veteran stated, "we had
to get out and show ourselves. "140 When taking risks they did not really want to
take, men learned to go out of their way to "stay out of trouble." 141
A perfect example of this is the way of thinking and actions of the following
individual. "You do what you have to do, but there is an old saying in the military:
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don't volunteer for anything." 142 Accordingly, this veteran was formerly a battalion
runner but he made the confession he did not always run. "I wouldn't say that I
ran, walked is a better word. You're supposed to run, but walk is a better word. "143
This revelation is very similar to another veteran who told the whole story about
what occurred on patrols in the winter stalemate in Italy in 1944-45.
Now it can be told I suppose. We'd go out as far as you want to go
and sit down and lay around a little while and come back and say we
didn't see anything. That happened a lot I'm sure, and we did our
share of it. 144
Considering this man was a sergeant who often led the patrols, how was
it possible for soldiers to go against orders and let their safety be the foremost
concern? The answer is in most Gls' opinion, if the situation allowed it, it was
totally acceptable to hold back in the name of survival. These men felt it was an
unnecessary risk to possibly stumble into danger.

They knew the German

positions, and thought for certain the weather conditions and mountainous terrain
prevented any German counteroffensive. However, the man added if they really
thought it was important for them to gain information on the enemy, they would
truly have patrolled.
The following situation illustrates how Gls always thought about avoiding
unnecessary danger. One veteran's unit had to cross a creek bed and since it
was most convenient to walk across the railroad bridge some of the Gls started
across the it. But this soldier always being smart and watchful of the situation,
noticed he would be more exposed and prone to enemy fire on the bridge. He
therefore decided to walk a little out of his way and get his pant legs wet just to
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be safe.
My buddies they just walked across that railroad track, but not me.
I went down and walked through the water. They were on their way
across when the shells started flying, but I wouldn't get up that high
because you're a target up there. 145
To see how the mentality of survival and the aversion to taking unnecessary risks
saved one man's life, see Appendix C.
In some situations men were forced to take extra risks to ensure their
survival. A good example is an occasion when one soldier saw another man "pick
up a grenade and throw it back at 'em. When one landed up beside you, you've
got to do something," he reasoned. 146 Correct something had to be done: in reality
one of two things. One could either cower away and pay the price, or one could
react and get the grenade away from one's body.

Therefore, it was not

necessarily all bravery that motivated the soldier to throw the grenade back, but
fear and the instinct of survival was the primary motivation.
Another reason Gls took extra risks was to rescue and assist wounded
soldiers, especially close friends. In all situations there were "superhuman efforts
to evacuate wounded fellows." 147 The following situation illustrates this, in addition
to the fact it was not only a soldier's obligation to help out friends, but orders to
assist a high ranking officers motivated them just the same. One veteran recalled
one incident in particular he had to put himself at higher risk.
Our battalion commander . . . went up on the front for some reason
or another and got wounded. And it was me, and I think three other
guys that went up there with a litter and brought him back to the
medics who were busy. It was a pretty hot day that day fire wise. 148
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Nevertheless, orders were the most common reason men took risks. In one
situation a soldier's unit was taking deadly accurate artillery fire from a concealed
88 in the hedgerows north of St. Lo. France. This individual happened to be one
of a select group ordered to locate and silence the German gun. For his part in
this dangerous mission into enemy territory in broad daylight, he was awarded the
Bronze Star for "bravery above and beyond the call of duty." However this man
did not equate this experience with bravery. Like all Gls, after orders got him into
the perilous situation, survival was his motivation.
You're not brave over there, you're fighting for your own life. As far
as bravery goes, I was the biggest coward there. I was just fighting
for my life. . . . It was not heroism or anything, it was just because
I was there and that's it. 149
Unfortunately, risks are always associated with wounds and death. This
man became aware of this during the attempt to locate the German 88. For he
was not only awarded the Bronze Star after this incident, but also the Purple
Heart. Running alongside a hedgerow getting closer to the 88 he noticed the men
in the patrol
were getting pretty close together. I knew the Germans liked to
open up on a bunch of us with machine guns. So I stopped and fell
over against a hedgerow. I laid there and watched my buddy get
away from me about twenty yards or so. Then I just stepped out
and . about the time I stepped out, wham! Boy he shot me. [A
German sniper shot him in the right arm]. . . . Of course it knocked
me for a loop. . . . It threw my arm clear around and it was laying
over my shoulder here [right arm twisted behind his head laying on
his left shoulder]. I pushed it [his arm] around and worked it around
and got it around in front of me. Of course I laid there like I was
dead. . . . My Sergeant, he came running by with the other boys
heading back toward the lines. Sarge said, 'we'll be back after you
Breeze.' So I laid there I don't know how long . . . . I knew my arm
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was broken, but I didn't know what all had happened. 150
The rest of the patrol took cover from the enemy fire, but they never forgot
their buddy. Behind the protection of a hedgerow they called for their wounded
buddy to make his way back to them as they provided cover fire.
I kicked off my helmet and left my gun there and hand grenades ..
. . I crawled back to the hedgerow, and all that time I was crawling
they were shooting over top of me. . . . Finally I got back to the
hedgerow, and the hedgerow was four or five feet thick, and I
couldn't get up over it. It had shrubbery and trees of top of it . . .
[so the] engineers came in and they dug a hole through there and
pulled me through it and got me on the other side. 151
He then thought he was relatively out of danger, but he soon found out
differently. He experienced even more harrowing time under fire getting to the rear
as medics had to scoot his litter across an exposed crossroad as the medics
themselves crawled. When the three finally reached an ambulance, out of small
arms range, he was informed by the ambulance drivers he was still in for a rough
ride. They told him every time they went down the nearby road they were fired on
by German artillery. Since they had no choice they started down the road and as
usual the Germans
opened up with an 88 or something. Boy I could feel the jar on the
road. Then he [the driver] slowed down real slow, and pretty soon
another shot. Boy it hit right behind us. Then the next time he really
took off and when they took the third shot, the third shot is supposed
to get you too, but it hit behind us. 152
All this man went through he was extremely lucky just to make it to the field
hospital located on Omaha Beach. One would expect to be safe once resting in
a hospital cot, but that was impossible in a war zone. That night air raid sirens
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sounded, soon followed by the sound of Allied anti-aircraft fire from shore batteries
and ships at sea. Laying in his cot he began to "see big slits in the tent . . . as
shrapnel hit." 153 Many of the lesser wounded men crawled under their cots hoping
to avoid the falling lead, but as terrified as he was, the wound and the morphine
prevented him from moving. Fortunately no men were wounded again, but it could
have easily happened. This man was not completely out of danger until he was
flown to England and then the U.S. to start a new chapter in his life:
rehabilitation. 154
Rehabilitation was a part of the collective experience for all Gls who
became casualties, or were injured in some form or another. In this sample alone
almost half, five of twelve men, sustained an injury severe enough to force them
out of combat and require hospitalization (see Appendix D). Men were wounded
in all different situations, but they all tell a similar story. One thing they all had in
common was the fact they were overjoyed to get out of combat alive.
Fighting in the Huertgen Forest in November of 1944 one individual suffered
a shrapnel wound during an artillery barrage. Others around him were killed, but
fortunately he only took shrapnel in the elbow and the side of his back. He felt
"lucky" when hit considering his gas mask deflected the biggest piece of shrapnel
that would otherwise have tore into his hip.

Most men had discarded the

burdensome gas mask, but since he never knew what to expect he had kept his.
All veterans know luck works in mysterious ways.
also illustrates this luck.

155

The man shot in the arm

After a series of operations he found out how truly

71
"fortunate" he was. "They told me .

. if this had been back in World War I they

would have just cut my arm off. "156
The man who received the shrapnel wounds left his old friends, the ones
still alive, but he said, "to be honest I was kind of glad to be out of there. "157 The
man shot in the arm thought exactly the same way. At the hospital in England he
said to his doctor, half seriously and half jokingly, "don't get me well, because I
ain't going back over there again." This was more like a joke because a "well
disciplined soldier" like himself would have fought again if his wound allowed it,
and he had orders to do so. 158 If able he would have returned to his unit like all
other casualties who recovered and did so.

159

One distinction in the collective experience must be posited between men
in rifle companies, as compared to men in rear-echelon units (such as anti-tank
companies, headquarters companies, and medical companies). A soldier in a rifle
company had a much greater chance of becoming a statistic on a casualty sheet
than a soldier in a rear echelon unit. Rear echelon units in infantry divisions were
never immune to casualties, but see Appendix E for proof of how life in a rifle
company was far more dangerous with a much higher rate of attrition.
Coming from a peaceful civilian background it is plausible to ask how
soldiers justified taking the life of other human beings; even given the sanction of
war. One thing is for certain, Gls were not motivated by hatred on a large scale. 160
The man wounded in the arm in the Normandy hedgrerows was asked throughout
his life if he would talk to the German who shot him. He said he never felt hatred
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towards the sniper, and always replied he would talk to him. He reasoned the
German soldier was
out there fighting for his life just like I was. They have their orders,
and we have ours. If I'd meet him on the street to this day I wouldn't
be mad at him. Because he was trying to save his life, and we were
trying to save ours. 161
This attitude reflects that common to the collective experience. Men often
did not hate the German soldier who was in the same predicament as them, but
they did hate Hitler and the Nazi regime that started the war. One man said he
hated Hitler and everything Nazism represented, but felt no hatred "against the
solder, not against the guy across the line from you. He's your enemy, but there
is no hatred there." 162 This sentiment was echoed by another individual.
You didn't hold it against the German army, the Werhmacht . . .
they were just like we were you know. Of course the SS, and Hitler
and the top guys were the ones you didn't like. 163
The prior statement also alludes to the reason why there was no great
hatred, in his words "they were just like we were you know." In most veteran's
opinion the average German soldier did not want to fight, but had to follow orders
or they would be shot. This attitude can be seen in several statements.
I really didn't feel a hatred toward them because I knew they were
in for the same reason we were. . . . They were in the same fix
we were. 164
"They were just doing their job, and we were doing ours." 165 Yet another veteran
thought
they were the same as we were. They didn't want to fight. . . . But
I didn't shake hands with any of them as far as that's concerned. 166
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However, there were always those men that hated the German soldier with a
passion, but they were the minority. The only man sampled who commented on
feeling a hatred towards the German soldier said,
you have to hate them to justify firing at them. The German soldier
comes to in essence personify Adolf Hitler and in essence the whole
Nazi regime. At any rate he's firing at you. 167
Like the previous individual illustrated, men might have hatred, but this
hatred was still due to the fact an enemy soldier was out to kill American soldiers.
Hatred or no hatred, obviously in a situation where someone is trying to kill you
and your fellow soldiers, and has in the past succeeded, their would be no love
lost. One man said they did not hate them, but it was also true "we didn't like
them at all." 168 When it meant life or death, killing was just a dirty job soldiers
knew had to be done to survive. This is like one individual who held no great
hatred but thought "still he was our enemy, and we were trying to get rid of him." 169
In combat men justified killing the enemy along the lines of the popular
phrase "kill or get killed." Like so many others, three veterans look back on their
experience in light of self-defense. "Back then it was either them or you." 170 "It
was something that had to be done. If you didn't they were going to get you." 171
The first man that I shot and knew that I killed. The first thing that
came to mind was that I felt sorry for his family. I didn't feel guilty,
but I felt sorry that I had to do it. . . . I wasn't mad at him. The
reason I shot him was because he was shooting at me: self-defense.
But I got over it pretty quick. I didn't have time to dwell on it. 172
In combat soldiers could notlet themselves be concerned by thoughts of the
enemy.

Any hesitation over pulling the trigger could prove to be one's last
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mistake. However, distanced from the life or death combat environment, veterans
are sometimes bothered by these thoughts.
Because it is so distressing, many veterans are reluctant to discuss this
aspect of their experience. 173 The following comment illustrates this.
That's something you don't like to talk about. You know every time
I shot I always said somebody else's shell got there first. That's
something you ask God to forgive you for. He's forgiven me. 174
When men revealed more information about their experiences, they definitely did
no bragging.
I pulled down on three German boys over there and one of them I
don't know whether it was the next guy, or whether I got him. I
never thought too much good about it. . . . I'm glad that I didn't
have to fire on any more than that, I'm glad it was that few of men.
Even though they were Germans, they were human like we were. 175
This introduces how it was common for soldiers not to know who shot a
particular enemy soldier because several Gls shot at him at the same time. Many
times men never knew if it was their bullet that hit its mark or another soldiers.
This was how it was possible for men to allay upsetting thoughts about their
actions like the man who said "you know every time I shot I always said somebody
else's shell got there first. " 176 The following statements illustrate how it was often
impossible to tell exactly who shot an enemy soldier.
We'd see a guy crawl out of his hole at dusk on the other side a
couple of hundred yards away, out to take a crap or something, and
there would be a dozen guys that would see him at the same time
and they'd all shoot at him and the guy drops. Now who is going to
cut a notch in the stock of their rifle. 177
Another man knew he shot many rounds, but never really knew for certain if he
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ever hit anyone. This is something most would like not to know.
I never could tell. I mean a lot of times you couldn't tell who did the
shooting. I mean we'd shoot where they were and we'd see a few
of them killed, but we didn't know who got 'em. 178
This was the same for another veteran who also could never tell for sure. "I don't
[pause] yeah I think I might have shot one. It was pretty close." 179
One reason for this was Gls could often never see the enemy, they only
knew where he should be. Three recollections illustrate this.
We'd just start shooting back in the direction it came from[the enemy
fire]. A lot of times we could never see any of the enemy.
Sometimes we did and a lot of times we didn't. We started firing
back where we thought they were. 180
Another man said how they were,
not necessarily shooting at a target all the time, we were spraying it
out there too. Somebody shoots at you and you don't know exactly
where that machine gut nest was, but you know the vicinity and you
shoot that way. . . . You can't see them all the time, sometimes
you can. A lot of the times you can't 181
Yet another veteran recalled,
we fired a number of times over in the general direction they were
at. The squad leader one time said, 'men they're in there, just fire
at will. '182
What is not well known in the popular history of the war is instances of Gls
attempting to fire their weapon, but having it malfunction. Nevertheless, men had
to overcome this reality if it happened to them, and they never knew when it might.
One individual's experience with dud bazooka rounds entirely changed his combat
career.

The following incident occurred in the Ardennes and was this

replacements first time firing his weapon, in his first engagement with the enemy.
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The only thing that I can remember was standing next to the
lieutenant and he was giving the orders when to fire and what to fire
at. He had me firing into this machine gun nest from behind some
trees. The lieutenant was standing beside me, giving the orders, I
fired three duds. Of course they could see the flash of the missile.
They opened up on us with machine gun fire and the lieutenant was
killed right there beside me. It didn't touch me. After they opened
fire on us, some of our men ran around the side and got them with
hand grenades. It was awful quiet after the explosion of the hand
grenades. 183
Having one's officer and leader killed in one's first action due to problems
with a weapon was definitely a disillusioning and demoralizing experience. This
man always wondered why the three rounds failed to detonate upon hitting the
targeted pillbox. They either could have been manufactured with defects, or there
is a possibility the another replacement, the loader of the bazooka on the spot, did
not arm the projectiles correctly.
I don't know if they were wired up right or wrong, or what happened.
I've often wondered whether the loader was connecting the wires just
right.184
It is very probable the loader could have played some part in the missiles
malfunction, considering three successive rounds should not have been
defective. 185
However, the next situation illustrates how it is impossible to pass judgment
in the previous situation. Another veteran recalled an episode when he fired three
dud rounds from his rocket propelled anti-tank grenade that he knew for a fact
were defective, and not the cause of failing to properly arm the projectiles.

This

occurred when he attempted to blast some Germans out of a house from which
they were firing.
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I pulled the pin out [of the grenade to arm the
warhead) and I shot up there and tried to hit where
there was a big door. . . . The anti-tank grenade just
hit and dropped down. I did that about three times and
boy my sergeant got so mad at me. He said 'pull them
pins, pull them pins.' You've got a pin you've got to
pull before they detonate. So I scratched around there
and I found those pins and I handed them to him, of
course after it was over with. 186
Nobody was killed or injured because of these duds, but the Germans did get
away to fight another day. This situation, like the other man's experience with dud
bazooka rounds, illustrates how duds could change the course of battle. The man
who experienced the dud bazooka round reflected "if we would have got that
pillbox with that bazooka, no telling what would have happened after that. "187
Experiences with duds alludes to an even greater problem that Gls in antitank companies had to surmount; a relatively ineffective weapon, their towed 57
mm anti-tank gun. Similar to the soldier who fired three duds from his bazooka,
one man became familiar with the 57's shortcomings when his first experience in
firing the weapon proved to be a disheartening failure.

He was a sergeant in

charge of a gun crew called up to the front to counter the breakthrough of German
tanks. The crew had no real idea of what to expect, and before they knew it, one
of the tanks surprised them. The gun crew managed to fire one head-on shot at
the tank, but the armor piercing shell harmlessly glanced off the tank's frontal
armor. Recalling with much dismay the inferior firepower of the 57 he said with
exasperation:
Oh that 57 mm gun! On a head on encounter with a Panther, or a
Tiger tank there was no chance. Our shells just bounced off. 188
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As a result of the direct hit, that did nothing, the German tank fired back
destroying the 57. Not being a good memory he did not discuss the event in any
great detail. In a reserved manner he said, "we lost that encounter." When asked
if it was frustrating to have such an experience he replied, "yes, it was deadly
frustrating. " 189
Another veteran's experience with the 57 mm perfectly illustrates how what
men experienced determined their attitudes, possibly creating polar opposites in
the process.

He was a member of a gun crew who in four months of combat

never fired their weapon at German tanks, they had no need.

Gls who were

members of anti-tank companies would not find this surprising since tank
encounters were infrequent, but gravely serious when they did occur (see
Appendix E).

His crew fired their weapon on only one occasion, for target

practice. This was only after an officer came to the bright conclusion it might be
good to have some of the replacements fire the weapon at least once before they
ever might need to in combat. After demolishing some upper stories of houses in
the city of Frankfurt, this individual was impressed with the guns firepower and
accuracy. He enthusiastically described the 57 mm as a "deadly weapon ..
Boy it was wicked." 190
This was quite different than the veteran with experience firing on German
tanks who knew what the gun was really like. True it was "deadly", but more along
the lines of "deadly frustrating." There is ample proof that if the soldier without
experience would have actually encountered an enemy tank he probably would
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have thought differently. The 57 truly lacked the firepower to stop most German
tanks by penetrating there frontal armor. 191
When it meant their survival Gls always adapted to overcome the problems
before them and the 57 mm is a good example. The veteran who experienced the
disastrous first engagement with a German tank, learned his lesson the hard way.
On that occasion they fired the gun head on but he said,
that happened to us only once. We never tried a face to face
encounter again. . . . What we learned is the only way you could
get those tanks was from the side, or from the back where the armor
is thin. 192
This was similar to another veteran of an anti-tank unit who also had occasions to
fire the 57 at enemy tanks and learned with experience to use the gun's one
strong point, its accuracy, to best advantage. Therefore, his crew always aimed
"at the tracks" with the intention of immobilizing the enemy tank. 193 German tanks
could be defeated by the 57 mm if crews could get a good angle to shoot, which
usually called for superior numbers of American guns.

Another way anti-tank

companies compensated for their weapon was liberally placing ant-tank mines
roads they expected the German tanks to traverse. 194
The history of the 57 mm is another example of how the series, the "U.S.
Army in World War II", failed to properly represent the true circumstances of the
war. The book in the series specifically devoted to weapons, Ordnance: On the
Beachhead and Battlefront, mysteriously made no mention of the 57 mm, as if it
never existed. This is most likely an oversight and not intentional, but those who
used the weapon will never forget it. 195
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The lack of adequate firepower was not the only downfall of the 57 mm.
Being a heavy towed weapon it also suffered from lack of mobility.

One GI

discovered how burdensome it was to move as his crew entrenched their weapon
covering a Belgian crossroads in the Ardennes. He recalled after they unhitched
the gun from the truck how difficult it was to put it in proper location in the deep
snow.
We got a hold of that damned heavy thing .... It was the hardest,
gruntenest, thing we ever had to do in our life to pull that damned
gun, quiet, in the dark, through that damned snow, while freezing to
death. 196
After they dug in their gun, and dug their own personal foxholes, the men
settled in for the night; with fifty percent of the them on guard duty. They were
awakened at daybreak when they heard the rumble of a German tank or armored
vehicle "back down in the forest. . . . It wasn't any time at all until we heard small
arms fire." The twelve men of the gun crew came to the conclusion that a German
patrol located their position that night since machine gun and rifle fire immediately
started to fly through their area, ripping off branches and chipping the bark off the
trees.
In the early morning fog the Germans could not be seen, but the Gls could
tell by the intensity of fire they were outnumbered and the Germans were "getting
closer and closer." Their squad leader was an experienced soldier who knew that
being isolated from the other gun crews of the company by a mix up of
communications, and being outgunned, it was better to retire to the rear to prevent
being killed or captured. Obviously, the immobility of the gun ruled out taking it
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with them, so they pulled the firing pin and started towards the rear. In this man's
words they "started a little bit of a fast run to get back farther. We didn't waste
any time." In their withdrawal they passed a company of riflemen dug in the forest
and continued west almost two miles, finally locating their unit defending
Livarchamps, Belgium. 197
This engagement was a small part of the action mentioned by General
George S. Patton, in his autobiography, War As I knew It, between the 35th
Division and remnants of the 1st German SS Division the first week of January
1945. However, Patton knew a war much different than what the common soldier
knew.

The attack this veteran's unit experienced was part of what Patton

described as "probably the biggest co-ordinated counterattack that troops under
my command have ever experienced. We were successful at all points. "198 One
would wonder what Patton would have said if he knew of the "fast run" towards the
rear as they abandoned their weapon after never firing it.

With this under

consideration, Patton's troops were "successful at all points" (all points that really
mattered), because there were enough men in arms that, if needed, Gls could fall
back to a stronger line of resistance. Another fact that illustrates how American
soldiers could almost always depend on superior numbers of men and materiel
was that this unit received a new 57 mm with "amazing" speed. "They brought us
up a new gun just within a day or so. " 199
How it was greater numbers that saved the day in this situation brings to
light the contention that veterans from this sample tend to agree with; that on a
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one on one basis the German soldier was not only as good, but often better than
the Gl. 200 The majority of men sampled recalled how their wily and competent foe
demanded respect in combat. In the typical fashion of veteran understatement
one comment illustrates the prevalent attitude. "We respected them. They were
good. 11201 Another man held the strong opinion that the German soldier was in fact
better than the GI and stated quite assuredly, "I want to point something out. We
were not the best army in Europe." This critic of American qualitative superiority
stressed the real reason the Allies were victorious, quantitative superiority. He
stipulated the Allies won due their "preponderance of war material", and also one
must not forget Hitler's often irrational leadership. 202
One of the reasons some men thought the typical German soldier was
better than the typical GI is that the Werhmacht often had better weapons than the
American Army. German weapons like the 88 mm stand out as superior, while in
cases like the 57 mm and the more will known Sherman tank, American equipment
had serous deficiencies. The second reason was the German soldier was often
better at operating his chosen weapon, such as mortars and artillery; due to either
good training, combat experience or both. Two men made specific statements
which support this, which is also reinforced in several sources.
The German soldier was very well trained. He had good weapons
and he knew how to use them, better than we knew ours. 203
The Germans on the whole had better equipment than we had ....
The 88 was awfully accurate. They were pretty accurate with their
mortars too, a lot more accurate that we were with ours. 204
However, there were always those men who belong to the minority who believe
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German soldiers were "second rate" in comparison. 205 It should be known these
attitudes are often associated with the latter stages of the war when Germany was
fielding lesser trained young and old men that could not match the top of the line
soldiers already lost. The fact remains sheer numbers of soldiers in all Allied
armies, wore down and destroyed the German war machine.
We had too much of a superior striking force and manpower.
Germany had fifty percent of her forces over fighting on the other
front. . . . However, we would have had an awfully hard time
whipping those jokers if they hadn't been fighting over there on that
other front. It they would have put everything going this way [west]
why then I don't know. I don't have any idea about what would have
happened. 206
Not only did Germany have to fight in the east, but they also had to tie down
precious men and material in Italy. One veteran's unique experience illustrates
how German manpower was stretched far too thin after their irreplaceable losses
in six years of war.

Commenting on the young, old, and poorly trained men

encountered in the last months of the war this mans said,
in fact, around the end of the war we ran into women who had been
manning some anti-aircraft guns they were using against the
infantry. 201
The Werhmacht was at its best against American forces in the early stages
of the Battle of the Bulge. The misperception of Germany's capabilities before the
Bulge bred complacency and overconfidence in American troops convinced of a
quick impending victory. However, Gls were in for a rude reawakening when they
were forced to re-evaluate German's war making potential.

One statement

illustrates the surprise that abruptly brought about this change on December 16,
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1944. The man recalled how, separated from the Germans by a river in his sector
of the Ardennes line, both sides were more inclined to coexist rather than provoke
fire from the other.
We wouldn't fire at them and they wouldn't fire at us. We'd wave to
each other. So when they attacked at six o'clock in the morning we
didn't know what happened. We weren't prepared for it. 208
The resilience and recuperative striking power of Werhmacht in the Ardennes
offensive was a shock to all. Gls never again underestimated the German army
and from then on even had the proclivity to overestimate German defensive
capabilities. Proof of this is found in two letters a GI wrote to his parents over a
two month span.

His attitude in a letter dated December 15, 1944 was quite

optimistic, but he was obviously unaware of the true situation. "Surely this war
situation will clear up this year. They claim politics is all that's holding it up now.
I don't know. "209 In another letter of February 16, 1945 his experiences had altered
his judgement. After living through the fighting in the Bulge, this man also fell
sway to the myth of the German mountain fortress.
Germany's last page is being written Dad, just a question of time
now. However, we never know, they might hold out in the mountains
until fall [of 1945]. Mountain and forest fighting is tough, I know.
Belgium was H---. 210
This change in attitude came in a large part to the ferocity of the fighting in
the Ardennes. The battle that is characteristic of the most brutal fighting of the war
for Americans in Europe, is often symbolized by the infamous Malmedy Massacre.
However, it cannot be denied this German atrocity sparked an even greater
atrocity committed by an even larger number of American troops. News of the
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incident at Malmedy spread rapidly throughout the different American divisions
along the entire American line with the aid of rumors, and the U.S. army
newspaper, "Stars and Stripes", which gave the story top priority.

The story

became common knowledge for those who were alarmed and craving information
about the German advance. One time there was a great hatred for the Germans
was after the Malmedy Massacre. This news incited a rage and determination to
gain revenge in the process of pushing back the German gains. 211
Vengeful attitudes resulted in situations where individual unit commanders
gave specific orders stipulating their troops not to accept German prisoners. One
veteran, who openly commented on such orders, was convinced his unit
committed atrocities in the Ardennes.

He recalled this was carried out in

"retaliation" for German actions at Malmedy.
Orders were passed down. I didn't participate, but I saw some of it.
. . . Personally I didn't like the way some of the German prisoners
were being treated. . . . I didn't help take any prisoners, but I did
see them take prisoners and take them back behind the line. They
shot some of them. I saw them taking them back, but I never did
see them execute any. . . . They finally put a stop to it. . . . We
weren't thinking too well. 212
Since the soldier did not actually see any executions take place, there is always
the possibility the German prisoners were not executed, but this individual close
to the scene wholeheartedly believed war crimes occurred.
While this soldier was helping to reduce the northern salient of the Bulge,
another soldier fighting miles away in the southern salient received similar orders.
Word came down to us to hate the Germans more and not to take
any prisoners. The word came down to all of us over there. We
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were madder than hell about that [Malmedy). . . . Word came
down not to take any prisoners. Along the whole line all the different
divisions and outfits knew what happened. Chances are the word
came down to them as it did to us. You don't have any love for the
German soldier when they did that. 213
Despite orders, this veteran's unit did not shoot any prisoners; they never had the
opportunity to take prisoners. His anti-tank company was never in close combat
where Germans wished to surrender. However, like the previous individual, he
believed his battalion's rifle companies were not taking prisoners. This man also
thought it was morally wrong to execute enemy soldiers that properly attempted
to surrender.
If he comes out with his hands up, you have no business shooting
him. He's given himself up, and you're supposed to abide by the
Geneva Convention laws and he's a prisoner. 214
Nevertheless, there were all types of soldiers out there, and there were always
some who did not care about the rules of war and were focused on hatred and
revenge. As this man commented, treatment of prisoners often rested with who
controlled the situation. If those that desired revenge had the power of authority
it would likely be carried out. If they did not wish revenge, it was likely prisoners
would be treated appropriately.
It just depends on what the situation is, and who is in charge of it.
Now it might be such a thing as they could have been shot, and it
might be they could have been taken prisoner. You just don't know
in a case like that. Every case is a little bit different. 215
Judging from personal recollections in the literature and findings from the veteran's
sampled, there were many more orders not to accept prisoners, in addition to
unofficial executions, than as portrayed in the "U.S. Army in World War II" series

87
covering the Battle of the Bulge. The author of The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
declared:
there were American commanders who orally expressed the opinion
that all SS troops should be killed on sight and there is some
indication that in isolated case express orders for this were given. 216
Not only were SS soldiers much less likely to be taken prisoner, but the chances
of being taken captive dwindled for all German soldiers.

All evidence in oral

histories and personal recollections confirm that reciprocal American atrocities
were more widespread than one would be led to believe in the official statement. 217
The Malmedy Massacre was one reason so many Gls were determined on
not accepting prisoners, however it was always likely contributing factors were
involved. This was the case for one battalion that not only went into combat irate
about German atrocities at Malmedy, but an isolated incident of German brutality
added to this unit's anger. In a sharp German counterattack, two rifle companies
of this battalion were overwhelmed and destroyed by stronger forces.

No

prisoners were taken, all were killed when the Germans used flamethrowers on
those remaining in cellars of a group of houses. When the Germans were pushed
back out of the town, the battalion discovered the aftermath. In response to this
act, the battalion's divisional history stated this "was a blow the division vowed to
avenge." The first two weeks of January, 1945, a battle of attrition raged in the
Belgian forest as these Gls battered the Germans back onto the defensive. In the
ruthless fighting that ensued both sides at times took no prisoners. The divisional
history stated "neither side gave quarter. "218
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In the Battle of the Bulge there were numerous occasions where the
German actions at Malmedy, along with other isolated German atrocities
committed on innocent civilians, and American soldiers, provoked Gls into not
accepting prisoners in reprisal. An even greater chance of retaliation existed when
soldiers had positive proof the enemy soldiers opposite were guilty of committing
the atrocities. 219 The Ardennes reached such a brutal stage of fighting that some
soldiers became consumed in a vicious cycle of retribution. Common sense says
when soldiers became aware of the possibility, no matter how accurate, they might
meet a brutal death rather than be taken captive, men of both armies would
definitely be disinclined to surrender.
Accordingly, Gls found themselves in a life or death struggle where there
were few or no rules, even when they technically existed.

All actions were

sanctioned by survival, which meant anything goes and ruthlessness and violence
often prevailed. Gls also were aware, many from first hand experience, there were
German soldiers who would rather fight to the bitter end than surrender. One
veteran recalled how the SS were especially known to possess that trait.
They[the SS] were rough. They wouldn't give up. There was only
one way to do it. And that's to go get 'em[sic]. 220
In this type of combat situation there were times when the enemy soldier
would be shot and killed on first sight, in the "heat of combat", rather than being
taken captive. 221 The following statement represents the classical "heat of combat"
justification.
I didn't see any German prisoners killed.

But there is a moment
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when they start to surrender and you keep firing. There are at least
two reasons. You don't trust them and you are so hyped up on
killing someone before they kill you that you just keep firing. 222
The collective mentality provides not a defense, but an explanation why the
incident described above was not a purely malicious act, but occurred for the sake
of survival. Men were by nature cautious and had been taught since training to
"never give your enemy a chance. "223 Aware of the German soldier's stereotype
of ruthlessness, it was only natural for Gls to espouse the attitude one man held.
You were in a position there that you couldn't trust them at all. You
never took any chances. 224
Holding no trust whatsoever in the enemy, men were presented with a life
threatening problem every time they saw an enemy soldier. They could never
know the enemy's true intentions; as far as they knew he might have a trick up his
sleeve. This meant in the confusion of combat, when one merely reacted more
that thought, it was always possible for a soldier to be absorbed in the fury of the
moment and shoot and kill an enemy soldier before giving him a chance to
surrender, given he even wished to surrender. Under these circumstances, "heat
of combat" incidents should not be classified as an "atrocity" in the same light as
shooting unarmed men, after the fact, for revenge.
When focusing on the atrocities and brutalities of war, it is too easy to
overlook the fact thousands of German soldiers were taken prisoner in the
Ardennes; there were also those who treated prisoners with due regard.

For

example, even in the case of the 35th Division that "vowed to avenge" German
actions, the division took over one thousand prisoners in a little over two weeks
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of fighting. 225
Most likely Germans who wished to surrender, and did so in large groups,
had the greatest chance of being treated properly. One reason being that in one
on one situations individual soldiers were more prone to become victims of "heat
of combat" incidents.

Also there are a few documented cases where large

concentrations of German troops were herded up and gunned down after
surrender; however, such examples do exist. 226 When committing atrocities in
reprisal soldiers failed to recognize, and prevent, the inherent contradiction and
injustice of their actions. This illustrates how one man's observation describes the
collective experience.

When talking of atrocities he made the comment, "we

weren't thinking too well. "227
As veterans with combat experience in other places than the Battle of the
Bulge confirm, what constitutes war crimes can occur any time enemy soldiers
meet in combat. Most all soldiers came to determine that "dirty fighting . . . was
actually a general characteristic of war. "228

Accordingly, there were always

situations when captured enemy soldiers might be treated contrary to regulations.
When a German sniper, who had possibly wounded or killed Gls, tried to
surrender, counting on instant clemency was one scenario when this mistreatment
was likely to take place. For a soldier who had lost a friend at a sniper's expense
not taking his anger out on the culprit was sometimes impossible. 229

One

statement illustrates how snipers were common targets for immediate retribution.
"A sniper. We wouldn't take him. He'd be shot right up there in the tree." 230 This
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same individual recalled how one sniper was lucky just to be physically abused.
There was one German sniper who wounded two or three of our
guys. We finally got him and knocked him down out of the tree ..
. . [Later he saw the German and someone had] kind of beat him up
a Iittle bit. 231
Personal recollections confirm there were situations when Gls allowed their anger
carry the situation and they committed atrocities in the wicked name of revenge. 232
One veteran spoke of men looking the other way allowing others to gain revenge
when the issue did not concern them. One such incident occurred during the
liberation of Nazi prisoner and concentration camps. One man recalled,
I forget if it was a Ukrainian or a Pole or whoever he was but he took
this German out and he killed him while he was trying to escape.
The official story. 233
The following reference to the improper treatment of a German prisoner is
just one example of how group standards set the quality of conduct. One veteran
commented on a "cocky" soldier new to his squad that
went over to this German standing there and he spit in his face.
That made me mad! I said, captured man or not . . . don't do
anything like that. I went and got him [the GI] by the shoulder, and
I shook him up a little bit. . . . I said, 'that's the last of that. What
in the hell are they going to think of you. . . . By God don't ever
do anything like that again. Leave them alone. Don't touch them.'
That just sort of got under my skin. . . . All the rest of the guys
were with me. 234
There were also instances when soldiers with reputations for mistreating prisoners
were barred from transporting prisoners to the rear by those that insisted on
treatment according to regulations. 235
The following incident is a manifestation of the collective mentality and the
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bizarre situations of combat; where Gls took no unnecessary chances and went
to drastic extremes to survive. This occurred in the first week of the Normandy
campaign while this veteran's unit was surrounded behind German lines. Deciding
to divulge this story the man prefaced it by saying, "it ain't a very good story."
When we were behind the lines for three days . . . we had dead
Germans all around, in the ditches and along the road. . . . We
were standing there beside the road in a ditch talking when a
German on the other side of the road, who was wounded, just sat up
and looked around. Of course he didn't have a gun or anything with
him, but there he was. They got to talking [those in charge] about
'what are we going to do with him? Tonight we are going to slip
through the lines and go back home. We leave him here he's going
to tell the other Germans about us. What are we going to do, we
can't take him with us?' And -----, he says: 'Aw don't worry about it'
or something to that effect and he took his rifle and pointed it that
way and blew his brains out right there. Now that's terrible to say
about our American people, but he did that really to save our lives.
But that's terrible! He did it so fast and everything I don't know what
I would have done. I couldn't see anybody doing that even though
he was our enemy. Things like that, oh that disturbs a guy .... A
guy should be put in jail for something like that. 236
This man could barely reconcile himself to this "terrible" act, but at the same time
he realized this was done for group survival. They were in a predicament where
they could not be bothered by caring for the wounded German; they were totally
engrossed with keeping themselves alive. Therefore, the man in the group with
the personality least hampered by concern for the enemy, took control and solved
the problem the quick and easy way.
Another veteran's recollection again illustrates the total lack of regard for
German life when American life was threatened. This incident, which occurred at
the Anzio beachhead, Italy, also illustrates the different type of personalities that
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existed among Gls. This man felt no remorse over the story, in contrast to the
man above who strongly disagreed with the act of his fellow soldier. On a cold
rainy night this individual, being a staff sergeant, was the ranking man in his antitank squad. Deep in his foxhole another soldier came up to him with two German
prisoners asking what should be done with them. He recalled his response to this
question.
I said, 'do you want to take them back?' He said, 'hell no. I ain't
going to f--- with them.' And I said, 'dispose of them.' And he shot
'em.231
Obviously these prisoners were not important enough to make these men put
themselves at higher risk by transferring them to safety. They would have to leave
their foxholes and dodge shelling to take them back and then come back to the
front still under fire, while leaving their squad shorthanded.

This man used a

rough analogy as an explanation for this incident.
You do what you have to do. . . . All right, let me ask you. If you
were just fighting to beat hell and got Germans all around you, and
say you got a hundred men . . . and maybe five hundred men
surround you and somebody wants to surrender. What are you
going to do with them? You shoot them. 238
The situation and numbers are purely hypothetical, but the concept of survival at
all costs is essentially correct. There is proof that in small scale platoon or squad
size engagements, enemy soldiers that otherwise would have been prisoners were
shot when they could not be effectively kept under guard. This happened because
watching over prisoners instead of using every man to fight jeopardized group
survival which soldiers found intolerable. 239

Not that this is good or just, but
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evidence indicates placing rules on survival in combat is impractical and expecting
men to be too docile in their fight for life.
The problem of retaining prisoners under guard in combat situations relates
to an issue covered up by some sources, but recently brought into the open by
oral histories. 240 During the Normandy Invasion, some shock troops had orders not
to take prisoners in the initial stages of the assault. Statements of soldiers from
the 29th Infantry Division and 101 st Airborne Division attest that various units did
have these specific orders. 241 Like German troops at Malmedy, Gls could not let
prisoners slow them down or impede successful operations. However, not all units
had orders stipulating Germans would be shot rather than be taken prisoner. One
man who hit Omaha Beach with the 175th Regiment of the 29th Division recalled
quite clearly his orders.
There for the first two or three days . . . they told us 'if you take a
prisoner you're responsible for him.' That's what they said. They
didn't say shoot him, or get rid of him, or nothing. Coming in off the
beachhead there's no place to put them. The MPs don't come in
until you've got a toehold. That was what they told us. They didn't
say shoot them or anything, but they said if you take prisoners you
take care of them, you are responsible for them. 242
In this statement there exists no direct orders either way, and it appears soldiers
had an impled option. If a soldier wanted to take the responsibility of a prisoner
he could. But apparently, if he did not wish to be bothered, their responsibility
could have been to eliminate the problem.
Some soldiers would be unwilling to take the added responsibility, however
there were always those willing to accept prisoners. It was after the first three
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days of the invasion, but nevertheless, the soldier from the 29th Division captured
a prisoner. After his unit overran a small village he saw a lone unsuspecting
German soldier walk out of a house with his rifle slung over his shoulder. The
man recalled the sequence of events.
I saw him coming and . . . I guess he saw me about the same time,
but I was a little faster than him . . . . When he saw that I had the
drop on him before he could get one on me he just kicked his rifle
off his shoulder. He put his hands up and came walking right
towards me. He was hollering 'kamerad, kamerad, kamerad. '243
After fully disarming his prisoner and sending him back to the rear under the guard
of MPs, he felt good thinking how he did the German soldier a "favor." He was
glad he did not have to kill the man, and yet he took him out of the action. This
was just one small victory without a loss. 244
Like the German soldier in the situation above, many Germans would rather
give up and survive, than attempt to fight when it was a hopelessly lost cause.
Like most any man, even if they were in possession of the enemy, they were
sincerely happy to be alive. As one veteran said, "when it became obvious they
were going to lose, the proclivity to surrender increased. "245

For this reason

interaction with prisoners became an even more common part of the collective
experience as the war came to an end in the spring of 1945.
Most veterans expressed how their fears never totally disappeared in
combat. One recalled, "there is always a constant fear you're going to be hit. "246
Soldiers learned they could never know exactly when something bad was going
to happen, surprises were the norm.
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One of the things you learn when you're in battle is that the
unexpected is the most expected thing. We ran into an ambush one
I still don't know what
day and the lieutenant disappeared.
happened to him to this day. I really think he was probably wounded,
but I don't know where he went. 247
Never knowing what was going to happen the next week, the next day, even
the next minute, soldiers were constantly plagued with uncertainty.

The real

mental torture came from knowing you could be killed, but never knowing when or
how it would happen. As far as death or injury, one man said, "it was just one of
those deals that just happened and that's it.

You could never tell when it

would." 248 Another man who dreaded the uncertainty of combat recalled,
you never knew when or what direction it was going to come from
really. That was the scary part . . . you never knew. 249
Veterans commented on how this ever-present uncertainly produced their worst
"apprehension" or "anxiety. "250
This fear was worse in situations which were more dangerous and had a
higher degree of uncertainty than the normal everyday routine. All soldiers that
went on forays into enemy lines can relate to patrols "nerve wracking suspense. "251
One man who despised going on patrols stated,
you had no idea of what your enemy had been doing before. Maybe
they had time to put down some mines or one thing or another. I
hated that. 252
Another circumstance that made patrols so bad was that they often took place at
night, when it was almost impossible to see anything in the pitch dark. Several
men commented on the terrors of night patrol while one in particular said,
of course you had terrible things to endure everyday, but the worst
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was night patrolling, you didn't know whether you were going to
come back or not. I think I went all together three times on night
patrol which came out pretty good. 253
Gls not only hated night patrols, but they hated the night in general. The uneasy
feeling of not knowing where the enemy was and what he was up to was always
worse in the dark.
Another situation which challenged soldier's nerves and patience was
fighting in areas where they could not see the enemy unless they were at short
range, like urban areas and densely wooded areas.

One man spoke of the

scattered and confused small scale firefights that took place when enemy soldiers
bumped into each other in the Huertgen Forest. The man who fought through all
the major campaigns in Western Europe, recalled how scary it was fighting in the
thick forest. "You couldn't see them .... Oh it was terrible. That was one of the
worst battles of the war." 254

Another individual

commented on the same

experience in the Ardennes forest. Combing through the woods for Germans, the
men in his unit never knew what they might find, so they were ready with fixed
bayonets.
You never knew how many men you were going to encounter.
That's another thing I hated. Going through somewhere where you
couldn't see. 256
Because it was so widespread and affected so many men, the stimulus
which provoked the worst fear on the greatest scale was artillery. Every artillery
barrage always had a large element of uncertainty. Soldiers never knew exactly
where the shells were going to hit and it was a terrible feeling waiting the
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agonizing seconds before barrages ceased and the last shell exploded.

"You

never knew when they were going to hit. The closer they hit the harder it was on
you. It would shake you to death." 258 One man, like so many, recalled his worst
fear and uncertainty came from artillery. Other than hope the shell did not land
close enough to hurt them, there was really nothing soldiers could do to defend
themselves from this impersonal weapon.
I felt that I could take care of myself, but outside of digging deeper
in a hole, you had no defense against artillery. . . . You worried
more than anything else about whether a kraut was going to zero in
close to you. It used to get kind of scary when they started perhaps
a mile on your right and they started walking it over [the shellfire]
and you wondered if they were going to stop before they got to
you.251
Anxiety, fear, and uncertainty could be so severe for certain individuals they
could not cope. For those who could not accept the fact they could be killed at
any moment, they were ways to get out of combat. One choice was to shoot or
injure oneself in some manner, but only one man in this sample knew of what was
possibly a self-inflicted wound. There were those who selected this option, but
rumors were much more abundant than actual cases. 258 Another way soldiers
could purposely get out of combat was to find a devious way to go AWOL. This,
like a self-inflicted wound, was also uncommon. Only one man sampled knew of
a case where a GI deserted in combat. The rest had no personal experiences with
deserters after they reached the combat zone.
The man who talked about his experience with a deserter recalled he was
a replacement who only had been in his unit one day. The man relaying this story
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was a sergeant who "made the rounds" that night finding the soldier's foxhole
empty.
We didn't know whether the krauts had snuck in and captured him,
or whether he'd been blown to bits by artillery. We didn't know. . .
. I found out later that he had taken off . . . from a man that had
come back to us after a wound.
. That's the only time I
259
remember anybody taking off.
Desertion could call for execution by firing squad, but the stark reality of
combat could influence men to take this chance. Actually it was a good chance
to take considering only one soldier was executed for desertion during the entire
war.

Before his death, this hapless GI, Eddie Slavik, stated why he could not

control his fear.

His reason for deserting was the uncertainty of knowing that

death could come at any moment.
Up there on the line you never know when it's coming, and it's that
uncertainty that gets you. I guess that's what I couldn't take-that
uncertainty. 260
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority continued to fight until their
services were no longer required, or they were no longer physically able. The all
important question is: why men continued to put their lives on the line when they
knew they could be killed? The answer to this is the collective mentality. With no
rotation policy, the quintessential aspect of the collective mentality was the
determination to keep going until the undesirable task was over, so one could go
home with one's honor intact. Gls went into combat thinking they had to "take" or
endure all adversity and hardships they would face in combat and they had to fall
back on this understanding when the going was at its toughest. One man recalled
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his mind set in combat.
You had to realize the fact that you had to be over there, and you
had to do the best you could until we got it over with. 261
Another man stated the same reason why he kept going; notice the phrase "had
to." "You just had to do it, and you hoped to get out of it and get back home." 262
Another statement illustrates the collective rationalization. "You hate it . . . but
you know you have to do it. "263
The problem was that possessing even the stubbornest determination to
stick it out it, was totally different than actually doing it. When trying to keep going
soldiers were forced to withstand tremendous accumulative and combined
pressures of both the emotional stress and physical fatigue of combat. One must
first consider that GIs had to abide with some of the most abysmal living conditions
imaginable. This was made worse during times of inclement weather, like the
severe European winter of 1944-45. All men who experienced it complained of the
problems due to the below-zero cold, specifically in the Ardennes. 264 Because
nothing could be done about the weather, it too was something soldiers had to
suffer through and endure. As one man said, "you just had to tough it out." 265
Nevertheless, as will be later illustrated, it was sometimes impossible to physically
endure all mother nature could dish out.
If it only were contending with the living conditions, combat would be
formidable enough. However, constantly keeping on their feet, to either counter
the enemy, or to make an offensive thrust of their own, Gls had to keep pace with
combat's rigorous physical demands. On the move for extended periods of time,
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while frequently experiencing periods of sleep deprivation, physical exertion often
resulted in physical exhaustion. Soldiers also had to keep a vigilant eye for any
sign of danger which worked to wear them down. Accordingly, one veteran said
people without combat experience can never "visualize the stress and
responsibility" of a soldier. 266 With the omnipresent dread of the unknown, combat
was not only physically exhausting, but, as one veteran said, it was also
"emotionally exhausting. "267
These conditions presented a constant challenge to an individual's will and
ability to persevere.

One man recalled, "it gets to your nerves worse than

anything. . . . It would get to you, just the strain." 268 The central aspect of the
collective experience is also illustrated by the following statement.
It was hard on everybody. Even though you're a young fella [sic)
that should take it, it is sure hard of a fellas [sic] constitution. It
effected everybody. 269
True, everyone was affected, but some soldiers definitely had it worse. This was
because of the distinction between rifle companies and rear echelon units, with the
former possessing a much higher level of danger along with requiring greater
physical demands. One member of an anti-tank unit knew from experience that
riflemen "suffered the worst" from the debilitating stress of combat. 270
Trying to meet the grueling demands of combat soldiers were pushed to the
limits of their physical and emotional endurance. When the stress and strain of
combat became unbearable some men exceeded their limit of endurance. There
was always the possibility that a GI could emotionally and physically collapse. The

102
common and repeated use in several sources of the term "breaking point" is
positive proof that one exists for all men. 271 Breaking down and losing the ability
to cope with the rigors of combat is usually referred to as "battle fatigue", but this
is an amorphous term susceptible to different interpretations. 272 No matter if a
breakdown was due to mental trauma or physical exhaustion, the fact is combat
was so severe it could prove to be the downfall of any man.
In war it is not just the weak soldiers, or the sensitive ones, or the
highly imaginative ones or cowardly ones, who will breakdown.
Inevitable, all will breakdown if in combat long enough. 273
Breakdown on the battlefield is the end result of all the madness and should be
regarded as just another wound with no stigma attached.

Even the strongest

motivation could never indefinitely sustain an individual in combat. 274

CHAPTER THREE
The experiences of the next four veterans illustrate how it was impossible,
even for those who thought and acted in accordance with the collective mentality,
to continue in their quest to soldier on. One example is a soldier motivated in the
same way as all his counterparts. To begin with, he would have been "ashamed"
not to stay up with the close friends in his unit. This determination to uphold the
respect of his buddies was a prerequisite quality of any successful soldier. This
drive was so strong that, regardless of the dangers, he yearned to get back to his
unit after recovering from with his second wound, suffered in Metz, France in the
fall of 1944. 1
Another constant motivating factor for this man, like all Gls, was the
determination to get the fighting over, and get back home to normal civilian life:
essentially survival. He recalled his unit's attitude in March 1945 while anticipating
the impending Rhine River crossing. "We knew that when we crossed the Rhine
we would get to come home." 2 If they had made it that far, Gls knew there was
nothing else they could do but fight until the end. The fact he had never seen his
first born son, in person, intensified his desire to get home. He married a women
he met on leave in New York City in 1941 and had not been back to see her, or
his child since. Within days of the successful Rhine crossing this man finally got
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his wish of making it home to see his new family.

The problem was, what

happened was not how he wanted to get home.
Getting in a few precious moments of rest while waiting to move out he
recalled how
all of a sudden shells started coming over, 88s. We jumped into a
hole, three of us, and a shell came right in with us. It blew us out of
the hole and killed the other two guys. I got wounded in flank. That
sent men home. 3
Such an unsuspecting incident is an example of what was most unnerving:
never knowing when death and injury would come.

It also represents the

thousands of Gls who were killed, having all their similar aspirations so tragically
snuffed. These men would have loved the chance to tough it out like the rest.
Therefore, he was fortunate to survive this situation, notwithstanding the pain and
suffering he went through. Nearly killed in the deadly explosion he spent nine
months in a hospital recuperating.
Another man's experience also illustrates how men had to be physically able
to fight on, even when possessing the will to persevere. This was the soldier
whose letter at the beginning of Chapter One illustrates the collective mentality.
He always held the understanding it was mandatory he "had to" keep fighting.
Another letter, dated February 16, 1945, shows how soldiers always concentrated
on finishing their job, even when they hated what they were doing.
I suppose my letters sound like I'm having a good time, but I'm
certainly not. ... But since I'm over here, I want to see it through.
It can't last forever. 4
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However, six weeks later this man was unable to "see it through", as a
nagging knee injury forced him to seek medical treatment. He suffered this injury
in the Ardennes when he jumped off an army truck and slipped on an ice-packed
The injury occurred in early January, but being a minor injury, he just

road.

toughed it out and kept going with the hope it would recover. That is what this
determined soldier did for two months, "I had been going on it, limping a little bit." 5
Without proper care, and the wear and agitation from the rigors of combat, the
swelling and stiffness grew worse instead of better. Removal from the line for
medical care finally became unavoidable. Aware of the problem for some time his
lieutenant closely inspected his knee in late March and sent him back to an aid
station.

Getting out of combat alive, he was nevertheless let down about not

keeping up with the rest. In a letter written from a hospital bed in Belgium, he
wrote with a sense of dejection: "it looks like I never did make it over the Rhine." 6
Like the man above, it was common for soldiers to sustain injuries officially
referred to as non-battle casualties. These injuries were not wounds inflicted by
enemy weapons, but nevertheless still directly related to the hardships of combat.
This is illustrated by another veteran's experience, a man who valued the exact
same things in life as all other men. So he could get home to his wife and two
children, he was "looking forward to getting out. "7 This is the continued story of
the soldier who lost his lieutenant after three successive bazooka rounds failed to
detonate. That experience was during his first day in combat, and it turned out he
was only in combat a total of three days.
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Continuing towards their objective on the first afternoon his unit started to
receive heavy shellfire that compelled them to dig in. Throughout the rest of that
day, and into the night, they were confined to two man foxholes; two man foxholes
in the attempt to conserve body heat. The men not only had to contend with
shelling, but also the danger of the excruciating cold of the severe Ardennes
winter. He recalled his first night in the foxhole, with his new buddy.
It was survival. . . . We'd take our boots off and massage each
other's feet for circulation .... You have to talk, to keep awake, to
keep from freezing to death. 8
As the shelling continued into the second day, and then into the second
night, the men remained in their foxholes.

"They had us pinned down", he

explained. The shelling was so severe that in the confused fighting they were also
cut off from re-supply. By the second night the men had run out of rations, water,
and even cigarettes. As a result, the second night in the foxhole was much worse,
their resilience had weakened considerable. The morning after the second night,
the two men took their boots off for circulation, only to have their feet painfully
swell up. "I didn't have any feeling down by my feet." Having problems getting
their boots back on, they knew something had to be done. Frostbite had set in
during the night, in their agony they tried to escape their problems by getting a few
hours of sleep.

When asked if it was then that someone took them back for

treatment he replied,
they didn't take us back we went back.... There was seven of us.
We got an officers jeep, it must have been an officers jeep. Seven
of us dodged artillery fire from our front lines, back to our aid
station. 9
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If this unit's lieutenant had been present, most likely the other demoralized
and leaderless soldiers who commandeered the jeep, would not have found their
way out of the situation as they did. The two with frostbite had to get medical
attention some way, and without positive leadership of their lieutenant, the
negative leadership of cold and hungry men took over. Upon reaching the aid
station, those able eventually went back to action, but the two with frostbite
received immediate care. Flown to England for hospitalization his feet partially
recovered and the doctors only were forced to remove three toes.

Since he

happened to be on the bottom of the foxhole, he was the lucky one of the two.
The soldier more exposed to the cold subsequently lost both legs. Both of these
replacements saw little fighting, but still made life long sacrifices.
To show how the collective mentality allowed Gls to continue to fight and
withstand the horrible actuality of combat, one must start with orders. Several
veterans made repeated use of the common phrase, "orders came down", when
explaining why they moved forward. 10 This relates to the sense of obedience to
authority conditioned into Gls since training. One veteran recalled, "you had to
follow orders whenever they came out, day or night. When they say go, you go." 11
Two other veterans made similar comments which speak for the collective
mentality.
You always had a bunch of officers leading .... You more or less
had to follow them. If they said go down this way, you did it. That's
all there was to it. It made no difference how you felt. . . . You
belonged to the military. You didn't have any say of you own
anymore. For your own good you'd better do just what you're told.
You didn't argue about it, you just did it. 12
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When an officer told you to do something you had to do it, or else .
. . . When they say 'this is an order', while you better do it. You'd
stand a court martial if you didn't. 13
One man commented on the effect of orders. "Every GI knew for the whole
day where they were going, and what they were going to do, and what to
expect. " 14 Significant in this statement was how orders defined each individual's
unit objective. Soldiers entered combat with a set objective and once in the fight
they all experienced the same motivation: the fear induced fight for survival. 15 Two
men spoke of why they had to keep fighting once they were in an engagement, or
"in the thick of it" so to speak. 16 "There's no escape. "17 "There was no escape. "18
Once in an engagement, the only way to survive was to fight to get out of danger,
destroy the enemy and accomplish the objective. Men could also turn and run, but
that was not an option most seriously considered.
Nevertheless, it often took more than only orders to make soldiers go
forward and take extra risks. A battalion commander who observed how soldiers
acted under fire knew they had to be "coerced to courage. "19 This was done by
those type of men that had the ability to lead others, and initiate forward
movement. The type of men that one veteran described as the stereotypical "born
soldier. "20 These were the men who "could get people up and get them to move
when they didn't want to go." 21 Often these men had gained their proper place as
company, platoon, or squad leaders, although a private's de facto leadership was
not uncommon. Combat motivation was dependent upon the positive leadership
of these pivotal men, once the group started to move forward, or backward as the
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case may be, individuals followed. One veteran's statement illustrates this. "You
wouldn't want your buddies to go off and leave you somewhere. "22
One veteran said he "just happened to have a very good platoon leader."
The type of leader that did "extra things" for motivational purposes. 23 However, it
did not just happen to be that this man had a good leader. Another veteran's
recollection illustrates how men who took control of the situation were an essential
part of every good unit. This man felt it was a "wonder" that his squad leader did
not get shot because he gave the enemy so many chances.
If I ever saw a man that liked to get in there and scrap. He was one
of them. He was a good leader.... [However], he took too many
chances .... He stuck his neck out when he shouldn't have. When
he should have been down crawling, he was up walking. He made
himself a known target too many times when he didn't have to, even
though he had some men under him. 24
Why he thought his squad leader took too many chances was he dreaded the
thought of his sergeant getting himself hurt. When good leaders were killed in the
act of physical leadership, it was sometimes devastating on the men who would
have followed. 25
Another man recalled an incident where his company commander rendered
inspired leadership. Best result always came when men led by example.
The Germans opened up on us one time and shot him [their captain]
in the leg. Our own medics wrapped him up and took care of him.
He could hobble around and he cut a stick for a cane and he went
right along with us .... Two days later while we were going across
a big open field, of course we were all scattered out, and the
Germans opened up on us and they hit him in the elbow. . .. He
wouldn't go back with that wound in his leg, he wouldn't let them
send him back to the rear.... Of course when he got shot in the
arm he had to be sent back. . . . It looked like to me that it [the
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bullet] tore his arm off. It hit him in the elbow and just traveled down
his arm, and came out around his wrist. 26
Unselfish leaders like this, always demanded respect and admiration and were
likewise beneficial to unit cohesion and confidence. 27 The same veteran who told
this story, had another experience which is a classic example of combat leadership
and Gl's "reluctant obedience." This occurred when his unit, Company C, 175th
Regiment, 29th Division, was cut off and surrounded behind enemy lines north of
the Vire River in Normandy.

Two companies of the 175th, Company C and

Company I, crossed the river on a "reconnaissance in force" on June 12 to secure
the link up between Omaha and Utah Beach. The mission was so important the
Brigadier General of the 29th Division, General Norman Cota, went across the river
with Company I to observe. After crossing the river into German territory, both
companies were ambushed and dispersed with heavy American losses. Split into
small isolated groups, survivors from both companies soon filtered back together
to form a small force of over one-hundred men strong. 29
In the confused melee, General Cota took control of the men to the best of
his abilities. After being cut off for two days, General Cota decided to lead the
group back to American lines. One GI at the scene recalled how the general
intended for the group to cross an open field, a field this soldier was convinced the
Germans had covered with deadly machine gun fire.
We had a general with us. I don't know who he was, but he was a
general. I don't know his name, or nothing, but he was with us
there, and he said, 'well let's all of us get up, and scatter out now.
We are going to cross this field and get over to that other road over
there.' I said, 'not me.' [The general said], 'you will to soldier!' Of
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course everybody was getting up and crawling over there, and he
said, 'come on get going.' I said, "I don't know how long you've been
here, but I'm not going to cross that open field.' [Looking at the stern
face of the general he began to change his mind.] 'If you go across
that field I'll go with you.' He said, 'come on.' He crawled out there,
and of course I did too. . . . Boy he climbed right up over that
hedgerow and jumped down there and 'let's go,' he said. He
sounded like a pretty good Joe .... We went across the field, and
that's when they opened on us. I don't know what ever happened to
him after that. 29
A self-proclaimed "ideal serviceman", this man did provide a defense for
his actions.
There were things that I've done, or said, in the service that maybe
I shouldn't have. But sometimes it was agitating. 30
It is not surprising men might lose their temper considering the stress of
having one's life in the balance, day after day.

It must have been incredibly

"agitating" knowing full well that in the upcoming action one's life could be violently
brought to an end, but nevertheless one had to go on. It was only natural for men
to be verbally expressive at frustrating times. In fact griping about the situation,
but nevertheless doing what was required, was a common way Gls coped. Griping
and complaining while performing the task made time go a little quicker, while
getting the unwanted job over with. Three statements illustrate how soldiers

us~d

gripes to make the best of bad situations. "There was just a lot of gripes, but then
that's common. "32 "They'd always say, you're not American unless you're griping
about something. "33
Griping was normal, but actual disobedience to direct orders, with Gls
refusing to go forward, was very rare. On the other hand, it was fairly common for
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soldiers to let the instinct of survival influence them into ignoring minor regulations
that were not feasible, or tolerable, in combat situations (see Appendix G). Men
knew it was acceptable to gripe, but realizing the consequences of actually
disobeying orders, they knew orders had to be followed.
It was just something to do, you just had to do it. ... It was a job,
you didn't think to much about it. You hated going back up on the
line when you were away from it, but you just did it. ... We weren't
anxious to move on into combat, and we weren't anxious to avoid
our responsibilities. It was just a day by day robot type of thing. You
hate it, but you know you have to do it. 34
Accordingly, the collective mentality gave Gls the resolve to keep fighting, and
obey disliked orders, always in the face of death. As it was in all situations, orders
and physical leadership got soldiers into combat, and then the fight for survival
began. Thus, combat was a series of engagements punctuated by irregular lulls
where if a soldier survived one engagement, and orders set another objective, the
process started all over.
Being physically able to fight on also meant being physically sustained with
food and the commodities of war. The human element in warfare always had to
be appropriately dealt with. One veteran correctly stated, "if you can't keep a full
stomach you're going to lose the war." 35 There were some problems keeping Gls
supplied in intense fighting (like Normandy), and intense weather (like the
Ardennes), but Gls did have access to the abundance of "American supply." 36 Gls
might rarely have been without certain items, and thus griped about their supply,
but they unquestionable had the best. The least American soldiers had to be
concerned with was keeping supplied with the bare necessities of life. 37
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What is furthermore essential to sustained combat performance, is the most
complex issue. As well as being physically sustained, Gls had to be mentally
sustained. Soldiers had to maintain the will to fight, a winning offensive spirit.
Several miscellaneous motivations worked in conjunction with the collective
mentality in maintaining this fighting spirit. For example, severe winter weather in
the Ardennes provided men with a unique incentive to fight: the desire to win
control of villages for the shelter and warmth of houses. "We fought like all Hades
to get into those small villages." 38 A different motivation, the liberation of those
oppressed and brutalized by the Nazis, had an effect on one veteran similar to
most all Gls who experienced the obscenities of the Nazi concentration camps.
The man saw hundred of Jews tossed in a mass grave.
They marched all of us guys by there to see them. To see what
Hitler was doing to the Jews .... That's kind of sad. That kind of
egged you on though to get in there to free them from the camps.
That was an awful thing, pitiful. 39
A sense of hatred or revenge, similar to the situation above, or something like the
loss of a close friend, could also bring on the temporary motivation of rage. 40
These motivations were all secondary to the motivation, and sustaining
power, of what both experts and veterans posit as fundamental in combat
motivation: camaraderie and the Gls desire to uphold the respect of his buddies. 41
One of the first benefits of camaraderie was soldiers took orders from men they
most often knew and trusted. In every combat unit, especially in rifle companies,
despite their differences in rank, all men, from the captain down to the private,
were exposed to much the same predicament. Therefore, one man recalled rank
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did not necessarily determine all friendships; the ability to carry one's fair share
was a much better gauge of men. "Rank didn't make much difference in our
situation." 42

One man recalled the close relationship with, and admirable

personality of, his company's captain. "He was right there with each and everyone
of us. He was just like a buddy. One of us." 43 Orders were more meaningful
when they came from a friend and integral member of the group who actually did
the leading, rather than an impersonal order from someone in the rear.
Camaraderie also afforded the individual what can never be underestimated:
the sustenance of a friend and the group.

Once in the service, young men

suddenly became, in the language of the day, new "buddies" with men from all
different parts of the nation. Despite their differences, these men soon found out
how much they really had in common.

Two statements illustrate how men

transformed their unit into their new family away from home. One veteran fondly
recollected,
your buddies. You lived with them, slept with them, ate with them .
. . . They talked about their families and you talked about yours.
You get to become a family. 44
Another man felt even more adamant about the kinship and brotherhood among
his new buddies.
I'd have to admit they were better friends than family. We lived
together, fought together, trained together, drank beer together,
chased women together. Why we were better friends than family. 45
One veteran, formerly an original unit member, recalled how the living under the
incredible demands of combat, the pre-existing bonds of friendships could not help
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but intensify. "The longer you are in, and the harder the fighting, the closer the
ties." 46
Replacements predominantly went into combat with total strangers, however
they rapidly developed friendships and camaraderie within their new unit. One
soldier who served as a replacement commented on this.
You made friends pretty quick .... Everybody talked and visited
together whenever they had a chance, just like they'd known each
other all their life. 47
Another replacement remembered how a sense of camaraderie was always
present, regardless of how long soldiers knew each other.

"You did feel that

[camaraderie] whether you had known a guy who had only came up to you that
day, or if he'd been with you a few weeks." 48 In combat, it did not matter who the
man was, but if individuals were beside each other, they were buddies. This is
how one man felt, as an original member of the 29th Division, who in only ten days
of combat had so many replacements come into his unit he never had a chance
to learn their names. "You didn't know who was around you. All you know is that
he's a buddy no matter who he is. "49 A replacement that experienced similar
situations of his own recalled,
your friend was the guy next to you and that was it. You didn't know
from one minute to the next technically if he'd be there, or if you'd be
there the next day. . . . But as long as he is wearing the same
uniform that is all that is necessary. 50
What one veteran said about the dynamics of combat relationships, "the
longer you are in, and the harder the fighting, the close the ties", was true for all
soldiers. Accordingly, one former replacement spoke of the strong bonds that
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developed in his unit as time went by. "They were a pretty good bunch of boys.
You got pretty close to them." 51 An original member of an outfit felt similarly, and
used the same adjective to describe the feeling. "We got kinda close. "52 Relying
on each other for survival, soldiers in all units developed unequaled friendships
during their ordeal. Most veterans were convinced the men they were associated
with in combat were of the best quality existing. They were essentially correct,
considering all units were filled with capable men. One veteran spoke with pride
of the fine men in his unit.

"We had been together since we formed the 4th

Infantry [1941]. We had a pretty solid outfit. "53 Close friendships were the source
of a great feeling of unit pride. One veteran's opinion illustrates a very common
sentiment. "I was thoroughly imbued with the spirit common among all infantrymen
that my outfit was the best damned outfit in the whole damned army." 54
The great need for camaraderie in combat was one reason all sorts of
divergent men created their most intense friendships of life. Camaraderie was
essential where men depended upon the support of the cohesive unit. Moreover,
the best way to mitigate the horrors was to make the best of the situation with the
help of one's buddies. Even the development of camaraderie reflects the way of
thinking of the collective mentality. Men had to learn in training that a team effort,
which was essential in combat, required toleration. Camaraderie cannot exist if
the different types of men could not get along. One veteran recalled how men
had to adjust once in demanding situations of training.
You all went to bed at the same time, you all got up at the same
time, you all reported to revelry at the same time, you all went to
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breakfast at the same time. You did everything together so you had
to get along .... You were with a group of men from all walks of life.
You had to get along or you were just defeating yourself, because
you were all in the same boat. 55
In combat the need for toleration was naturally intensified. Soldiers could
not allow potentially divisive problems to effect unit performance. Indicative of the
collective mentality, with something men could not change, like the choice of fellow
soldiers, they had to endure or tolerate whatever, or whomever, they may dislike.
You had to get along with everybody the best you could. I got along
with about anybody ... [but] some of them you didn't like. You had
to put up with stuff like that you know, like some little smartaleck
guy.5s
With such a great diversity of men in uniform, another individual recalled
learned the necessity of "getting along with the other guys." This man went into
the army at age thirty, a college graduate with junior college teaching experience,
and a feeling he was better than many of the younger, less educated men. His
attitude changed once in combat.
You've got all kinds in the army. Some of them were practically
illiterate, some of them were from the back woods and so forth. I
went in with pretty much of a superiority complex. That vanished,
particularly after you got into combat. I learned the important things
were not how much education you had or what your background in
civilian life was .... There are some very decent fellows who are illeducated. 57
Another man felt similarly, stating the past meant nothing in combat, it was
"immaterial." "If you thought you were any better because you had a Cadillac, you
soon learned differently."58 In combat soldiers were judged by ability and accepted
if they had the merit. 59
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Along with tolerating what they could not change, the corresponding facet
of the collective mentality also played its part in the development of unequaled
wartime friendships. The fact that to mitigate adversity, men had the to tendency
to "accentuate the positive. "60 Soldiers made the best of the available friendships,
becoming great friends with whomever they were put into a unit with. Nothing is
comparable to the trust and affection soldiers have for each other when they
depend of one another for survival. One veteran commented, "you depended on
them, you had to. You had to trust one another. They were behind you, and you
were behind them." 61 Another recalled, "you're fighting for his life [your buddy],
and he'd be fighting for your life. "62

With so much on the line bonds of

brotherhood became incredibly strong.
One veteran's experience exemplifies the development of soldier's greatest
friendships. Similar to all men, he became "good buddies" with a group of men
he met entirely by chance. Presumably, if it would have been an entirely different
group of men, the friendships would have been much the same.

The story

surrounding his experience is especially interesting considering his friendships
were determined by the alphabet. Soldiers were needed to bring a squad up to
full complement, and the list was filled with men whose last name started with the
letter B. "In our unit a lot of the men's last names began with a B. Brownwell,
Burnett, Bidwell, Baudino, Brady, Boyer, Breeze." Even more, his "best buddy",
in his days in combat, and then later in civilian life, was the man he happened to
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share his pup tent with in training. 63

There is no telling the thousands of

friendships that originated in a similar manner.
As a result of camaraderie, great friendships, and unit pride men developed
a profound sense of "small unit loyalty."64 Each individual knew others counted on
him for survival, and they had to uphold their part of the bargain. One veteran
stated his motivation, which was the collective motivation. "You don't want to let
down your friends for the sake of pride." 65 Three-fourths of the veterans sampled
cited this motivation, over all others, as what kept them going each day. This is
further reinforced by the literature of this subject. 66
The key word in the previous statement, "pride", was the underlying reason
men continued to fight. A fierce sense of pride in one's self and unit gave soldiers
the courage and tenacity to keep up with their unit. Three veterans' recollections
illustrate this aspect of the collective experience. Driven by the desire to "belong"
and not to "fail" soldiers had a greater "fear of shame." 68
I was scared as hell, but I kept going because I didn't want to be
called chicken by the rest of the men. 69 You especially did not want
to disgrace yourself. I frequently felt this pressure. 70 I lacked the
guts to take being thought a coward. 71
With these considerations determining thought, one veteran made a statement
which illustrates the collective rationalization.
I figured, 'well if the other guys can do it, I guess I can too. If he can
keep going, I can too.' That's the way I looked at it. I felt like I could
do anything anybody else could, if I set my mind to it. 72
Another recollection also illustrates the coercive influence of friends and the
unit on soldiers' actions. It also illustrates how one's desire to uphold their honor
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and reputation could be intensified with seniority in rank, and a man's ancestral
history soldiers in the family.

When asked what kept him going one man

responded,
the main thing was pride. I was in command as a sergeant. I would
have been ashamed to let those men know that I was afraid .... I
wasn't brave, now don't get me wrong. I was scared to death a lot
of times. But, I wanted to finish my job. I would have been ashamed
to come home with a dishonorable discharge. Because my great
grandfather was in the Civil War, my grandfather was in World War
I. I had the history of the family. The Kingery name, I had to uphold
it. 73
Like all men who were determined to fight it out, this man possessed a quality that
made him value his friends and reputation over his own life.
Gls had the prerequisite will to fight on, but at that point all soldiers had to
rely on their own stamina and inner determination to keep going. 74 Sustained
performance hinged upon the individual's ability to withstand the pressures of
combat. Illustrating the collective experience, one man stated that underlying all
motivations, he depended upon his own "hard-headedness" to persevere. 75
Several other factors contributed to Gls will and ability to persevere. Sleep
was not only a physical need, but it was another form of mental sustenance. One
man recalled the panacea of sleep when off the line, in a secure area.
That was the best sleep in the world, at least your fears were
diminished if not completely gone .... Your mind was free and
unincumbered. 76
Besides the physical benefits, sleep had the effect of rejuvenating battle weary
soldier's vigor and determination. Accordingly, because it came so seldom and
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irregularly, soldiers learned to find sleep anytime, anywhere possible (see
Appendix H).
Also aiding soldiers' inner determination to keep going was religion. Faith
in religion helped men tolerate and cope through their own personal manner. Two
letters from one soldier illustrates how religion was used in conjunction with all
previous motivations. One of his letters home read, "yes, the Bible and God will
bring me through. He has the strongest power overall." Another letter to his wife
closed with the words, "maybe I can see you before long, let's pray so. "77 Soldiers
commonly used prayers as a crutch to allay fear and worry. One man remarked,
"when you're in an artillery barrage, or moving up you get real religious, because
again you don't know what's going to happen." He continued by saying that in
trying situations it was normal to recite "every prayer you ever heard. "78 Because
of the uncertainty over life and death it was common for men to place a greater
reliance on the salvation of religion. The common use of the phrase "foxhole
Christian" alludes to this fact (see Appendix I).
In combat certain situations had the resulting effect of fostering a positive
offensive spirit. In GI slang this was a "boost to morale", however this phrase
encompasses several meanings. 79 One veteran commented upon this.
Morale is something nobody can explain. What is morale? ... You'd
be in combat and something would happen that happened to be
funny. I don't know if that would be a boost to morale. Or there
would be a town ... and that would be an objective. After we took
a town well you'd say 'hey we got another. '80
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A "boost to morale' was anything raising soldiers' spirit and confidence. This
was often the outcome of a successful completion of a mission's objective.
Capturing territory from the enemy, men saw for themselves the progress of their
efforts. They were beating the enemy, winning the war, and getting closer to
home. 81

One individual involved in reducing the Ruhr pocket in April, 1945

recalled with pride one of his unit's greatest achievements: a motorized advance
of 33 miles in one day. This veteran, like several others, recalled the positive
attitudes due to the "good news" printed in the Army newspaper Stars and Stripes
in the spring of 1945. News describing how successes were being replicated in
all units, while the Germans surrendered in mass and the Red Army closed in on
Berlin. 82
The support of other arms, such as tanks, airplanes, or artillery also raised
soldier's confidence. "What helped you the most was when your own tanks would
go on past you .... You felt good then." 83 A man who landed on Omaha Beach
on D+1 recalled a similar feeling watching P-38's strafing the bluffs while the navy
bombarded. "You knew you had company." 84 The sound of outgoing artillery was
one of the Gls most favorite and appreciated sounds. One veteran observed the
emotional response to a preparatory artillery barrage fired on the day's objective.
He described the men as "ecstatic with an elation born with excitement. "85 All this
coincided with victory, and gave soldiers greater resilience to compete against the
challenges of combat.
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However, positive morale was by no means so limited in scope, "morale
was a lot of little things." 86 One must always consider the powerful sustenance of
camaraderie. Specifically, the lifeblood of camaraderie, the humor between fellow
soldiers. It was this "delight in comradeship" that one veteran regarded as one of
the "secret attractions of war. "87 Without question men lived in the misery of fear
and uncertainty, however two statements illustrate how men did delight in
friendships and humor. "We had a lot of good times too. "88 "We had a lot of funny
times too." 89 At first one might ask how men had the state of mind to find humor
in their terrible predicament. The truth is men had to use humor to cope. Humor
allowed soldiers to enjoy bad situations while helping them to forget and suppress
their problems. In fact, the army advised soldiers the best way to cope with fear
was by "laughing it off. "90
One man recalled the common joke between the men in his unit as they
went forward into action. One of them always said, "I don't want to go up there.
A guy could get hurt up there." 91 He gave his reasoning as to why the men made
use of humor.
It kind of breaks up the seriousness which is really good. You
couldn't be that serious all the time. We had to have our humor. 92
Humor was used by men in all units. Another veteran recalled,
we'd joke around as much as we could .... There would always be
somebody cracking jokes no matter how bad it got. 93
Topics of humor were always representative of the collective mentality. One
example originates with unit pride. Being members of an exclusive group, those
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with the mettle to withstand the hell of combat, soldiers favorite target of humor
and derision were men in rear-echelon units. One veteran spoke of the jokes that
circulated about how many men it took to keep those at the front supplied.
We used to joke about that. ... No, it doesn't take that many. Let
me go back, and I'll do two or three of their jobs. 94
It was also the norm for young men, in grievous positions, to find ways to integrate
obscenities and vulgar language into humor.

A mild example of this is the

contemptuous term often applied to those in the rear area, "rear-echelon
bastards."95 Vulgar language was one way Gls could constructively express their
displeasure to which they felt they had a right.
The following joke was voiced as a unit walked down a road, "talking about
some brave deed somebody did." At the end of the group discussion somebody
said, "I'd rather be a live coward, than a dead hero." This drew a big laugh at the
time, and also when the man retold it. The joke was for the most part true, but
what made it humorous was the sarcasm. Despite how much they hated to, men
went to great lengths to avoid being viewed a coward. 96 The next example of
humor illustrates what soldiers always had their minds concentrated on: getting
home. The 29th Division had a slogan the ranking officer always shouted as the
men moved out; "Twenty-nine, let's go." Every time this occurred, some soldier
would take it upon himself to quip, "home." The slogan then became "Twenty-nine,
let's go home. "97
Another veteran spoke of how soldiers made a practice of
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making fun of things that in essence are not that funny. In other
words somebody get's shot in the behind. Big hee haw! Because
it isn't really all that dangerous of a wound if it's through the fleshy
part of the buttocks. But nevertheless, you get a good laugh out of
it. . . . What was he doing to be shot in the behind? 98
Gls needed humor to cope, but it is worthwhile to ask how they found anything
humorous about a fellow GI being shot?

The answer is in combat soldiers

experienced what can be described as a transient moral ethical lapse. This was
an adjustment that was a natural outcome of the way of thinking deeming it
mandatory to endure, or "take", all the horrors of combat. This facet of the
collective mentality, soldiers' emotionally defensive posture, allowed Gls to make
this change and find humor in what was not funny. To help themselves cope
soldiers had to learn to accept things, and do things, previously unthinkable in
civilian life. One veteran recalled this aspect of the collective experience. "You
had to acclimate yourself to it ... you had to, otherwise you'd go crazy." 99
Soldiers went into combat knowing they could not be affected by the death
and destruction, however combat was so severe they nevertheless were affected.
It is necessary to recall what one veteran said of his first shocking exposure to the
carnage of battle.
At first it sort of upset you .... But I tried not to let it bother me
because I knew I was going to see a lot more of it. So why fret over
it so much. 100
Knowing what they had to expect in the future, soldiers felt the need for an even
greater lack of concern for what they could not change. As men suppressed and
tried to ignore what otherwise would have been harmful to their sanity, a stoical
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insensitivity developed. The following is an example of when one man finally
realized he, and his unit, had "really became accustomed to combat." This
occurred when his anti-tank company occupied a small town, previously cleared
of the enemy by the rifle companies. Towing their 57-mm behind their truck, his
squad pulled behind a barn to set in for the night. "We noticed that when we
backed in, we had run over some kind of object." In the morning light the men
found out what the object was. They had ran over a dead German soldier. When
the men discovered this, they happened to be eating breakfast, but they all went
out to take a look at the body while continuing to eat their rations.
That was when I realized I had become accustomed, or callused.
Back in civilian life that would have been repulsive, but I just took it
in stride. 101
Four veterans' statements illustrate the collective adjustment that helped
soldiers cope with the horrors of war.
Finally it got to be a routine. You learn to live with it. You had to
learn to live with it, that's all. The next day there was going to be
some more. 102 After a while it didn't bother me so much seeing it,
because it was just everyday anyway. We just got so where we
didn't care. 103 We became immuned to it ... callused. 104 It was just
routine. 105
No matter how men described it, they all felt the same way. Men could only be
concerned with what was essential for their survival, which the dead were not.
Two other recollections illustrate the attitudes resulting from the mentality of
survival.
You get used to it. It's just kind of an atmosphere that is new, but
you get used to it, and don't think too much about it. You just save
your own life. 106 After we were at the front lines for awhile a lot of
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things just naturally fell our way as far as looking at dead Germans,
burning buildings, and explosions, and so forth. We just took it for
granted everyday. We just had to do what we could do to try to
save our own neck, and keep going at the same time .... No, after
awhile it didn't bother me any to see them killed, shot, or burned. It
was just another phase of the operation. 107
Because Gls fought and died in such a brutal environment, the better
soldiers were ones more insensitive and more brutal. Take an example from a
soldier in the 4th Division who participated in the liberation of Paris with the Free
French Forces. He recalled how the French went after German snipers with a
previously unseen wrath of vengeance and brutality.
Those Free French men, I tell you, they would get them [German
snipers], they were rough on them. That Free French was a pretty
good outfit. They were with us quite a bit. 108
The Free French were a "pretty good outfit" because in war one wants a mean and
tough unit, or comrade, by his side. It was reassuring to know somebody was
there to help out in a bad situation.
Indicative of this forced insensitivity is the nickname applied to the German
soldier. If a GI shot, or saw a dead German, he was not referred to as German
soldier, he was a "kraut." Kraut replaced German soldier in the Gls' vocabulary,
they had to dehumanize their enemy. 109 Gls could not be bothered by the fact
their enemy was human; they had to kill or be killed, any hesitancy could be fatal.
Thus one veteran recalled how there developed a complete lack of regard for
enemy life. After clearing out a set of woods, killing several of the enemy, his unit
sat around and discussed how they accomplished this success.
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It was just like going out and hunting for squirrels. You'd see one
way over there so you'd shoot him, and he falls down. Back then it
was nothing to just talk about it. You were right there and it had to
be done and you did it. Now to me today it is cruel, but back then
you were fighting for your own life so you didn't care who, what, or
where .... It was just like you were shooting squirrels out of a tree.
That's just the way it was. You just cocked back and pulled back.
Nothing to it you know. It's bad .... When you were over there
fighting, it didn't cross your mind so much, until you got out of it. 110
Men definitely thought differently in combat. For example, taking no
unnecessary chances for their survival, it was not unheard of for soldiers worried
about German soldier's playing dead to "waste a round to be sure." 111 Bayonets
were even used to check the dead. 112 As far as most Gls were concerned, "the
only good kraut was a dead kraut." 113 One veteran commented on the change that
allowed soldiers to think and act as they did.
A soldier exists in war on two emotional levels: On one
level, he kills and destroys; the other level, carefully
insulated from the first, is his rational self, lying
dormant until it can with some safety reassert itself. It
is a self induced schizophrenia, essential to emotional
survival. 114
Gls also had to be insensitive to losses they themselves suffered. As much
as they hated it, men did all they could to deal with the death of fellow soldiers.
Because this was so difficult a task, the easy way to cope was to remove the dead
to the rear as soon as possible. The less one had to seen them, the easier it was
to forget. 115 There were also times the necessities of combat demanded front line
troops to go on fighting, leaving the dead for graves registration. One veteran
recalled a solemn incident that occurred under machine gun fire in a wooded area
in Normandy.
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The Germans just scattered rounds all over the woods. I had a
buddy there, and he got killed right by me. Of course they just took
his blanket and laid it across him, and took his rifle and put a
bayonet on it, and stuck it on the ground beside him and put his
helmet on it, and we went on. 116
In situations such as this, soldiers were too busy to do anything else, they did all
they could and they had their own survival to think about.
Gls always had tremendous concern and loyalty towards their comrades,
but in their insensitive state of mind, their pre-eminent consideration was getting
their job done in the safest, easiest way possible.

In doing this soldiers often

sacrificed the concern for civilians, especially German civilians. Efforts to find
billets is one example of how manners fell to the wayside as soldiers ignored civil
property rights, and the normal conventions of peaceful daily life. In war men
found themselves in extraordinary situations where the world was turned upside
down and right was wrong and little could be done to change it. In the war zone
whether houses were occupied, or unoccupied by the owners, Gls had no second
thoughts about "taking them. "117 That is if they were fortunate enough even to find
the shelter of a house, if not a barn or any shelter would suffice over a foxhole. 118
The following situation occurred as a rifle company entered an undefended
town on the German-Holland border on a cold rainy night in early March of 1945.
Intent on finding a dry place to rest, the tired soldiers were even more enthusiastic
about finding a house since the town was completely free of damage. The squad
of the man who told of this incident picked the closest house and barged in the
front door. The men had all of their weapons, were very muddy and wet and with
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over a week's growth of a beard. "We looked like a bunch of men from Mars", the
man laughed.

His unit was surprised to find the upper class house still had

electricity, a working telephone, and nice furnishings.
We opened the door and went right on in on their good rug and on
their good furniture. We hadn't been in there two minutes until a
lady came up out of the basement area somewhere ... and she
didn't even know we were in there. A lot of the guys had already
flopped on the couch and the lounge chairs and so forth to take it
easy. This lady came up, and she was about thirty-five to forty. She
came in and saw us in there and she just went crazy. Oh my god,
she started cussing us in German. You never heard such carrying
on in your whole life. She got a hold of one of the guys and started
beating on him. 119
The men tried to diffuse the situation, but the lady continued to "raise hell."
"Finally one of the lieutenants came up, after he saw what was going on .... He
tried to get a hold of her and calm her down, but she wouldn't calm down." The
men were not going back out into the rain, or compete with other soldiers for
another house, so the lieutenant had some of the men take her outside, and tie
her to a streetlight. That is where she stayed until the Gls left the next morning.
This was a crude act, but the soldiers could then get their desired rest. In their
situation, the men and the impatient lieutenant, had no feelings for the lady.
Fortunately she was not seriously harmed. 120 This again illustrates what one
veteran said about Gls in combat. "We weren't thinking too well." 121
Similar to being immune to the feelings of German civilians, where soldiers
had to be immune to death, bizarre events often occurred. In the Ardennes in
January, 1945 an anti-tank company spent close to one week in a war ravaged
farm house. On the first day, they had problems getting into the house, since an
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artillery blast had blown away the front porch and steps. "We had a hell of a time
getting in the door, it was up so high." A soldier with a jeep gained the squads
attention saying: "will you help me a little bit, I've got a good idea." The men
proceeded to use the jeep to drag a dead frozen horse into position at the
doorway. They decided the frozen horse made a good temporary step.
We used that old mare there for a step for a number of days. When
we left there all the hair was wore off that horse ... where we had
stepped on it. 122

Just as Gls became inured to death, all people exposed to combat
experienced this same change. The following is just one example of how the
German soldier also let the instinct of survival prevail over squeamishness. One
man saw instances of German prisoners taking loaves of bread from the packs of
their dead comrades. They knew they were the ones that needed it. 123 After years
of exposure to war, civilians also became insensitive, in this case a spiteful Belgian
farmer. One veteran recalled a sight he witnessed in the Ardennes in January
1945.

I saw this Belgian man ... coming down this hill with a horse behind
him .... When he got down a little closer why I looked and thought
'what's he got back behind that old mare.' I thought, 'well I'll just stall
here just for a second and see what he's got.' ... He had wrapped
a chain around a dead German that was up on his property .... He
stopped right there in front of the pig pen. I waved at him and he
said something and waved back.... He loosened the chain and put
his hands underneath that dead frozen German and rolled him in the
pig pen. He just rolled him in the pig pen and then brushed his
hands off.... Well he done that two or three times. I think it was
three dead guys that were up there next to the trees back on the hill
of his place .... He rolled them in there and just acted like he said
'good riddance' and brushed his hands off. Like the pigs well eat
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them up, the pigs like it. The pigs did like them. Oh they'd get a
hold of them and they'd push and pull on those frozen bodies. When
we left there that place was a mess. Ah [sigh of disgust]. That's just
one of the bad things of the war. 124
As terrible as this all was men got to a point where they had enough of all
the gore. Like one individual said, "you never like it, but you became accustomed
to it." 125 There came a time when Gls went out of their way to avoid seeing the
disgusting. Some soldiers, who had witnessed the awful results of tanks grinding
over dead bodies, including dead Germans, began to move them out of the tanks
path.
Why a lot of us guys would get a hold of their arms [of the German
dead] and pull them over toward the ditch, to get them out of the
road because the tanks were coming through. 126
As much insensitivity as one could build up it was never enough, Gls
always had problems suppressing negative thoughts. It is necessary to recall how
men were always afflicted by the fear and uncertainty of death. Similarly, as hard
as they tried to forget, men still had problems forgetting the sorrow over lost
friends. An excerpt from a soldier's wartime journal illustrates this.

His close

friend had been killed weeks earlier, and he still thought of him when he had time
to reflect.
He's still much on my mind and it depresses me to think he's gone .
. . . I've got to quit thinking about him, too. It doesn't bring him back
and it doesn't do me any good. 127
This GI realized it was troublesome to think about depressing matters, so
he tried even harder to forget. Keeping their mind occupied with different thoughts
was what helped soldiers forget their problems. Officers were advised to keep
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their men occupied with anything providing a "distraction", anything to make them
"think about something else. " 128 Several veterans agree, "the secret of getting
through combat is having a purpose and keeping busy. " 129 Before going into
combat, when apprehensions were at there highest, thoughts of the danger ahead
were distracted in the same way as always: by preparing their equipment and
double checking their buddies', making sure they were all "ready to go" before
"jumping off." 130 Once in an engagement soldiers were usually "too busy" to think
of anything but survival. 131 One statement illustrates how soldier's minds were
preoccupied in combat, but it was when they had too much time to think that they
had difficulties controlling their problems and worries.
When one of your people fell it didn't bother you immediately
because you had other things to do. Like going after the guy that
got him, or digging deeper in the ground, or trying to save your own
skin. It was later on, when you had to go back and get his dog tags
or whatever that you thought too much about it. 132
Other veterans commented on this same phenomenon of combat. One man
felt the same way about the losses his unit sustained. "You didn't have time to
mourn and cry you know.

You were moving and you had to get your stuff

done." 132 Similarly, another man remembered instances he thought he could be
hit by enemy fire but he said, "you couldn't dwell on it. They didn't let you have
too much idle time, that was probably one of the reasons why you didn't think
about it." 134 It appears his officers knew the advantage of keeping their men busy.
In a similar case, a man first bothered by thoughts of the first man he shot and
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killed, was fortunate for his own well-being to say, "I got over it pretty quick.
didn't have time to dwell on it. "135
There were even times when Gls had to make their own distractions under
fire.

Humor was one way this was often done, but anything that occupied a

soldier's mind worked just as effectively; like what one man did to cope with his
fear.
When you're pinned down and you can't move, can't shoot, and
you're scared to death while you're laying down there with bullets
going over you, you pull out that little Testament and read. 136
This man was referring to the pocket sized Bible the army provided to every GI.
Soldiers did odd things under fire, and accordingly, any number of things could
allow them to concentrate on other things than their fears. What the same man
did in another situation illustrates this, and also the extreme absurdity of combat.
I remember one time they opened up on us, and I hit the dirt and
there was old cow pile there, and I just laid there [sic], with my eyes
looking right at that cow pile counting the grains of corn that weren't
digested. 137
Primarily, it was when soldiers had too much time to think that they were
most affected by their problems. As it was, Gls were not always in the midst of
combat, there were always lull periods. Times when exhausted soldiers had to
rest, and time spent waiting for orders and the ensuing offensive preparations
before again moving into battle. "You might sit around for two or three days without
anything to do." 138 It was common to rush to a location, and then sit around
waiting with nothing to do. This is where soldiers coined the common wartime
phrase "hurry up and wait. "139
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During these times, when they had too much time to think, soldiers had to
avoid negative thinking. Men could not "sit and brood", they had to have
distractions. 140 When there was nothing to do but wait, there were several aspects
of the collective experience that occupied thought and action. So they did not
have to think at all, soldiers learned to take advantage of the temporary escape
and refreshment of a nap. They also consumed their time with cleaning weapons,
making sure they were fully operationable. One statement illustrates how this was
a very important chore to many.
You had to keep your weapon in good shape, ready to go. You lived
by that weapon that you were carrying. You had to keep it in good
shape. You'd clean it every time you got a chance. You'd be
surprised at how many men really took that to heart. 141
Three statements reveal some of the other common ways men occupied their
thoughts, and actions, in their spare time. "You play cards, write letters, you play
cards hour after hour, after hour, after hour." 142 "You had reading material, and
you'd just sit around and shoot the bull. "143 "There wasn't anything to do but look
at one another and shoot the breeze, and light a cigarette .... Every other man
had a deck of cards. You could at least play rummy to pass the time. A deck of
cards would do it every time." 144
Reading was one popular escape. With the time and opportunity Gls
enjoyed the army publications Stars and Stripes and Yank in addition to the
"reading material" provided to them by the army, or whatever they received from
home. "You did a lot of reading. About everybody carried something to read. A
pocketbook, or you would read letters, whatever." 145 Letter reading, and writing,
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was another very popular pastime when combat allowed. "You wrote a lot of
letters, and read the ones that had been sent up to you. There was a lot of
that." 146 Letters from home were very important to one's personal spirit as they
were the only attachment to home, unless one was fortunate to have a coveted
picture of those left behind. One comment illustrates the collective experience,
"you always felt better when you got a letter from home. "147
Similar to correspondence with loved ones, distractions were best when they
were pleasurable. For example, the atmosphere created with camaraderie and
humor surrounding a card game. When combat permitted, Gls played cards in
one veteran's words, "every stop. "148 Men also enjoyed their friendships while they
shot the "breeze" or the "bull." Men often discussed the situation at hand, but
other popular topics were "wild stories" about home, often concerning past exploits
with women. 149 "You kid around, and talk about your girlfriends." 150 Rumors were
another popular topic of group discussions. One veteran fondly recalled, "some
guys specialized in rumors for kicks, inventing real wild ones. It was entertaining
in a way." 151 When asked about rumors, one veteran laughed and replied, "you
name it you got it. It keeps you thinking about various eccentric things. "152 This
was the best thing for Gls to be doing in their situation; concentrating on
something other than the horrors of combat they experienced, or expected to
experience.
One veteran spoke of the peculiar nature of some distractions. "It was
amazing how the guys would entertain themselves.

It didn't take too much to

137

entertain you. "153 One good example of the "amazing" ways men entertained
themselves concerned a jeep load of Gls trying to dodge artillery fire, while from
a safe distance other soldiers made bets as to whether the jeep would be hit. The
jeep made it to safety, but as a result, some GI lost his bet that the jeep would be
hit. 154

In their insensitive state of mind, where they needed humor to cope,

soldiers could not help but experience this moral and ethical lapse. 155 One veteran
who observed this change said, "the hell of it was, in that war we forgot to
remember what was right and what was wrong. "156
The moral lapse soldiers experienced in combat was actually magnified by
the realization that one could be killed at any moment. This is one reason why "it
didn't take much to entertain" most Gls. Aware they could have been killed in the
past, men were overjoyed just to be alive.

This powerful feeling intensified

everything about life, and every moment men continued to live they reveled in the
vibrance of life. A soldier's letter to his parents illustrates how life took on a new
meaning and the simple things became luxuries. Occupying a totally destroyed
German town, he wrote that the men "live and sleep in this stuff [the rubble], but
like it though." 157
Obviously they "like it" because they were still living. Knowing their lives
could be cut short so suddenly, soldiers made a concentrated effort to accentuate
life. One veteran noticed how his unit learned "to live with uncertainty, savoring
whatever good came our way." 157 Soldiers knew they could die at any moment,
so they were intent on making the best of life while it lasted. 158 In their situation
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very little mattered except the present; men lived for the moment enjoying all that
pleased them.

This gave Gls the ability to think in ways inconceivable to an

outsider.
This change is illustrated by the humorous distraction that occurred after
one veteran's unit occupied a knocked out German pillbox in the Battle of the
Bulge. Their sergeant told the men, "we're going to have to have extra guard duty
tonight. We're right up here where close. There's going to be a lot of patrols
coming through." Waiting around with only time to kill, the soldiers noticed three
dead German soldiers close by. With their warped sense of humor they got a
good idea, the frozen corpses would make good sentries and not complain about
it.
We went around and got three dead Germans that were laying
around there in the snow and got a hold of them and dragged them
up there to the pillbox. We got a hold of them and leaned them up
against the pillbox, and put their helmets back on them, and their
rifles over their shoulders. They were dead and froze like a railway
tie. . . . We had to have some humor along with damned deal.
When we left, those old boys were still leaning up against it [the
pillbox]. 160
These men found this humorous at the time and since they stayed at that spot for
a number of days, others also found it humorous. When soldiers from other units
passed by, the bodies adorning the pillbox walls were an amusing conversation
piece. Even in combat situations, soldiers might have nothing to do, and this was
one of the "amazing" ways they were distracted. Instead of sitting around in the
freezing cold dejected about their predicament the men stayed active occupying
their time with something they found entertaining.
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Other veterans commented on this change in humor. One recalled, "it
turned to macabre type humor after awhile, there is no question about that. " 161
Another veteran agreed. "It's a gallows humor. "162 Another example of how humor
changed was revealed when the author asked one veteran if there was anything
about the war that he knew of, that most people are not aware of. He replied, "I
think I have proof, right here, of something you maybe never heard about. You
look at that picture. "163 The picture this man was referring to, was an original
picture of General Patton in the process of urinating into the Rhine River off a
temporary bridge.
The man who took the picture, recalled how this created a hilarious uproar
in his unit. As a member of an anti-tank company with the 5th Infantry Division
that made this river crossing, he happened to be at the scene with a camera he
had taken from a dead German. His unit had placed... their guns on the east side
of the river, protecting the bridgehead from any possible counterattack. 164 The
men were in a state of mind where a normal bodily function, with the right actor
in the right situation, could be hilarious. However, since pristine civilians might not
think this was funny or proper, Patton cleaned up the story in his autobiography.
In, War As I Knew It, Patton gave his story of the incident, "I crossed the Rhine
at Oppenheim, stopping to spit in the river." 165 From what was apparent in the
picture, Patton obviously did more that spit. Again the entire story was not told in
the history of the war, about what Gls actually found entertaining.

i

I
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How the man who took this picture had a camera, that he had taken off a
dead German, introduces a historical tradition of war: collecting booty. Searching
for "souvenirs" was a "principle occupation" when the circumstances of combat
allowed it. 166 This aspect of the collective experience provided Gls with a major
distraction in time and thought. This activity gave soldiers something to do they
actually wanted to do, and even found pleasure in. Moreover, the word souvenir
has a meaning which assumes the possessor would survive, and one would have
something to show for his experience. This is what one soldier thought when he
took an ornamental Nazi dagger off a German soldier he captured. Seeing the
dagger he instantly thought "I'm going to take that back home with me." 167 Gls had
to think this way, they had to keep up their confidence they would survive.
Another soldier found a movie camera on a dead German officer in the Battle of
the Bulge, with the film still intact.

He quickly tucked the camera into his

dufflebag, however when later requiring medical care he never saw the dufflebag,
or camera again.

"I'd like to have kept it, and had the film developed. . . .

Somebody snagged it I'm sure. "168
The most popular and desired object in the hunt for souvenirs was a
German pistol. Like one individual, "about all I wanted was a German Luger." 169
Eight of the twelve men in this paper had possession of a German pistol at one
time in their combat career. 170 A veteran of a rear-echelon headquarters company,
who had more time to search for such items, took home three pistols, which was
the limit.

"You're allowed three pistols, and I had three."

He also sent two
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German rifles home in the mail. Captured German weapons were so prevalent in
his unit, like most all rear-echelon units, that they sold them for profit to those even
farther in the rear. He said they gave the confiscated weapons to their "mailman
and he'd take them back and sell them for us. We'd get a hundred dollars a piece
for them." 171 Black market activity was a common and lucrative distraction for
many in rear-echelon units.
As one soldier's letter to his parents indicates, the word "souvenir" took on
an expanded meaning in combat. The letter was written on March 12, 1945 in the
German Rhineland .
. . . speaking of mischief, I've really been in it. Looting these kraut
homes after they flee. Souvenirs galore .... The fellahs [sic] take
everything valuable they can. 172
More than the legitimate spoils of war established by the army, which was anything
of Nazi origin, men made a common practice of "looting" anything catching their
fancy, obviously with no regard for civil property. This again illustrates soldiers'
moral and ethical change.

Because the man who wrote the letter had been

involved in "mischief', he knew what was occurring was basically wrong, but it was
totally acceptable in the abnormal world of combat. Accordingly, there was nothing
wrong with partaking in the looting, and then even telling his parents about it.
Because Gls own interests were supreme, and they in essence set the
standards of behavior, anything they wanted they took, as long as they could
feasible care for it. In their state of mind, their conscience did not stop them from
looting, and in most situations, neither did their officers who often had the same
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intention. 173 "The guys would go through houses and take anything they wanted.
There wasn't anything said about it. "174 Another veteran experienced the same.
"We all stold[sic]. In general, everything that was German was free game." 175
Although, looting was not only confined to Germany; looting occurred most
anywhere Gls fought, even in Allied countries. 176 However there were times when
soldiers were deterred from looting, booby traps always made men leery. "It was
hard telling what you'd find. You had to be careful for booby traps." 177 This was
similar to what another veteran said, "you might roll a guy over and try to rob his
wallet, or wrist watch. Then they would blow up on you." 178 There were also times
when there was nothing left to loot.
You've got to remember that a house that's had Germans in it, and
then Allies in it, and then Germans in it, and then Allies in it, and
then its been hit with artillery and bombs. There's just not much
left. 179
Nevertheless, for an example of how powerful the attraction of collecting war
booty actually was, see Appendix J.
Another distraction, similar in nature to looting souvenirs, was looting
consumables, "scavenging" for food and drink. 180 Official rations typically provided
soldiers with adequate nourishment, but it was never good enough in quality, or
quantity. "We were always hungry." 181 Accordingly, Gls always supplemented their
rations. In doing so they had an insatiable appetite for anything different, anything
"for a change." 182 When not in an engagement, but nevertheless still at the front,
men were obsessed with searching, even hunting, for food.

One recollection

illustrates the collective experience, chickens and eggs were a favorite.
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Guys would check the chicken houses for eggs all the time .... We
butchered a chicken once in a while too, when we would get the
time. 183
Two other veterans spoke of fishing by throwing hand grenades into the water
then collecting the dead fish after the explosion. 184 It also was not unheard of for
men to kill deer, cattle, or pigs and then butcher them for food. 185
In many situations it was the civilian who had little or no food, and it was the
GI that gave them food, if they had it to spare and were permitted. 186 One veteran
recalled, "the fact is, most of those people didn't have any food." 187 However, in
some situations when civilians did have food, no matter how little or even when
hidden, this did not stop Gls from devouring it.

A soldier's letter from the

Rhineland on February 16, 1945 illustrates this.
I found a half a bushel of apples in a farmer's tool shed. They didn't
last long after we got through them. Also took care of his turnips
and onions too. Ha! On German soil so why not. 188
Never knowing if they would live to eat another day, Gls binged and gorged
themselves whenever they had the opportunity, which is one manifestation of their
hedonistic impulses. Supplementing food functioned as a distraction that satisfied
Gls physical needs, and also some of their wants. 189
Another want of the GI was alcohol, accordingly soldiers spent considerable
amounts of free time looking for it. One veteran recalled looking for food, and
looking for alcohol, was "about half and half." 190 Another man commented on this
common distraction.
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When we were on the move, there were a lot of old boozers in there,
jokers always looking for liquor. Every house we went into, the first
thing they did was pull the cabinet doors open looking for liquor. 191
Another man recalled, "if they could find anything they would [drink it]." This same
man remembered how his unit learned to look in the attics for hidden bottles of
liquor that would normally have been found in cellars. 192 The search for alcohol
was a distraction that often had positive results. One veteran held the opinion the
"most rewarding diversion was the search for booze. "193 Alcohol could act as an
anodyne, aiding men in enjoying themselves and enabling them to temporarily
forget their problems. 194 However, most Gls were not drunkards, with survival the
foremost concern the majority knew alcohol was permissible in moderation, but as
always, not in excess. Several men were dead set against drinking alcohol in
combat situations, it was too dangerous when life depended on constant vigilance.
One man said they drank alcohol when near the rear, but "not on the line. "195
Another man recalled, "we were smart enough .... We didn't want to be out there
fighting and be half drunk." 196 Another man held the same attitude.
You didn't want to go out there with people shooting at you, and you
be drunk. I figured that was the wrong place to have any kind of
liquor. The fact is, I was afraid of it. I never wanted to touch any of
the damned stuff. A lot of the guys got sick. 197
Similar to bad alcohol, there were always problems associated with
overindulgence. Intoxication was noted as the largest contributing factor to crime
and misbehavior in the ET0. 198 It was also a contributing factor to accidents,
alcohol in excess always had the tendency to be dangerous. One man recalled
an instance were two soldiers were killed by a nervous sentry. The two were "out
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boozing" and forgot the password, and when questioned made the fatal mistake
of running. 199
An anodyne that typically accompanied alcohol, but used to an even greater
extent, was cigarette smoking. Almost all Gls smoked cigarettes during the war.
"About all of us smoked." 200 Only one man in this sample did not smoke, and he
knew he was a rarity.

"I never ever smoked cigarettes." 201

In an age when

smoking was glorified and a sign of true grit; young men belonged when they
smoked. Even if the health risks were readily known, it would not have been a big
concern for men in their situation, they enjoyed smoking too much. Several men
spoke of relaxing and passing the time with a cigarette. Even smoking afforded
Gls with a temporary respite and distraction from the fight.

Like one veteran

thought, "it seemed like a smoke calmed your nerves .... I don't know if it did, but
it gave us something to do." 202 Accordingly, cigarettes were an essential
component of good morale. When one veteran's unit ran out, they almost rioted
before they were re-supplied. 203
Another valuable source of distractions for the GI was the often elusive, but
the always pleasing "joys of fraternization." 204

Soldiers lucky enough to be

involved in the liberation of Allied lands were often swept away in the jubilant
celebrations that followed.

However, even these high spirited moments were

fleeting as the GI always moved on. 205 It was nothing near the fashion of meetings
in Allied countries, but despite being prohibited, Gls never stopped fraternizing with
German civilians. 206 It must be noted that contact with German civilians took place
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on no great scale until after the Rhine crossings in March, 1945. Before this time
many German civilians had evacuated from the west bank of the Rhine, but
afterwards there was no place to flee, and it was also necessary to deal with the
exodus from the east escaping the Soviets.

As a result, most fraternization

occurred in the latter stages of the war when Gls were commonly billeting in
German houses.
What one man experienced illustrates how fraternization could allow men
to enjoy the finer pleasures of life in the middle of war. Billeted in a house of a
German family (a medical doctor, his wife, and two teen-age daughters) a friend
approached the man and said the daughters were
'going on about how un-cultured American soldiers are. Why don't
you go over and play the piano for them.' So I went over and played
the piano for them. Here I am with a Tommy gun across my back,
and hand grenades in my pockets, playing piano for these two pretty
women. We had a very pleasant time. . . . I was playing some
classical music for them. It's one of those incongruous things that
happens only in war. 207
It was the unusual things like this that Gls needed and always thrived on.
Obviously distractions from the misery were the best when pleasurable, and there
was little else better than female companionship. One veteran experienced a
situation enjoyable in civilian life and heaven in a combat zone. Occupying a
German home late in the war with a group of young German women, his unit
made themselves a party. With no young German men around the women were
excited about the Gls, along with their cigarettes and rations. At the same time
the men were enthralled at the sight of women, and thus decided to break out their
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alcohol to lighten things up even more. With a chance to live out their youth, the
young men and women spent the rest of the evening drinking, smoking, dancing,
and flirting.

"You could communicate, and have a good time."

However,

disappointing for the men who had more than that on their minds, all they did was
communicate. 208
What these soldiers had on their minds, was what all Gls were obsessed
with: sex, but more aptly the lack of sex.

Sex was one thing that was more

pleasurable than mere female companionship, however it was also rarer. None
of the infantrymen in this paper spoke of personal sexual encounters in their time
in combat.

This was also consistent with the majority of veterans' personal

biographies. 209 One man recalled, in most situations, "you didn't see any women
in the first place. "210 However, towards the war's end there were more women to
be found, especially in the larger German cities. Other than after the war, most
likely if a GI was fortunate to find a consenting women, this was time. Not only
were German women were available, but also the multitudes of displaced women.
These hungry, deprived women were hardly averse to prostitution. "The slave labor
women ... would do anything for food. They would give their bodies for food, for
clothing, for anything." 211

Nevertheless, sexual deprivation was the norm the

overwhelming majority of time. The individual whose squad smoked and drank
with the young German women, came the closest to having sex, as far as the men
in this sample revealed. It turned out this man was even stymied.
One night I had a little gal in bed and she was wrapped ... with
some kind of cloth all over down there so you couldn't get anywhere
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near close to her.... She did that on purpose. She kind of outwitted
me.212
Another time men had a better opportunity for contact with women was on
rest and recuperation.

However, R&R was another thing most usually went

without. If men were fortunate to survive long enough, they might have had a day
or two rest off the line in a rest area every month or two. 213 From the twelve men
in this sample, only one was sent on R&R to an exotic location. This man said he
"lucked out", and won a raffle giving him and a few other's in his unit three days
leave in Paris while the rest of their unit stayed on the line. However, other than
sightseeing, his biggest adventure was having his new combat jacket stolen. 214
For those few that had the opportunity, R&R was a valuable distraction. Men were
relatively out of danger, and with this respite from fear soldiers could let down their
guard and totally relax, possibly partaking in the previously described pleasures
of fraternization. Although in the real life of an infantryman, R&R was mostly an
unanswered wish.
Already established, this was often the same for sex, and this fact
sometimes caused problems. The man who said he was in bed with a women,
knew what he wanted but did not push the issue when the woman did not agree.
However, some soldiers did push women against their will and resort to rape. Two
men referred to instances where they knew cases of rape occurred. One knew
some of the men in his company had committed the crime.
I have known a couple of guys that committed rape over there. It did
happen a few times where I was. I really don't think there was a lot
of it, but there was some I know. 215
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How some soldiers could not control themselves is also part of the reality of the
collective experience. For the criminal element always present in the ranks, rape
might satisfy their unfulfilled urges. Alcohol could also play a large role in this type
of misbehavior. This was the case for what one man experienced making his way
into a German town while under artillery fire. While running and then ducking in
between shellbursts, a distressed middle-aged German man gained his attention
by frantically motioning for him to look inside his home. Looking inside the house
he saw another GI trying to rape a women.
He had this guy's wife down on the couch. He was drinking, he was
about two-thirds looped . . . and trying to tear the clothes off this
lady. After I saw what the situation was, I saw the 35th Division
patch on his shoulder, I said, 'soldier, what the hells a matter with
you.' He started to rattle something off about the woman .... I said,
'you can't do that, now get the hell out of here and leave these
people alone. 216
This soldier pushed the other out the door to the gratitude of the smiling man and
crying woman, "danke, danke", the man repeated as the soldier went on his way.
After the fact rapes were often swept under the rug by the culprit's fellows, but if
they could be stopped in progress they sometimes were. 217
More common than the slight possibility of consensual sex, Gls found
pleasure and were distracted from worry in several more significant ways. One
way was through what is described as one of the "secret attractions of war": Gls
"delight with seeing.'' 218 In their bizarre surroundings soldiers were intrigued, even
excited, with the previously unseen, the outlandish things they could never see in
civilian life. Veterans know war offers plenty as a "spectacle. "219 Seeking out the
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unusual and unexplored broke up the monotony, while satisfying inquisitive minds.
For example, two men said they looked inside knocked out tanks. After that they
never looked again, but they still had the initial desire to look. One man gave the
reason why his unit stopped what they were doing, climbed on up the tank, and
peered inside. "You wanted to see what was going on, curiosity." 220
What two other veterans did illustrates how insensitivity helped men satisfy
their curiosities. The two said as soldiers they were interested with finding out
more about certain items of the German soldiers' uniform and equipment. They
discovered it easiest to find out what they wanted to know by checking out
German corpses. One veteran remembered how
the Germans had a backpack that had a fur piece on the back of it,
and I don't know what it was for. Whether it zipped up over their
head or what. ... I reached down one time to take a better look at
that pack .... I don't know why guys pick things up. 221 The German
soldier always had a funny looking water or coffee container. They
had a funny looking round one that looked something like a juice
can, and it looked to me like it had two lids on it. I had to investigate
one of them one time .... I wondered 'how in the hell do they get
that drink out of there.' ... We had to check all that stuff out. 222
The word "we" indicates that checking out German equipment was a group activity.
After winning an engagement Gls had to make sure the enemy was truly dead,
which was a good time to look over their former foe and study and rate them.
One veteran's experience is a prime example of how spectacles could
distract attention away from combat's reality: death.

Clearing mines from the

roadway before a German town which his unit, and a unit of tanks, planned on
entering a German sniper shot and killed one of the men.
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There was a guy out there looking around, and all of a sudden he
just, ugh, fell over dead. One of the guys in the tank said: 'that
church steeple!' [The shot came from the church steeple.] ... They
just blew hell out of that church steeple and it was funny .... The
bell started ringing gong, gong, gong, while the church was coming
down .... It was kind of funny to be standing there watching that
church fall down, and all the time the church was coming down the
bell was ringing .... I laughed about that bell ringing. Now why
that's so funny I don't know. 223
Why this man, and the rest of his unit, thought this was funny was not only
a result of their "delight in seeing" the spectacles, but also another "secret
attraction of war", the "delight in destruction."224 Soldiers often found it thrilling to
see the damage they could inflict, another thing they could never see or do as
civilians. The fact their target was a church compounded this; in their mixed up
world, the more bizarre the better, it was too surreal to be taken seriously.
Significant about this is how this sight and the sound of the bell overshadowed the
death of the GI, therefore this memory is associated with humor, not sorrow.
Other veteran's experiences illustrate this "delight in destruction." The first
example is the individual in the anti-tank squad that used their 57 mm gun once,
for target practice in Frankfurt. He thought "it was exciting" to see the destructive
firepower of their weapon when his squad scored hits on their targets. At the time
it made no difference the targets were civilian homes. How they could delight in
this, like the destruction of the church, again shows Gls' moral lapse. These men
had to enjoy their shots that hit on target, they were doing their job well. They
could not and did not concern themselves with the homes they destroyed, or the
civilians they might have injured or killed. 225
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Three other men commented on this same feeling of exhilaration with
firepower and destruction.

For one man it came when his squad spotted a

German ammo truck on an open stretch of road and opened fire with their M-1
rifles using armor piercing rounds. When hit the ammunition onboard ignited
causing a brilliant explosion. His squad was impressed with the results after they
inspected the burning vehicle.

"That's the first time I saw what those armor

piercing shells could do. "226 Another veteran's experience also originated with the
57 mm anti-tank gun. He used the same adjective as his counterpart in another
anti-tank unit, "exciting", to explain the feeling of destroying German observation
posts. 227 Why it was "exciting", and not scary or terrifying, was in these situations
they were doing their job in relative safety. Houses and observation posts do not
shoot back. Another soldier had the opportunity to enjoy shooting an object that
offered no resistance. In the Ardennes his squad had bazooka target practice on
a knocked-out German Tiger tank. Each soldier had two shots and always making
the situation amusing, they made it a contest to see who was the best shot. "We
got a big kick out of that. "228
"Delight with destruction" also came in the form of deliberate destruction of
property.

One veteran seeing such instances could only describe his fellow

soldiers who participated as "berserkers and mad destroyers. "229 Two veterans in
this sample used the term, "wanton destruction", to characterize soldier's actions
when they got out of line, and purposely destroyed objects.

230

One said,

there was quite a bit of destruction, a wanton destruction . . .
unnecessarily destroying property, mostly in Germany. That's
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something I saw several times. I remember going by a house in
Germany ... and some Gls must have ransacked the house and
just thrown everything, practically everything out of the house. I
picked up a book there and brought it along because it was
something very unusual. I still have it. 231
This man only saw examples of wanton destruction, but another veteran
spoke of a situation where he, and other men in his squad, lost control of their
tempers and participated in "wanton destruction" of their own. Their company had
just captured a town, but they also took casualties in the process. Saying the men
were mad is an understatement. The individual said they were all "ornery" while
checking houses for hiding Germans. In their outrage, many of the soldiers
released their anger with destruction. One of the men noticed a telephone still
intact so he pulled it out of the wall, shouting the people would never again talk to
Adolph. In a fit of rage the soldier telling the story threw a clay bust of Hitler into
a nice Grandfather clock, smashing both items. 232 Actions like this were often
ignited by casualties, the anger and frustration over the loss of buddies. As one
veteran described it, men were "blinded by rage to destroy."233 This was both a
distraction and a way for soldiers to cope; it gave them something else to think
about other than their losses, and it blew off steam.
Another veteran spoke of an example of "wanton destruction", but on a
much greater scale. This occurred after his unit had sustained casualties during
a battalion size engagement over a small German town. The town changed hands
several times in the early morning hours in what the man called a "hard fought
battle." Once the battalion finally secured the town, soldiers did whatever they
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could to try to live with their losses. Suddenly, this individual, who was standing
in the street, saw a piece of furniture fall out of a building's third floor window
crashing onto the street. The first piece was followed by another, and then
another, and then several more pieces of furniture came crashing down. A crowd
quickly gathered; with their delight in seeing the spectacles, soldiers had to get
an eyeful. The man recalled his emotions at the time.
I was in great glee just watching it happen . . . it was rather
interesting. Pretty soon guys were carrying furniture up to the third
floor to drop out. At first it was just dropping the furniture that was
on the third floor. And then the second floor, and then the first floor.
And then they were bringing furniture up just to see it drop. 234
Once these Gls cleaned out the building, they denuded the nearby houses of their
furniture to be used as playthings. The men only stopped when they became
exhausted from carrying all the furniture up the stairs. This is a prime example of
both "wanton destruction" and "delight with destruction."
Taking place in a battalion area, and since it lasted about thirty minutes,
one may ask why senior officers, especially a major or captain, did not stop this
flagrant display of misconduct. When asked what the officers in charge did about
this, the man said the officers had the attitude of "so what. They're not hurting
anybody." 235 Another veteran, a former sergeant in charge of eleven men, recalled
the same attitude in similar situations. "Things get a little crazy at times. You
overlook a lot of it. "236 Men in charge realized it was not advantageous to try to
stop the majority if they were bent on destruction, it would deny them their
pleasure. This previous incident most likely started with soldiers' rage, but
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snowballed into a mischievous prank, combat style. The individual looked at the
incident this way.

"It was a way to pass the time, and sort of a vengeance I

assume on the town. . . . The German people were living in a glass house
weren't they. "237
Looking back on this incident, this man now must also look at this from the
other side. He had to admit, "it doesn't speak well for us does it. ... If it was my
furniture today I would have been upset." 238 How this occurred, and then how it
was allowed, is testimony to the change of men in combat. Men had no concern
for German possessions, or for how they would be viewed by history.

The

immediate present was all that mattered. Incidents like this, the malicious ways
men passed their time, are another part of the war not told by the U.S. Army
series. The book, The Siegfried Line Campaign, portrayed the events of the battle
for the town, but made no mention of the delight in "wanton destruction."239
Another aspect of Gls' "delight with destruction" needs to be addressed.
One source asserted the "ultimate destruction is killing another human being. "240
One situation where men might experience the feeling of delight was when an
active enemy sniper would be rooted out and shot. Men often felt satisfied when
snipers were killed, especially if they had wounded or killed close friends. One
veteran reminisced on his feelings when snipers were shot, "good, they got what
they deserved. "241 It was often the soldier who actually shot the sniper who felt
best about his soldierly performance.

When Gls killed the enemy preventing

further bloodshed of their own, they often felt a sense of "pride and sense of
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accomplishment. "242 For an example, one soldier who shot a sniper that had killed
several of his fellow soldiers was "so delighted" that he jumped up and down, and
verbally "gave all the German's hell. "243
There was the same exhilaration when soldiers demonstrated their skills as
expert rifle marksmen, killing the enemy with long range shots. Like one soldier
who shot a German and then proceeded to jump and shout in delight, "I got him!
I got him!" 244 It was not unusual to hear "whoops and shouts", "catcalls", and
"cheers" when unsuspecting Germans were caught in the open and killed by rifle
fire. 245 However, not all soldiers delighted in the destruction of the enemy, but for
many, the true delight was in their own survival. Inspecting the perimeter of his
front line a battalion commander witnessed this incident.
A stretch of farmland along the bottom of the ravine was in full view,
as we watched, three or four Germans appeared, trudging along in
single file . . . . Very much as in a shooting gallery, one of our
riflemen crumpled them into gray bundles .... The rifleman who had
done the shooting had a wolfish grin; the rest looked on without
speaking. There were few avid killer in our ranks. 246
That there were "few avid killers" is supported by experiences of most
veterans in this sample, however there were those very few avid killers. These
soldiers were so uncommon they stood out, only one veteran spoke of a soldier
like this. He was a seventeen year old who lied about his age to get into the
army, the man characterized him as an "eager beaver." The "eager beaver"
enjoyed keeping count of how many he shot, and then notching his rifle whenever
he added to his tally. He also found humor every morning by waking everyone up,
saying it was time to "go kill some more krauts. "247 There is evidence there were
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soldiers that kept count of how many they shot, as notches on their rifle butts
confirm. 248 However, when most had to kill, if at all, the real delight came in their
own survival.
Two veterans spoke of this feeling. One said,
if we were pinned down by a tank that was hidden in a part of a
building, or a machine gun in a German building, and the artillery, or
air force would knock it out. There would be a good hurrah. 249
Soldiers often experienced this relief and rejoicing when the enemy was destroyed,
"it's much the same way as a point after touchdown I guess, it's one for our
side. "25° Feelings and actions like these were the cathartic release of the pent-up
fear and stress, unleashed when soldiers suddenly realized they again prevailed.
Another individual's experience illustrates the delight with survival. This
veteran, from the 29th Division, mentioned a firefight in Normandy when his
squad's BAR man saved several soldiers' lives. He recreated the situation:
we were going across an open field and there was a hedgerow all
around the field. Up ahead of us, the Germans had cut out a slice
out of it [the hedgerow] and had a machine gun planted in there. Of
course they were waiting for us to get out in that field before they
opened up, which they did .... I don't know how many people got
hit ... but they kept firing at us, and Brady was right behind me, he
was the BAR man. He opened up with that BAR and he wiped out
that machine gun nest. Boy I'm telling you, bullets were just flying
around me. He was behind me about ten yards or so and every shot
he fired it just seemed like it was going to hit me right in the back of
the head .... He saved us that day. He saved a lot of us, not just
me.251

The instant after this happened this individual realized the significance of this act.
He suddenly felt the need to repay his buddy in the only way he knew how. He
had planned on taking home as a souvenir the Nazi dagger taken from the
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German prisoner he captured. When taking the dagger from the prisoner the BAR
man, Brady, commented on how much he like the dagger, and how he would like
to have one like it. Therefore, as a gesture of his gratitude for the job well done,
he gave his well deserving buddy the dagger.
I just pulled it out, and pitched it over to him, 'that's yours.' I said.
. . . Brady was wanting that you know. 252
What was obviously most important was the soldier saved the squad, their survival
is where they found delight.
For those Gls fortunate to have survived and kept up with their unit, on May
8, 1945 they experienced what was to that point their greatest delight in
destruction. Victory in Europe and the destruction of Nazism, what all Gls had
fought and died for, finally arrived. Rehabilitating in a hospital in Belgium, one
soldier wrote his wife about the outstanding news.
This is the day we all have been waiting for.... The boys here are
quite happy. They rang the church bells in town [Cine, Belgium] and
the train came by and really gave the whistle. . . . The guys can
hardly wait ... they will no doubt go on a pass in town and get really
soused. 253
Situations like this were the same in all units. Once the realization set in
that Germany finally was defeated, men also experienced a delight with survival,
this time to a level never felt before. They were successful in their individual
personal war. One soldier wrote his emotions in his wartime journal. "I have
made it! ... I, me, myself.'' 254 Men in all units now had a good reason to rejoice,
accordingly they "celebrated the evening.''255 The majority of veterans used the
same word to describe the events that occurred on the night of May 8:
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"celebration." 256 If they had access to alcohol it often flowed to excess, drinking
was a part of most all celebrations as one veteran could attest. "We burst into
some cellars and came up with all sorts of goodies and we had a big party." 257
The war in Europe was over, but it still took hardened soldiers some getting
used to the idea they were no longer in combat. There was no more "black out"
on the line, also no sound of the distant rumblings of war, men found the silence
unusual. Men even felt odd being able to light and smoke a cigarette in the dark
with no worries. 258 However, men could not be too overjoyed, just because the
war was officially over they were not totally out of danger.

There were Nazi

fanatics still intent of waging a war of their own. On May 9, while one man was
getting a haircut, a sniper's bullet missed him only by "inches." Fortunately the
sniper was killed before he shot anyone, but men still had to be on their guard,
wary of their former enemy. 259 Soldiers had to be wary of the former battleground
as well. One veteran witnessed an ambulance roll over an anti-tank mine, killing
two medics, days after the war's end. 260
No time for exultation, the euphoria of victory in Europe quickly passed and
reality set in. The war was only half finished. The other enemy, Japan, still had
to be defeated and Gls were obligated to serve "for the duration." Accordingly,
towards the end of the war in Europe, soldiers started worrying about fighting the
Japanese. What had been rumors, and then confirmed by the army newspaper
Stars and Stripes, was that infantrymen were needed from Europe to fight the
Japanese. One man remembered this concern.
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There was a lot of talk about going to Japan. I was sweating it out
I sure was .... Of course rumors abound and we were pretty well
convinced the last few months of the war in Europe that we would
be committed as a division [the 34th Division committed to Japan]. 261
His trepidation was for naught; for he considered himself lucky when it became
known the 34th Division was not picked to go to Japan. 262 However, thousands
of Gls were sent back to the U.S. to train for the planned invasion. Accordingly,
out of the men in this sample that were physically able, half of them were selected
to participate in the expected fighting. 263
The four men interviewed slated to go to Japan all returned to the U.S. by
the first week of June 1945, less than one month after VE-day. These men had
earned the privilege of a one month furlough to go home and re-acquaint
themselves with their families. However, after the furlough the men were required
to report back to their unit for "jungle training" before leaving for the Pacific. 264
After what they had lived through, these combat veterans were not enthusiastic
about going to Japan, they had enough of combat. One veteran's understatement
illustrates the collective attitude, he said his unit was "very unhappy .... We
thought we had to do it again." 265
Another individual knew a man even more unhappy than most. When they
received their furlough his friend told him with all seriousness, "I'm not going to
Japan." He wondered if he would ever see his friend again, but when the time
came he did.

He reported back to their unit like everyone else, reluctant, but

ready to fight when required. 266 However, Gls were no longer needed, Hiroshima
and Nagasaki determined this. The final delight with destruction, the two atomic
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bombs termination of the war, saved unknown thousands of Gls from death and
injury. "That stopped our trip to Japan", one man said with great relief. 267
Exactly as in the past, Gls would have fought if ordered, even the man who
once said, "I'm not going to Japan." His actions illustrate the "reluctant obedience"
of the collective mentality. Gls would gripe and complain, but do what was
necessary in the safest and most careful way possible.

CONCLUSION
My paper demonstrates how the collective mentality gave Gls the will and
ability to persevere and withstand the horrors of combat. The determination to
keep fighting resulted from the quintessential aspect of the collective mentality: the
goal of returning home with their honor intact, presupposing survival. Common
virtues were loyalty to one's buddies and pride in upholding the respect of these
men. For the vast majority, desertion and the repercussions in both military and
civilian life of a dishonorable discharge was unacceptable.
needed soldiers discovered untapped reserves of energy.

Therefore, when
One veteran

commented on this surge, "you pick up energy when you know things have to be
done." 1
The "good times" soldiers experienced most always came in the form of
camaraderie; they also functioned as distractions from the misery helping to make
combat bearable. Men thrived on the powerful sustenance of friendships,
especially humor. In the hour by hour mundane struggle for existence a respite
and diversion, where soldiers were not worrying but instead enjoying the fruits of
camaraderie, was invaluable. Distractions facilitated one's ability to persevere
whether a personal distraction, letter reading and writing is one example, or a
group distraction, like chasing down a chicken to cook and eat or dropping German
furniture three floors.
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Like their expanded sense of humor (such as frozen enemy corpses as
sentries), what soldiers did as distractions offers proof of their transient moral and
ethical lapse.

Looting, the "delight in seeing", "delight in destruction", and

especially "wanton destruction" are other prime examples. "Wanton destruction"
often resulted from the rage over the death of friends, but was also spawned by
the aggravation and frustration associated with soldiers' "reluctant obedience."
When tempers reached a point they could no longer be restrained soldiers had to
release the anger and frustration of knowing they could be killed anytime, but they
had to fight on.
Destroying much of a German town's furniture for spite and thrills illustrates
how soldiers' adjustment was totally essential if they were to enjoy the outrageous
things they found amusing. "It doesn't speak well for us does it", said the man
who witnessed this example delight in "wanton destruction." 2

Men in all units

reacted to combat in the same way; several veterans noticed the "unsavory moral
change" that came over soldiers in combat. 3

One man's unit came to this

conclusion while still in combat. He write how his unit had a "discussion of our
failure as an invading army to present a favorable picture of ourselves . . . all
types behaved badly." 4 Another veteran made the same observation, "the hell of
it was, in that war we forgot to remember what was right and what was wrong." 5
Reflecting on the atrocities that occurred, another man agreed, "we weren't
thinking too well." 6 Forced to make this adjustment soldiers could permit nothing
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to interfere with their survival and positive fighting spirit, not their previous moral
standards, not their emotions, nor their fears.
Young American men were fighting for what cannot be denied as a noble
cause, nevertheless, once involved in the fight, these men demonstrated how they
were not above the moral corruption produced by war. This is demonstrated by
the atrocities and brutalities committed against German soldiers, along with the
essentially criminal acts committed against the civilian population and their
property. The results of Gls' actions, who had a good cause and intention, are
testimony to the evils of war and why these men fought for peace (see Appendix
K).
War's impact on its participants is part of the peculiar wartime paradox: how
combat produced the best and worst experiences of the participants lives. One
veteran characterized his experiences as the "ultimate depth and height" of his
life. 7 Like so many others, despite all the "terrible" things one man experienced,
he still said, "it's the greatest experience I had in my lifetime." However, because
it was so "terrible" he had to admit, "but I wouldn't want anybody to go through it."8
Another veteran felt quite the same, "it was quite an experience. . . . I wouldn't
take a million dollars for what I experienced, but I wouldn't want to do it again for
a million dollars." 9

Another comment illustrates the collective experience.

"It

wasn't all bad, but I wouldn't want to do it again." 10
Combat fluctuated, usually very rapidly and frequently, between two
extremes: between the defining apex of soldiers lives, and the nadir of their terror
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and misery. The Allies' victory over Hitler's murderously repressive regime and
expansionistic ideology, however marred by the atrocities and moral degradation
is another example of this paradox. The development and then violent and
unnatural termination of friendships is another.

Friendships, camaraderie, and

humor created unequaled memories of the simple joyous things in life, but
veterans can never quit grieving for what is impossible for them to forget: the
suffering and loss of life of so many good friends. 11
The pleasure and excitement of Gls' "delight in seeing" was similar. A man
who saw parts of the world he felt he would not have otherwise seen, described
his experience as "wonderful. . . . I wouldn't take anything for it. It was exciting
to see all that stuff. " 12 Another veteran commented on this aspect of the collective
experience. "There were a lot of good sights. You see a lot of good things too." 13
Nevertheless, always homesick, soldiers always desired to get home to the ones
they loved. Regardless of the fascinating sights they saw in the process, men
fought to resume their interrupted life and escape the deprivation, the fear, and
savagery of combat. One veteran's statement illustrates this. "We saw a lot of
stuff. I was in Rome three times. . . . But you feel like, 'so what' , you're wanting
to get back home. "14
How G Is had many of their best experiences of life, and created unmatched
bonds of friendships with strangers they met entirely by chance, verifies the
existence of the collective mentality. First of all, without their moral and emotional
insensitivity, men never would have had the state of mind to find pleasure amidst
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the madness. This adjustment allowed soldiers to experience "good times" and
anything near "wonderful" in such a terribly abnormal situation. 15 Then according
to the other facet of their way of thinking soldiers accentuated all aspects of life by
exploiting any anodyne to the fullest degree; especially once they realized how
quickly their life could be ended.
That most veterans felt they had to readjust to civilian life also supports the
validity of the collective mentality. Once away from combat men made an effort
to forget the vile aspects of war and start over; they could be themselves again,
and regain their civilian moral standards. One man commented, "after the fact, I
think people pretty much revert to what they were before the fact." 16 Another
veteran's opinion illustrates this collective readjustment.

"I was an altogether

different person in combat than I was before or after. . . . We were in artificial
atmosphere over there. Once the war was over we went back to our old ways." 17
Combat nevertheless left lastingimpressions on the minds of the
participants. Veterans were compensated in some manner for what they endured
by the retention of the positive qualities developed during their ordeal; specifically
patience, tolerance, self-assurance, and self-discipline.

Appendix A
Appropriately when studies focus on the individual soldier's perspective the
strategy of the war assumes a secondary role. Most often Gls were not aware of
the strategy behind their orders, they were far too preoccupied with staying alive.
"You've got your own little foxhole and the area surrounding it and that's all you
think about." # 20 Hill. The following veterans expressed the same opinion about
their lack of knowledge concerning the strategy of war. "You didn't know
nothing[sic]", said one man.# 25 Bowen.# 24 Breeze. #18 Everman. #17 Hoenes.
#23 Hott.
Appendix B
"No one can understand the reality of war unless your there yourself. I can't really
explain it to a person." #23 Hott. One soldier who fought in Italy stated: "I got a
letter from my folks and my Mom said she was sure glad I wasn't up in Europe
were all the fighting was going on. That's just because there wasn't as much
[fighting in Italy] and the newspapers didn't play it up because it wasn't as exciting
to read." #20 Hill. In a letter to his parents one GI informed them they will "never
know just what its like when a big shell crashes through the roof of a building in
which your trying to rest. Hell from start to finish Dad. Home folks will never know
what it's like." Willis Bowen. Letter to parents. Transcript dated March 16, 1945.
Appendix C
The mentality of survival and the resulting desire to stay out of unnecessary
danger saved a man's life the author otherwise would have never known, his
grandfather. This occurred while he was temporarily dislocated from his unit after
being sent to a rear-area aid station for a nagging knee injury. Once arriving at
the aid station the medics rerouted him and in the process of trying to find the
other aid station he got himself lost. He thus decided there was nothing else to
do but walk back to where he knew his unit was when he left them. However,
when he arrived to where they had been, his unit was gone. All he could do was
head off down a road in the direction he believed his unit had gone. Walking
down he began to hear explosions and small arms fire in the distance. He
concluded the sound of battle was his unit involved in heavy fighting to occupy a
town straddling the road ahead. Around that time a tank retriever came up the
road and the driver stopped the vehicle and asked if it was the town of Rhienberg
ahead, where he was needed to pick up some knocked out U.S. tanks. The GI
was not positive of the name of the town, but he told the driver he did know there
was some heavy fighting going on in the town. After an exchange of pleasantries
this GI turned down the offer of a ride, the driver thought it would be easier than
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walking. Considering what was going on around the town, this GI was totally
content with walking and wasting as much time as possible in hope that the
fighting would slack off. As a result the driver drove off to complete his duty, and
the GI continued toward the town in a deliberately slow gate. Minutes later he
heard a large explosion and noticed smoke bellowing above the road ahead.
Quickening his pace to see what had happened, he soon discovered the tank
retriever had hit an anti-truck mine and lay in the ditch in a mangled burning
wreck. This GI looked over the truck for any sign of the driver and finally found
the him amidst the wreckage, but he was beyond help. The driver was mortally
wounded in the blast that totally destroyed the passengers side of the vehicle.
Accordingly this man has always felt extremely lucky about the decision that he is
positive saved his life. #25 Bowen.
Appendix D
When men were injured or wounded, often regardless of severity, they commonly
experienced a long drawn out recovery period full of army red tape. The man shot
in the upper part of his right arm spent a total of twenty-two months in and out of
various hospitals in England and the U.S. After four operations this man still had
a physical impairment he had to adjust to. Due to the wound the man can grip
with his right hand, but nerve damage will not allow his muscles to retract his
grasp. This is in addition to a restricted freedom of motion in his entire arm.
Nevertheless, the man learned to overcome his difficulties and enjoy a happy
life.#24 Breeze. The man that lost three toes to frostbite spent close to one year
in various hospitals. After his foot healed from his operation he found out he
needed to learn how to walk again without the aid of the balance three toes
provide. For the first six months out of the hospital he was forced to walk with a
cane, but he quickly learned how to adapt and walk normally. #19 Evermon. The
man who was severely wounded by shrapnel from an artillery blast spent over one
year recovering in a hospital bed. His injuries required the doctors to remove three
of his ribs, his spleen, and parts of his small intestines. How this man fully
recovered and has lived well into his seventies is testimony to the resilience of the
human body. #9 Kingery. The other man that was wounded by shrapnel received
not as severe wounds to his elbow and the side of his back. He was wounded in
late October 1944 and remained in a hospital in England until the spring of 1944.
His wounds nevertheless kept him from being sent back to his unit until the war
was over in May. #15 Hott. The man hospitalized for his knee injury spent the
months of April and May 1945 rehabilitating until he was sent back to his unit in
June. #8 Bowen.

Appendix E
The personal experiences of the veterans in this sample verify that in an infantry
division rifle companies had a higher rate of attrition than rear area units, such as
headquarters companies, anti-tank companies, and medical companies. The only
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two men who were original members of rifle companies both sustained wounds in
action. #23 Hott. #24 Breeze. Moreover, evidence that soldiers in the rifle
companies bore the brunt of the casualties is that four of the five replacements
polled were assigned to rifle companies. One of these replacements commented
on how even in April 1945, when he entered the unit, because of prior losses his
squad was never to full complement. He also added that since his division, the
8th, had been in combat since North Africa not a single man was an original
member of the unit, all the men he knew had been replacements as one time or
another. #14 Brick. A replacement that went to the 34th Division, also in combat
since North Africa, commented on the very same thing; all the men in his squad
had been replacements. #18 Hill. One veteran's experience is a good indication
of how one's chances of becoming a casualty was far greater in rifle companies
than in rear-area units. This man was first made a replacement in an anti-tank
unit, and in the month with this unit during the Battle of the Bulge they never
suffered any casualties. However, after the losses the rifle companies incurred in
the Ardennes, he was transferred into Company I, 137th Regiment to help fill the
depleted ranks. When this man found out about his transfer he thought "well that's
my tail ... I also got mad about it because I thought I had a better deal riding on
the trucks." He quickly determined how much more dangerous it was in the rifle
companies. His unit never suffered any wounded when he was in the anti-tank
company, but in the rifle company he said "guys would get knocked down all the
time." #8 Bowen. Another replacement that ended up as a truck driver in an antitank squad felt lucky since he knew rifle companies were more dangerous and
physically demanding. #12 Buser. A sergeant of an anti-tank squad said his
squad suffered some casualties, but not as much as they would have if he had
been in a rifle company. "I was fortunate, had I been in a line company I would
have probably lost more." #1 O Mercer. A man that was a veteran of a
headquarters company said that despite being only 500 to 800 yards behind the
front lines, there was a "wide gulf' in the intensity of action and likelihood of
becoming a casualty between his unit and the rifle companies. Bearing this out,
five of the six men that served in rear-area units survived their entire tour of duty
casualty free. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer.
However, men in rear-area units were never totally immune to casualties, one
veteran of an anti-tank unit suffered three wounds during his stay in combat. #9
Kingery.
Appendix F
A sergeant of an anti-tank squad confirmed that confrontations between 57 mm
anti-tank gun crews and German tanks were rare. This man was in combat seven
months with the 95th Division, from October 1944 until the end of the war, and
only fired on three German tanks under combat conditions. This man stressed
that the 57 mm was more of defensive weapon, while the U.S. forces were most
often on the offensive. #1 O Mercer. Another sergeant of an anti-tank squad said
they used the weapon more often on enemy fortifications and observation towers
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than against tanks. #9 Kingery. The other two veterans that were members of
anti-tank units had no encounters with German tanks. One of these men was in
his anti-tank squad from the 5th Division from late January until the war's end.
#12 Buser. The other GI was in an anti-tank unit of the 35th Division for one
month, between mid-December 1944 and mid-January 1945. #8 Bowen. Only two
infantrymen in this sample mentioned combat involving German tanks. #15 Hott.
#21 Mercer. Another source came to a similar conclusion. "The 29ers [men of the
29th division] usually had little use for their anti-tank companies in combat since
they rarely encountered German tanks." Balkosi, 116.
Appendix G
The following stories illustrate how the mentality of survival influenced men to
disobey trivial orders they found intolerable. The following situation occurred when
soldiers trapped behind enemy lines were ordered to make their way back to
friendly forces. "They gave us orders to take our ammunition out of our guns and
fix bayonets. We were going to fight our way out by hand. . . . We weren't
supposed to shoot any of our own weapons." The soldiers had these orders since
the sound of their rifles would give away their positions. Figuring they were
outgunned it was better to try to sneak through. It turned out there was too much
hype for nothing since the soldiers silently made it to their lines with no mishaps.
The man recalled what his buddy told him after this. '"Whenever they told me to
take my ammunition out, boy that jarred my teeth!' he said. I said, 'boy me too!'
We got to talking and I don't think anybody took their ammunition out. ... I
thought that was pretty good, no one was going to let anybody get close enough
to us for us to have to stab them." #24 Breeze. Another man spoke of how the
men in his unit kept their guns off of safety when in forested areas despite orders
to the contrary. The men thought if they saw the enemy unexpectedly, because
it was difficult to see in the thick forest, they needed to have a "quick shot back."
#8 Bowen. Men aslo ignored regulations for convenience, anything to make their
hard life a little easier. With all soldiers had to carry, one man said his unit often
carried their K-rations inside their gas masks; this was if they even kept their gas
mask at all. "You weren't supposed to do it, but everyone did." #15 Hott.
Appendix H
Men were often in a state of such utter exhaustion that they learned to sleep
whenever and wherever possible. One man who said he had to learn to sleep with
the eerie sound of combat made a statement that illustrates this. "You'd sleep
whenever you got a chance. Everybody was as tired as could be." #14 Brick.
"We could sleep anytime." #9 Kingery. Men that made similar comments are as
follows. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #18 Hill.
#21 Mercer. #23 Hott. Accordingly men often had to find sleep in odd places.
One man recalled how he once slept in a bath tub, and another time he slept on
top of a billiards table. #8 Bowen. Another man said some of the best sleep he
had while in his ten days of combat came in a rain filled foxhole. #13 Breeze.
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This man said he once slept in a "compost heap." #23 Hott. One veteran in an
anti-tank unit recalled how the men developed ways they could sleep while on the
move in their trucks. The trucks had canvas straps holding ammunition securely
in place in the bed and he said the men would "fasten their belt around that strap
and lay there on that ammunition ... They would sleep maybe four or five hours
while we were driving." #9 Kingery.
Appendix I
Three veterans made use of the phrase "foxhole Christian." #3 McKenna. #14
Brick. #25 Bowen. Several sources agree that soldiers thought of religion more
often because of the real possibility of death. As one man said, "it made you think
about things like that." #5 Buser. "A lot of the guys didn't think praying did any
good until they got over there." #14 Brick. Another man said it was common to
pray that one would not be killed or injured. #4 Curran. One source stipulated that
"there are no atheists in the foxholes." Kennett, 138. The following sources agree
that most men became more contemplative about religion and what comes after
life. Astor, 210. Atwell, 317. Nevertheless, war's reality did make some men
question there religious beliefs. Giles, 24.
Appendix J
This originates from when one veteran was the first GI into the home of a
prominent member of the Nazi Government. "I was the first GI into the home of
the Vice-Chancellor Franz van Poppen. I cut off the epaulets of his son's uniform
and stuck them in my pocket." At the time he was "traveling very light" so he only
took the epaulets. However, looking back on the situation he recalled "what I
really regret ... is that he had a whole shelf of the Foreign Affairs Quarterly by the
United States Department of State .... I regret that I never picked one of those
up and brought it home." The attraction to collecting souvenirs, the spoils of war,
was so powerful that this man had no question of his right to have taken what he
wanted, regardless if it was another man's property. The irony of this story was
that this man knew who van Poppen was while most others would not have know.
"I don't suppose many of them [the other Gls] would have know much about him,
but I had happened to read his biography years before." #1 O McKenna.
Appendix K
One veteran referred to World War II, as so many have, as the "good war." #12
Buser. However, considering what actually happened, this is a problematic
catchword. It is impossible to relate atrocities, looting, and the injustices that
occurred to anything "good", but the war can be seen as "good" only in one sense:
the end result. Gls were not fighting for conquest, they were fighting to turn back
and defend against aggression. Gls fought and then went home, while the U.S.
aided in the establishment of German self-government. Rather occupy and settle
conquered lands, Gls went back to their homes and families, as peace loving
civilians. Indicative of this is the life of one veteran who spent his entire life living

172
in the same rural farm house in which he was born in 1922. This man's bedroom
even happens to be the same room where he was born. #12 Buser. One man
had this to say about the so-called "good war." "God damn war, even the good
one." Nichols, xiv.
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time into the service, assignment to either a rifle, anti-tank, or headquarters
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21.
Several men felt a repugnance towards all of the killing and dying
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23.
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24.
Thirty-four men had the opportunity to divulge their story, but only
fourteen veterans agreed to participate. The reasons most declined to discuss their
role in the war was that they did not remember, or they did not want to "relive"
their experience. One man in particular rejected previous opportunities to tell his
story but has since tried to come to grips with what he went through. "It took me
a long time before I could even talk about it. It still bothers me to talk about it
sometimes." #24 Breeze.
"Some things are vivid in your mind and some are blotted out." This
25.
man still remembers one particularly gruesome scene that is etched in his mind:
"I've thought about that a lot." #24 Breeze. Another individual deduced that "the
human mind blots out the . . . truly unpleasant situations", however this same
individual still had one incident that was to distressing to reveal. When asked if
he could elaborate on the incident he replied: "Yes, but I'm not going to tell you
ok. "#16 Curran. "There is one incident that stuck in my mind." This ex-soldier
was referring to when a barn took a direct hit by an artillery round and several men
were killed directly in front of him.#19 Everman.

"I'll never forget that.
. . . I remember it just like it was
26.
yesterday."Brick, Frank. Interview by author. #14 (10-6-92). Tape recording at
interviewee's residence. RR 1, Box 24, Neoga, II. "I remember that vividly." #10
McKenna. "Some things are vivid in your mind."#24 Breeze. "I can remember that
so clear and so vividly."#25 Bowen.
27.

#10 McKenna.

28.

#12 Buser.

CHAPTER ONE NOTES
1.

Transcript by Willis Bowen, November, 1944.

2.

Fussell, Wartime, 143.

3.
"The Japanese attack galvanized opinion." #16 Curran. The following
incident typifies the outrage and hysteria resulting from the Japanese attack.
"Shortly after that [the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor over the radio]
a bunch of other guys on fraternity row [at the University of Iowa] all came by the
house in just kind of an impromptu parade. Some of the guys had sticks and
stones like they were expecting the Japanese to invade Iowa City." #18 Hill. Men
that never wanted to fight and loved peace held an unequivocally bitter opinion of
Hitler, someone who intentionally led a country to war. One individual who had
read Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf came to the "general conclusion was that he [Hitler]
was a nut." #1 O McKenna. Another veteran thought that Hitler was just a "wild
lunatic." #25 Bowen. "We just hated him like everybody else, we thought he was
nuts." #11 Mercer.
4.
#1 O Mercer. The American people understood the "inevitability and
worth-whileness of whatever sacrifice lay ahead." The war was viewed as simply
"unavoidable." Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army
Life, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) 81, 149. Several
veterans made comments in regard to Nazi aggression, one recalled, "there was
no question he [Hitler] was on the rampage ... it was very evident. He was just
gobbling up hunks of Europe." #1 O McKenna. Another said, "the Germans invaded
those other countries over there and they were fighting in Russia and they started
bombing England. So you knew there was no way in the world we could keep out
of it." #20 Hill. "It was a necessary war. After all remember Japan and Germany
declared war on us. So you could say it was a matter of defense of our country.
I think most of the people understood this. In fact that was the most elementary
reason that could be given." #1 O McKenna. Men also comprehended the threat
to American soil as long as Nazi Germany existed. "We knew what was coming
if we didn't fight. It's best to fight on their soil than it is on ours. We were fighting
to keep them from coming over here." #24 Breeze. "It seemed he [Hitler] was
getting stronger all the time and taking over all those countries. Something had
to be done about it before he jumped over here on us. . . . You had to realize
that if we didn't go over there and settle things down, there was a good chance
they might start coming back over on us. We sure didn't want any of those jokers
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over here tearing things up." #8,25 Bowen. "The overwhelming
Americans agreed it was a war that had to be fought." Roy, Hoppes.
Remember the Home Front: An Oral Narrative of the World War
America (New York: Berkeley Books, 1977; reprint with introduction,

majority of
American's
II Years in
1992) xvii.

5.
Some men sampled paid considerable attention to the international
developments that surrounded the war, while others paid very little attention due
to their disinterest. For example, one individual stated, "I didn't follow the war too
much until about the time I got drafted. Germany, I knew they were the enemy."
#22 Everman. At the other extreme, there were men who fell into the category of
men who were "quite interested" in the war. Incidentally both of these men were
future scholars. #1 O McKenna. #16 Curran.
6.
Fussell, Wartime, 180-1. Newspapers, magazines, radio, popular
music, advertisements, cartoons, motion pictures, books, and discussions between
both family and friends all focused on the same rhetoric. For a random example,
the introduction to the New Soldiers Handbook stated that according to the
Selective Service Act, the American citizen was required to "defend our right to live
in our own American way and continue to enjoy the benefits and privilege which
are granted to the citizens of no other countries." War Department, New Soldier's
Handbook. (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1941) vii.
Another contemporary source declared Americans "must fight to defeat an enemy
who is cunning and ruthless and determined on the destruction of all that has been
most precious to us." Marquis Childs, This is Your War (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1942) 15. The same general message is repeated in all sources
published between 1941 and 1945. "No people ever had a work that meant more
than ours, either to themselves or to this earth. No Army and Navy of people ever
had a prouder, more glorious aim in hand and mind and heart than ours now has."
Joseph, Greene, The Infantry Journal Reader (New York: Doubleday, Foran, and
Company, Inc. 1943), 542. Another medium of communication that followed the
same course was the Why We Fight film indoctrination series. Explanatory in the
series title, the film defined the reasons for which Americans fought. The series
expounded the Nazi history of aggression and oppression in contrast to the history
of freedom and democracy in the United State and other Allied countries. The
series made it a point of showing how America had worked for peace in the
interwar period, while Nazi Germany prepared for total war. All recruits were
exposed to this film series during training, nevertheless it made a very little
impression on the men sampled. Only one individual out of twelve, remembered
enough about the film to comment on the series. #16 Curran. Two men
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remembered the VD, and personal hygiene films, but not the Why We Fight series.
#13 Breeze; #18 Hill. One individual stated, "I don't remember any films at all. "#22
Everman.
7.
"Hitler we had to get rid of him. What he had done wasn't right. I
was for it all the way. I think it was a good cause." #5 Buser. "There was no
doubt in my mind that was the thing to do." #15 Hott. "I was always proud of the
fact that I was in there fighting for our people ... We were in it all the way." #14
Brick. One individual held very strong feelings for a head of state ordering men to
war. If men are going to be required to possibly give their life, he felt it must be
for a "damn good reason." #10 McKenna. All veterans interviewed believed in
their "cause." #4 Curran. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #22 Everman. There
was "no doubt our cause was just." Perkins, 563.
8.

#13, Breeze.

9.
Harvey S. Ford, What The Citizens Should Know About The Army
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1941), 204. Anthony Kellett, Combat
Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer Publishing, 1982),
140.
10.

#21 Mercer.

11.

#17 Hoenes.

12.

#9 Kingery.

13.
One individual held the opinion that "the depression had conditioned
us all to an acceptance of things as we found them." Cawthon, Other Clay, 14.
14.
Another individual enlisted for a secure job, and appreciated how the
army provided for his needs. Janice Holt Giles, ed. The GI Journal of Sergeant
Giles (New York: Mifflin Company, 1965) 7-10.
15.
The following men did not want to fight and had no idea that they
would soon go to war. "I didn't think I would have to go to war, so I didn't pay
much attention." #17 Hoenes. Another man had no idea about the likelihood of
war "not when I went in no[October 1940] ... I was just a farm boy and I wasn't
interested in politics or anything." #9 Kingery. A man drafted in April 1941 recalled
outlook on war and peace. "I didn't have any idea about that [the possibility of
war]." All the isolationist's held the false belief that "no we weren't going to war."
#21 Mercer.
16.

Men were focused on serving their one year term and so they could
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go back to their civilian life. This is seen in the lyrics of a popular pre-war song
which stated that "I'll be back in a year little darling." Men construed this to mean
that they were heading off to the "Little Darling War" and would be back in one
year when there term was up. #11 Mercer.
17.
A popular book of the time, See Here Private Hargrove, had the
intention of providing incoming recruits with advice on how to adjust to the culture
shock of army life. The author used clever dialogue to advise recruits to bide their
time with a stiff upper lip, and make the best of their situation with sarcastic humor.
Marion Hargrove, See Here Private Hargrove (New York: Holt and Company,
1942), passim. All three men in the army before American involvement in the war
commented on the growth of new friendships. "We were just like brothers." #9
Kingery. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer.
18.

#18 Everman.

19. Every veteran sampled acknowledged experiencing fear long before
combat, while the author found no instance, even in literature, of anyone who
denied experiencing fear. "Fear is the anticipation of danger." What the Soldier
Thinks, May 1945, 6-7. Ambrose, 53. Balkosi, 5. Dollard, 8-9. McDonald, 6-7.
Tappert, 109.
20.
A veteran in the service before Pearl Harbor recalled how after the
"Japs bombed Pearl Harbor. Naturally we went on from there." #17 Hoenes.
Another man had a brother in the National Guard and "he just went right in
naturally", when the guard was activated into Federal service. #10 McKenna. For
the majority, it seemed that service in the armed forces in the beginning "simply
happened, that it was action preceding thought, rather than action based on firm
ideas." Tappert, viii. Use of the word "naturally" suggests men did not make a big
issue of why they had to fight, but rationalized that rather than refuse orders and
make their situation worse, it was better to abide the law and take their chances
later in combat. The following scenario is merely a hypothetical situation which
illustrates the consequences of breaching the Articles of War. One individual
sampled, as a member of the 5th Infantry Division, was sent to Iceland to protect
American interests from Nazi Germany months before the U.S. was at war.
Theoretically, this man could have been executed if he would have refused to go
with his unit. For this man there was never a second thought about going. He
knew if he refused to follow orders he would be branded a coward among
everyone he knew. Like others throughout the war, this soldier held the personal
conviction, "I would have been ashamed to come home with a dishonorable
discharge." This meant even more to this individual because in his words, "my
great grandfather was in the Civil War, my grandfather was in World War I, I had
the history of the family, the Kingery name, I had to uphold that." #9 Kingery.
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21.
#12 Buser. #15 Hott. #22 Everman. The draft was simply a "fact."
Cawthon, xiv.
22.

#1 O McKenna.

23.
Cawthon, xiv. This was a time when man actually felt an "aversion
to flag waving and loud heroics." Kennett, 86-9. Out of the men sampled there
was a decided lack of enthusiasm for the war. This generation learned lesson at
the expense of the generation that went off enthusiastically to fight WW I.
24.

#1 O McKenna.

25.

Ibid.

26.
Only 0.04 percent of all men registered for Selective Service were
imprisoned after declaring themselves conscientious objectors. Kennett, 8-12.
27.

#16 Curran.

28.
#10 McKenna. Men knew they didn't like what was ahead, but they
also held the attitude that regardless, "it has to be done." #16 Curran.
"Of course in those days you didn't burn draft cards[reference to
29.
protests of the Vietnam war], because even if you did in those days you'd be in the
hoosegow." #16 Curran. Another individual made a reference to the movement
of young men refusing the draft during America's involvement in Vietnam in the
1960's. "I don't think a lot of these draft dodgers who went up to Canada." #13
Breeze.
30.
One veteran recalled that Gls "on the whole . . . went to the
battlefield more at the urging of duty and sober conviction." Cawthon, 16.
"Everybody was urged to get in the war effort." Hoopes, 169. "You knew you had
to go." #21 Mercer.
31.
#12 Buser. The "general attitude" towards service was that
"everyone should do what he was assigned as well as he could, but it was not
considered essential that an individual 'stick his neck out'." Kellett, 179.
32.
Those few that refused service attracted negative attitudes from
those men who did serve against their wishes. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery.
#10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. One
veteran thought that for many conscientious objectors it was "just some way to get
out of it" and not a true moral stance against war. #8 Bowen. "The occasional
shirker stood out." Wilson, If You Survive, 157.
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33.

#14 Brick.

34.
#16 Curran. Most men went along and performed up to expectations
despite their fears out of their "desire for conformity" and want of "group approval."
Kennett, 60. For example, when one man went into the army for the first time in
his life he was a "somebody." Giles, 4. A Gl's "reputation" was "the one thing that
he is likely to value more highly than life." Marshall, 143.
35.
Seven of the twelve men sampled had every offspring of their family
in the Armed Services. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #13 Breeze. #16 Curran. #17
Hoenes. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. Every man sampled had relation and friends that
also served in the military. Two of these men commented on family jokes that
originated when all their family's siblings were in the service in one capacity or
another. One man recalled how he joked with his brothers since he was the last
of the four to be drafted. "I told them I had to get into the war for them." #24
Breeze. Another man commented of how everyone always joked that his sister
was the only one in the family of four other boys good enough to get into the
Marines. #1 O McKenna. This introduces another important aspect of people giving
their all for the war effort. To a greater extent than ever before women played a
tremendous non-combat role in the armed forces and in the workplace. "My kid
sister enlisted." #10 McKenna. Two of the men sampled had their sisters working
in Washington, D.C. for the government. #10 McKenna. #22 Everman. Another
Gl's wife worked on a lathe in a defense plant, it helped her quit worrying about
her husband. #25 Bowen.
36.
One individual held the prominent attitude of the era, that it was one
of the "greatest honors" to serve your country when needed. #21 Mercer. Eleven
of the fourteen individuals sampled referred to the phrase a "sense of duty" when
describing why they fought. Americans believed that it "was a citizen's duty to
respond to the country's call." Perkins, 563.
37.

#20 Hill.

38.
Another individual used the analogy that he wanted into the
ballgame. #12 Buser. Two other men in this sample made decisions about serving
with the help of their friends. #9 Kingery. #14 Brick.
39.

#12 Buser.

40.
#25 Bowen. "I don't recall anybody thinking that [the war could be
lost] at all." #20 Hill. The entire country had a "pretty positive outlook." #23 Hott.
"I just believed in the United States I guess." #22 Everman. "You have to
understand the innate optimism of the American Public in the power of this
country." The "dynamic" leadership of President Roosevelt inspired an "optimism
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... which gave us the confidence that we could do the job." #16 Curran. Kennett,
124. Stouffer, Vol, 1, 127.
41.
"It was on your mind all the time that you might have to go." #12
Buser. The following individuals knew that they would serve, but waited to go until
they were drafted. #3 McKenna. #8 Bowen. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran.
#19 Everman. One veteran recalled the common feeling, "I knew sooner or later,
I'd be in the war." Astor, 15.
42.
One GI had a brother who was twenty-seven and single who enlisted
in 1942, because "he knew what was coming." This decision paid off when the
man ended up in the Air Corps, as a Major, based in California. #8 Bowen.
Another man knew of a friend who enlisted with the hope of bettering his situation.
#15 Hott. Incidentally, the man in the Navy and the man in the Army Air Corps in
this sample, enlisted during 1942. #2 McCall. #6 Knott. One of the individuals who
enlisted into the army understood that it was "so all encompassing that sooner or
later; I'd go anyway." #20 Hill.
43.

#15 Hott.

44.

#14 Brick.

45.

#16 Curran.

46.
#13 Breeze. Another individual married, but with no children, was
also drafted in 1943. #3 McKenna.
47.
#1,8 Bowen. Another married man with a child stayed out of service
while he could, yet once drafted in August 1944 he was driven by the personal
conviction that "you want to do your part. "#12 Buser.
48.
"Of course, everybody is scared to death . . . nobody wants to get
in it." #22 Everman. "I wasn't too anxious about it [going into combat]." #14 Brick.
"A lot of guys were very un-anxious to go." #10 Mercer. "Most of the draftees, I
say most of them, that I ran into in the service had a different mental attitude than
those that had enlisted ... There were some after we got in that were not too
happy about being there." #18 Hill. Another individual was a member of an
infantry division but "few in it wanted anything to do with combat." Atwell, 12.
Soldiers were definitely not zealous about going off to war, but served
nevertheless "because their country required their presence." Astor, 510. Ellis,
315. Men exhibited a decided "lack of enthusiasm" about having to fight. Stouffer,
Vol. 2, 5-29. Men "seemed to accept their role to fight for home and country
without complaint. ... We were not gung ho but quietly went about our duties."
Wilson, 157.
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49.
Ernest Hemingway, a veteran of WW I, authored the introduction to
an anthology of war stories he edited and published in 1942. This book expressed
his thoughts on why American involvement in the war was an unfortunate
necessity. He declared that he hated war, however "once we have a war there is
only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than anything
that can happen in a war ... The more you hate war, the more you know that
once you are forced into it, for whatever reason it may be, you have to win it."
Hemingway, Men at War (New York: Crown Publishing, 1942), xi-xxxi. The Why
We Fight film series expressed a similar viewpoint.
50.

#22 Everman.

51.

#1 O Mercer.

52.
One man spoke of how he was motivated by his thoughts of home,
especially getting back to his wife and baby girl. #5 Buser. Another veteran was
motivated to "get the war over with. We were all in the same boat. We wanted
to get it over with as soon as we could. I think we all had about the same feeling.
We were anxious to get over there and get out of our training, our training was
pretty rough. And then after we got over there [Europe] we wished we weren't
there too." #14 Brick. "We were just wanting to get in there, get it over with, and
get out." #22 Everman. The entire time one veteran was in combat he was
"hoping for the war to end." #21 Mercer. All men sampled referred to this same
desire which was also shared by veterans in the literature. For example, one GI
who kept a journal wrote before they entered combat, "we just want to get this
damn mess over with and get home." Giles, 11. The following sources concurred.
Kellet, 172. Kennett, 303. Marshall, 142. Mauldin, 73. Murphy, 28. Stouffer, Vol.
1, 172.
53.

#25 Bowen.

54.

#13 Breeze.

55.
War Department, New Soldiers Handbook (Washington, D.C.; United
States Government Printing Office, 1941 ), vii. All aspects of training were focused
on keeping the soldier alive including training manuals, pamphlets, and training
films. "To put a soldier out on the front line, it takes a lot of training to get him
ready to go." #25 Bowen.
56.

Joseph Greene, The Infantry Journal Reader, 271.

57.
#15 Hott. Another individual stated the instructors' purpose was to
"let us know what it was really like." #7 Brick.
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58.
#24 Breeze. One veteran recalled how his instructors lectured to the
men that "the main objective is to stay alive. Many of you won't come back, but
learn and you will have a better chance." #8 Bowen.
59.
#8 Bowen Several other individuals agreed that it was important to
learn all they could while in training. #10 Mercer. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #18
Hill.
60.
A former instructor had this to say about discipline. "What we did
when teaching recruits was survival, and the need to accept the fact that
somebody above you is responsible for making decision and without question, with
absolutely no second guessing, without even thinking that well maybe we should
do it this way." #18 Hill. "It was like a different world, but it's good for you though.
You learn discipline and things of that nature." #5 Buser. One individual learned
"how to take orders and make sure you didn't foul up." #17 Hoenes. "Another
thing that we learned is that we had to take orders, discipline." #9 Kingery. "You
have to do what your told to do." #16 Curran. "I learned a lot of discipline. Taught
to say yes sir, no sir." #1 O McKenna.
61.

#14 Brick.

62.
One veteran stated he "learned the hard way" that you had to obey
orders. #13 Breeze. In one situation an instructor informed a recruit that the
recruit had not shaved. This veteran relayed his story of how he objected, and
how the drill instructor then rebuked him. After his sergeant told him he hadn't
shaved, the recruit replied, "why sergeant you were standing in the latrine last
night when I shaved. And he said, 'I don't remember that.' But we had a
conversation during the time. Then pretty soon the lieutenant came down and
said, 'Curran, you haven't shaved.' And I said, 'but, but, but.' And he said, 'Curran
when I tell you you haven't shaved, you haven't shaved .... If you continue to
object I will hit you with a summary court [martial].' I said, "yes sir.'' #4 Curran.
In another case, objection to orders resulted in an individual being reduced in rank
twice before he was shipped overseas. When asked why he was "busted" the
man replied, "I wasn't too respectful to some of the officers, that's probably the
basic reason why. I questioned some of their orders." #10 McKenna.
63.
#1,8 Bowen. All men came to realize, sooner or later, that even if
they did not like things they were ordered to do, "you just had to accept it." #19
Evermon.
64.

#1 O Mercer. Ellis, 10.

65.

#16 Curran.
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66.
For example, a replacement stated he was taught "how to treat your
fellow buddy, how to treat your officers ... [how to] work together to form one unit.
. . . We were taught very strictly to praise our next man with us, because we
were all together as a unit." #25 Bowen. Similarly, a man from an original outfit
stated he was taught cooperation; "that we couldn't do it ourselves and we had to
have help. And our buddies couldn't do it themselves, you had to help them." #9
Kingery.
67.
#16 Curran. Other men cited the same feeling of unity. #9 Kingery.
#10 McKenna. #11 Mercer. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes.
Replacements went into units usually in combat situations where they knew know
one. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #7 Brick. #18 Hott. #19 Everman.
68.
#24 Breeze. All original members of units commented on the
camaraderie between the men before going into battle. "I was in a pretty good
outfit." #11 Mercer. Another man said during training his unit became "just like
brothers." #9 Kingery. Officers were also an integral part of a well functioning unit.
"We had good officers ... they were just like one of us. They knew they had a
job to do and they knew they weren't any better than anybody else. We were all
buddy, buddy." #24 Breeze.
69.
One infantry company, like all others, became like a family after their
training period. "Strong bonds of loyalty and friendship developed during those
long, grueling months of back breaking training." John D. Campbell and Harold P.
Leinbaugh, The Men of Company K (New York: William Morrow and Company,
1985), 25. Another veteran recalled how all men in his unit "had been through
months and years of wartime confusion and strains; marched countless tedious
miles; lived in mud and dust, heat and cold. I knew their problems both duty and
personal and they knew mine." Cawthon, 71.
70.

#24 Breeze.

71.
A formal drill instructor and combat veteran recalled how "you had
to acquaint yourself with the weapons of war. I taught infantry basic which
consisted of just hand grenades and machine guns, the M-1 rifle, the carbine, and
bayonet." Training consisted of "an introduction to weapons and how to take care
of them and what to do if this goes wrong and that goes wrong." #18,20 Hill.
Training stressed that "you had to take good care of our equipment." #14 Brick.
Recruits were taught their rifle meant their life, so it was mandatory they cherish
it, and keep it operational. Weapons training was taught by repetition to make it
a reflex, "to make you just react." #4 Curran. This was mirrored by an individual
who said the men were trained so that they just would react, like a "robot" in crisis
situations. #20 Hill. The success of repetitive training can be gauged by
considering two veterans stood up and demonstrated the bayonet stance and
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thrusting procedure with no prodding whatsoever. #8 Bowen. #24 Breeze.
72.

#12 Buser.

Kill or Get Killed. Rex Applegate, Kill or Get Killed (The Infantry
73.
Journal [Press]), 1943; reprint, Boulder Colorado, Paladin Press, 1976). Men
interviewed did not remember any exposure to the manual, however they did
remember their instructors making constant use of the phrase.
Applegate, Kill or Get Killed, 7. Instructors also taught the recruits
74.
to "be there first" and "shoot and ask questions later." #8 Bowen.
75.

#13 Breeze. Also referred to as "hand-to-hand combat." #3 McKenna

76.
War Department, Scouting and Patrolling; The Soldier. The Enemy.
The Ground (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1943), no page
numbers.
77.
Kennett, 51. One live fire training course was the infiltration course
with live machine gun fire thirty inches above the recruit. Men were required to
crawl underneath barbed wire thus avoiding the machine gun fire.
78.
#4 Curran. All infantrymen sampled traversed the infiltration course
and did not find it a pleasurable experience.
79.
War Department, Soldier's Handbook Basic Field Manual
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1941 ), 44.
80.

#21 Mercer.

81.
Men that commented on advanced training aids. #8 Bowen. #10
McKenna. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #22 Evermon.
82.
The individual who witnessed a training fatality recalled, "one of our
training missions was supposed to be just like the real thing." The men were
ordered to "take that hill" while live artillery fire was called in on the nearby hill.
During the process of the staged attack a man was struck in the neck by shrapnel
and killed right before the men. This occurred during January 1945. #14 Brick.
Anytime men trained with live fire there was the possibility of accidents. Cawthon
29, 33.
83.
"The men looked up to them." #14 Brick. Another replacement's
instructors were "experienced and tough ... they knew what was coming." #19
Evermon. "The sergeants and lieutenants down there [Fort Blanding, Florida] in
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my outfit ... were professionals. We had two or three guys that had already been
over to Anzio." One instructor made such a big impression he still remembered his
name. "Lt. Sutherland he was a good instructor. He knew what he was talking
about. . . . He helped us guys out an awful lot." #25 Bowen.
84.
#9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21
Mercer. Two men interviewed were forced by necessity to be drill instructors,
despite the fact they had no combat experience. During the time they were
instructors there were not enough men with combat experience to fill the positions.
#9 Kingery. #18 Hill.
85.

#1 O Mercer.

86.
"The whole damn thing was an endurance test from the very
beginning to the time I got home." #8 Bowen. All men felt after training they were
in prime physical condition and made great physical improvements. "We trained
for about two years before we went overseas. Physically I had been toughened
up very considerably." #10 Mercer. "I felt better physically. I really did." #12
Buser. Training stressed "physical fitness" in order to "get people into shape." #16
Curran. "Most of basic training of course is physical." #18 Hill. "It's pretty tough.
It's physical. ... My only trouble was I couldn't climb the rope. I'm telling you I
had more trouble getting up the rope and climbing over walls than anything. I
finally got where I could get a big run and get up it." #21 Mercer. After training a
man thought he was in "pretty good physical condition. It was fairly rough ... I
can understand why it was that way. When you got overseas you had to live
under some pretty bad conditions." #23 Hott. "You're young and in your prime
then, I never felt so better in all my life." #24 Breeze. "I felt like a million dollars."
#25 Bowen.
87.
When this individual ran the obstacle course he admitted, "I usually
didn't make the best times, but I managed to do the job." This was an
accomplishment for this nineteen year old who wanted to "succeed and not fail."
#16 Curran.
88.

#3 Mercer.

89.
#5 Buser. #13 Breeze. "I felt like I had kind of matured ... quite a
little bit." #23 Hott. Several other men stated the same opinion. #16 Curran. #18
Hill. #19 Everman.
90.
#23 Hott. For example one individual stated, "I thought my training
was excellent." #8 Bowen. Another man believed his training was very good and
afterwards he felt he was " able to do what I had to do." #12 Buser. Another man
who was an instructor for over one year in the U.S. before going overseas
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considered himself well trained and ready for any situation. #18 Hill. Nine of the
twelve men sampled felt they were well trained. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #11
Mercer. #12 Buser. #13 Breeze. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #19 Everman. #22 Hill.
Literature agrees with these findings. It was common to have men say, "I think my
training was excellent." Astor, 137. Cawthon, 71. Giles, 9. The majority of the men
polled before they saw action felt they wold rather stay out of combat, but they
were nevertheless "ready to go when my turn comes." Stouffer, Vol. 1, 45.
91.
#18 Hill. "Everybody was nervous you were bound to be." #14 Brick.
"Of course, everybody is scared to death." #22 Everman. "Sure you're scared
you're bound to be." #21 Mercer. One man described a feeling of "apprehension .
. . . There is always fear of the unknown." #20 Hill. Several men noted that the
"apprehension" bothered them the most. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #17 Hoenes.
One veteran labeled the feeling a "nervous tension." Grey, 13. There was a
prevailing feeling of "anxiety" in the men before Company K went into battle for the
first time. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 40. Another source cited the "anticipation is
the worst." Nichols, 304. Stouffer, Vol.2, 131.
92.

#21 Mercer.

93.

Giles, 14-5.

94.
Knowing nothing about where they were going to go, or what would
happen when they got there, men always experienced uncertainty over their future.
One individual was sent to Iceland in 1941, and then to North Africa in November,
1942, and never knew where he was headed when he left aboard ship. #9
Kingery. Another veteran, who was a medic, also participated in Operation Torch
and had "no clue" as to where he was going to land. #17 Hoenes. These two men
made it a point to stress the uncertainty over the situation, for all they knew they
were making an invasion on the European continent.
95.

#16 Curran.

96.
Other men sampled had the same feeling. #8 Bowen; #11 Mercer;
#13 Breeze; #18 Hill; #19 Everman. Men always had questions like "how will I
react under fire." Ambrose, 65. A replacement captain expressed in his memoirs
his dire hope that he could function effectively when he got into "it." It was very
important for him to win the respect of the experienced soldiers he was going to
have to lead. To do this, he knew that he could not allow his fears to show.
McDonald, 6-7. It was commonplace for men to have fears that they might show
themselves cowardly. Men experienced a "fear about showing fear." John Dollard,
Fear in Battle (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal [Press], 1944) 17-18.
97.

One man recalled how his drill instructors "said all you guys when
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you go up on the firing line you're gonna be scared. They said, it's natural your
a damn funny character if you don't." #25 Bowen. The pamphlet, Fear in Battle,
was designed to accustom men to the fact they would be scared and it was
nothing to be ashamed of, they had to learn to control fear. Dollard, Fear in Battle.
Other sources offered the same advice, such as the following statement. "True
courage is the ability to act as you believe you should in the face of recognized
danger." Greene, Infantry Journal Reader, 271. Fear in Battle provided men with
the very important advice that is necessary to "distract" the mind from fear by
concentrating on the task at hand. The manual also stated that humor was an
important device to reach this end. Dollard, 30-1.
98.

#24 Breeze.

99.

#23 Hott. #25 Bowen.

100.

#1 O Mercer.

101. The man who used this popular wartime phrase was already in the
service at the outbreak of war, and heard President Roosevelt's speech, declaring
war on Japan, on the radio at Fort Benning. The reaction among the men was
that "we knew we would never get out. We knew we were in for the duration." #21
Mercer. Infantrymen were required to fight "for the duration and six months."
Charles McDonald, The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the
European Theater in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 61.
102.
cited having
ground force
there for the
103.

To explain how men continued to fight, one historian and veteran
no rotation policy as one of the basic principles. "There were, in
units, no rotation. We knew that, unless wounded or killed, we were
duration, and in a way this was consoling." Perkins, 566.
#1 O McKenna.

104. #8 Bowen. "You had to take the good with the bad." #24 Breeze.
Another individual also used the words "take" in the same context. #20 Hill.
105.

#20 Hill.

106.

#22 Everman.

107.

#13 Breeze.

108. All veterans interviewed agreed that men were more concerned with
being cautious and safe than doing something heroic. One GI wrote in his journal
before combat that no one had their heart set on being a hero. Giles, 9-10. "The
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great majority though acting with such prudence and caution as they could, simply
did their jobs, even when it was dangerous." Perkins, 566. Wilson, 157.
109.

#16 Curran.

110.

Fussell, 143.

111.

#24 Breeze.

112. A World War I veteran described the general attitude before his
generation went off to battle as a naive "illusion of immortality." This same phrase
can be used to describe how human nature would prevent most men from thinking
they would be killed. Hemingway, Men at War, xvii. The majority of the men
sampled went into combat thinking they would make it through the war alive. #3
McKenna. #5 Buser. #7 Brick. #8 Brick. #9 Kingery. #11 Mercer. #13 Breeze. #15
Hott. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. The following recollection perfectly illustrates the
collective mentality and the illusion of immortality. This man was informed during
training that "'every one of you will be either wounded or killed.' We just turned to
the GI next to us and said, 'That's tough shit fella.' We were eighteen, nineteen
twenty year-old kids. None of us could believe anything bad could happen to us.
At most we thought of the million-dollar-wound, getting hit in the leg and being sent
home a hero." Astor, 3. "Few, I believe, really contemplated being a casualty at
all." Cawthon, 39. Going into combat men were convinced that it "can't happen
to them, they would not be killed." Fussell, Wartime, 282. In a letter which
represents the general attitude a man wrote to his mother that it was "foolish" for
anyone to worry about him getting killed, because he wasn't going to make any
stupid mistakes. Tappert, Lines of Battle, 141.
113.

#12 Buser.

114.

#18Hill.

115. #8 Bowen. After training men should have been aware that anyone
could be killed because a bullet or shell fragment had no preference. "We all
knew that somebody was going to be killed. They drilled that into us you know."
#24 Breeze. The fact that every soldier had to fill out their last will and testament,
is one time which obviously all men contemplated death.
116. #24 Breeze. There were some men that found it next to impossible
to make themselves believe they would survive, but thought opposite. One
individual referred to these men as "professional pessimists." #16 Curran.
117. All men interviewed replied affirmative when asked if they felt a
sense of pride in being an American soldier.
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118. #13 Breeze. This feeling was widely held considering the GI always
had "confidence in his country's armed might." Hoopes, xvi.
119. #24 Breeze. One GI wrote in his journal while waiting for the
invasion that his and others' "nerves sure are wearing thin." He did not want to
be in the invasion, but if he did, he hoped it would be soon so they would not have
to wait any longer. Giles, 14.
120. This individual felt the men were "propagandized" by army authorities
to think that way. #16 Curran.
121.
Transcript by Willis Bowen. December 15, 1944. This was an
ominous attitude to have on the day before the German Ardennes offensive. It
also speaks for the optimism, and how also soldiers were unaware of the true
situation due to lack of knowledge.
122.

#25 Bowen.

123. Two men sampled were replacements shipped to England in
December, 1944. They were still there at the outset of the Battle of the Bulge, and
both commented on how they reported to airfields where they attempted to fly to
the continent, but bad weather prevented the flight. Both men later crossed the
English Channel by ship. These men were confident, like all others, that the war
was almost over, but the Bulge made them think differently. #12 Buser. #19
Everman.
124. Out of the Gls interviewed, the man who went into combat the latest
(April, 1945) knew Germany could not hold out much longer, but they could still put
up a defensive fight on their remaining territory. #14 Brick.
125. Such as the individual who thought it might be possible to get a
deferment because he was married with two children, and his brother had already
been killed. #19 Everman. Another individual drafted in 1942, was made a
member of the army air corps based in California, and served there until the
December of 1944. This man felt "fortunate" he landed a job as a truck driver in
Los Angeles, because he was out of the fighting and still in the states. He lived
the good life for awhile, until he had the rude shock that he would be made an
infantryman due to the drastic need for infantry replacements in the winter of 194445. #14 Brick. The system that planned to keep married men out of the war for
as long as possible actually failed when it became a necessity to pick them later
in the war, and make them vulnerable replacements.
126.

#19 Everman.

127.

#12 Buser.

193
128. #18 Hill. Ground soldiers, who knew they were the ones who actually
met the enemy on the field of battle, indeed felt an "arrogance." "The Combat
Infantryman Badge became one of the most prized pieces of decorative metal of
the war." Cawthon, 42. Several men were still proud to display their Combat
Infantryman Badge that they kept in a safe place with all their other personally
valuable memorabilia. #1 Bowen. #5 Buser. #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #21 Mercer.
129. Men that are represented best by a person like Audie Murphy.
Murphy wrote that he was primed to get into combat, which he figured to be an
adventure for a young man. Murphy, To Hell and Back, 1.
130. The only three men sampled who stated any slight desire to get into
combat were the ones with the least doubts to their survival. #12 Buser. #16
Curran. #18 Hill.
131. #16 Curran. Men in the same predicament in the fall of 1944
recalled that combat was the "test we had to pass before we could call ourselves
soldiers .... We would have felt cheated to miss out on the fighting." Campbell
and Leinbaugh, 16-7.
132. One individual's unit had orders to participate in the invasion of North
Africa in the fall of 1942 but they could not sine the Allies did not have enough
shipping to get them there. This man remembered how his unit was prepared to
leave and the men got all the way to the POE [point of embarkation] before they
had to turn back. There was never any doubt that they would have been involved
if the situation allowed.#21 Mercer. Two other veterans went to North Africa in
1942 when their units received orders to do so. #9 Kingery. #17 Hoenes.
133.

#23 Hott.

134.

#1 O McKenna.

135.

#21 Mercer.

136.

#25 Bowen.

137.

#23 Hott.

138. #24 Breeze. Another individual in the 29th Division fell ill before the
Invasion but not wanting to look like he was trying to get out of going, he went
along sick. The man told his commanding officer "he did not want to let his squad
down and would like to go back and do his best." Cawthon, 47.
139.

Men in original outfits cited that it was reassuring to know that they
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were going in with friends. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16
Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer. Replacements knew no one when they went
into units, but they did say they received dome advice from the "old timers." #8
Bowen. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #19 Evermon. Several of the replacements said it
was reassuring to go in with experienced men. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #14 Brick.
140. Being this individual was involved in an amphibious operation he
went in loaded down with even more equipment. Because they had to carry in so
much, a major topic was "what were we going to take in and everything." This
man alone carried in six anti-tank rocket grenades, his M-1 rifle and extra
ammunition, and an added bandolier of .30 caliber ammunition crisscrossed over
his chest, and six regular hand grenades. This was all in addition to his full field
pack on his back. Just in case he also had a gas mask, strapped under his neck,
close to his life preserver. "We all had to do that because there was no way to get
stuff in." #13,24 Breeze. The distraction of preparing for the task also went back
to the prior weeks of intensive training. Another veteran of the 29th Division
believed that "on· the whole, I do not believe that all individuals in the invasion
force were greatly worried, for we were caught up in the complex mechanics of the
mission and our separate tasks in it. . . . We moved in the heady world of
preparation and expectation of success." Cawthon, 39,45.
141.

#24 Breeze.

142. #3 Mercer. All men sampled spoke of humorous situations before
combat which is also supported by findings in other oral histories. Balkosi, 11.
Ellis, 107.
143. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #23 Hott. #24 Breeze. Cawthon,
48. Men also found time to write a last letter before they went into combat if they
could find the time. Tappert, 208.
144.

#21 Mercer.

145.

#14 Brick.

146.

#23 Breeze.

147.

#22 Everman.

CHAPTER TWO NOTES
1.

#24 Breeze.

2.
The confusion in combat was on a much greater scale considering
this man, being in the 175th Regiment, landed on 0+1, however, he thought he
had landed on D-Day. Getting to the beach as he did, he never knew any
differently. It was in fact his own D-Day. "I don't know . . . I kept thinking that
I went in on D-Day. We were on the boat for so long [five days] and all the planes
were going in. . . . We were sitting there and all the boats were shooting their
big cannons in the air. I kept thinking we went in on D-Day, but it was possible
it was 0+1. It was rough."# 13 Breeze.
3.

Ibid.

4.

Balkosi, 175.

5.

#13 Breeze.

6.

Ibid.

7.
In combat one veteran observed an "intensified life force" which was
a feeling of "life forced to a hard, bright flame to survive." Cawthon, 71.
8.
What made this incident even more demoralizing was the fact it
occurred in late October 1944 in Holland. Holland at this time, in most men in this
unit's opinion, should not have been heavily defended. This was since it was not
part of the main line of resistance along the German border where the men really
expected a fight. This man thought the officers of his division were over-optimistic
in informing them of enemy strength and capabilities. He said he learned to be
skeptical of future situations since he knew the high command was known to
"gloss over the difficulties you might be facing." #4, 16 Curran.
9.

Ibid.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Charles McDonald, The Seigfried Line Campaign, 222.
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12.

G.A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 304.

13.

#21 Mercer.

14.

Ibid.

15.

Ibid.

16.

#23 Hott.

17.
Ten of the twelve men sample who experienced casualties before
they ever faced a German soldier in combat are as follows. #3 McKenna. #5
Buser. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #18
Hill. #19 Evermon. Those who cited experiencing artillery fire first are as follows.
#3 McKenna. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. "We hit
the artillery first. It started popping around you and then mortar fire." #23 Hott.
Atwell, 65. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 46-7. Giles, 36.
18.

#16 Curran.

19.
#13 Breeze. The title of Audie Murphy's autobiography, To Hell and
Back implies what he found combat to be. Before combat, Murphy viewed it as
awe inspiring adventure, but he found out later that combat was very different than
he imagined. He stated in his autobiography that he saw combat "as it actually
is, I do not like it." Murphy, To Hell and Back, 1, 15.
20.

#23 Hott.

21.

#16 Curran.

22.

#8 Bowen.

23.

#24 Breeze.

24.
This man recalled how their village training course "was a lot of fun
we got a big bang out of it." They surely would not get a big bang out of it if it
was anything like combat. #8 Bowen. Another veteran commented on how the
men had fun during exercises in the village training course. #1 O Mercer. Another
veteran said training was a "big game" compared to combat. #9 Kingery. The
problem one veteran said was that in training the "instructors stressed what they
got out of the training manuals." However, when they got into combat they found
out it was better to improvise and throw away the book. #23 Hott.
25.

Astor, 49.

Men in the sample that agreed are as follows.

#3
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McKenna. #4 Curran. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott.
#18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. Another veteran felt that "there is nothing that
prepares you for combat." Another "considered the preparation [of training]
extremely helpful in toughening him up but nothing could approximate the impact
of combat." Astor, 191, 205. "This was combat and they just hadn't told us what
it was like." Atwell, 65. When men encountered intense shelling for the first time
they determined nothing in "training offered an experience remotely comparable.
. . . We knew the manual, but we didn't know what was happening because we'd
never been in combat before." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 46-7, 88-9. A
replacement captain came to the conclusion that his long hours of training
"seemed pitifully inadequate" once under fire. McDonald, 7. One veteran felt that
before combat he considered his training "thorough and practical" yet once he had
combat experience he found "serious gaps in the training." Wilson, 41.
26.
#5 Buser. Another man also knew how it was necessary that one
just "make do." #16 Curran.
27.

#18 Hill.

28.

Campbell and Leinbaugh, 88-9.

29.

#24 Breeze.

30.

#21 Mercer.

31.

#18 Hill.

32.

#24 Breeze.

33.
#23 Hott. "You just took it as it came and tried to take care of
yourself." #5 Buser.
34.

#13 Breeze.

35.

#1 O McKenna.

36.

#16 Curran.

37.

#18 Hill.

38.
#25 Bowen. Three of the five replacements stated they were offered
advice from the veterans. #7 Brick. #12 Buser. #25 Bowen. Three of the five
replacements cited feeling relieved to be with Gls who were already combat
experienced. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #18 Hill. From post-war samples, the majority
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of replacements believed veterans "did as much as the could" to help them out.
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 242.
39.
#16 Curran. Another replacement who went into the line as a
sergeant said he got very little advice, all he could do was watch and learn. #18
Hill. Another replacement stated he was offered no advice upon entering combat
by any of the experienced men. When we came into the squad he carried an M-1
rifle, but the other men decided they were going to make him the new bazooka
man. Being very dangerous to use, it does not take to much of an imagination to
realize what happened to the last bazooka man. The experienced men, who
effectively controlled the situation, knew they did not want the dangerous job of
shooting the weapon, and also the burdensome job of carrying it. It seems that
these men took advantage of the situation and their seniority. #22 Everman. This
is similar to another case where a replacement was handed the heavy bazooka
when he first went into a new squad. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 165. One
eighteen-year old replacement who entered a company on December 31, 1944,
in the Ardennes said that no one "offered advice or information." One other
replacement was given a slight bit of help when the veterans said "when we duck,
you duck." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 157, 163. Instances were replacements were
used as "cannon fodder" were not uncommon. Ellis, 337. Murphy, 53.
40.
The following veterans said they helped out new replacements. #3
McKenna. "We protected those guys." #9 Kingery. #15 Hott. #21 Mercer.
41.

#15 Hott.

42.
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 90-1. Ellis, 13. Indicative of this shortage
was one man sent to infantry replacement training in the fall of 1944 after two
years in the army air corps. Procurement planning had not anticipated the serious
need for combat infantry replacements. #14 Brick.
43.

#12 Buser.

44.

#1 O McKenna.

45.
Replacements had a rapid assimilation into their unit usually "under
the pressure of necessity." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 280.
46.
#8 Bowen. This quick assimilation is also apparent in this soldier's
letters to home. On February 13, 1945 after being put into a new unit he wrote,
"I don't know anymore where I am, makes it bad ... I'm OK just lonesome as
ever." By March 22, he wrote home about the variety of different men in his
squad, like mechanics, railroad workers, ranchers, and grocers. This letter said
they were "a bunch of swell fellows too. Mostly married around 27 years old."
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Transcripts by Willis Bowen.
One replacement who was only in combat three days said he had no
47.
time to learn anything. #22 Evermon.
48.
This man recalled that the replacement he tutored "was just a young
kid. Just about 18. That poor kid didn't know how to strike a match. . . . He
didn't know how to handle himself. I don't know why they ever put him up there
in the first place." #25 Bowen.
49.

#14 Brick.

50.

Ibid.

51.
The first time one man experienced seeing dead Gls he stated he felt
a "revulsion" at the sight. #1 O McKenna. Another veteran also noted a feeling of
"revulsion" the first time he viewed dead German soldiers. McDonald, 19. It was
very much the norm for men to be like one GI who considered it disturbing to see
his first dead German, which was accentuated by the fact that it was also the first
time the man had ever seen a dead body. Terkel, 42.
52.

#17 Hoenes.

53.

#1 Bowen.

54.

#18 Hill.

55.

#21 Mercer.

56.

#14 Brick.

57.

#8 Bowen.

58.

#12 Buser.

59.
The majority of the men sampled cited feeling mixed emotions. #8
Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran.
#18 Hill.
60.

#25 Bowen.

61.

Ibid.

62.

Ibid.
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63.

#7 Brick.

64.

Campbell and Leinbaugh, 160.

65.

#5 Buser.

66.

#15 Hott.

67.

#25 Bowen.

68.

#24 Breeze.

69.

#5 Buser.

70.

#22 Everman.

71.

#8 Bowen.

72.

#22 Everman.

73.

#25 Bowen.

Several men saw dead animals on several occasions. #8 Bowen. #9
74.
Kingery. #14 Brick. #24 Breeze.
75.

#16 Curran.

76.

#8 Bowen. #10 Mercer. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #18 Hill.

77.
After a furious German counterattack which decimated this man's
battalion he reached his "personal depth of the war, and it has remained with me
as only the events that mark the ultimate depth . . . of one's life." Cawthon, 104.
Another man commented on the affect of the heavy loses in the Huertgen Forest.
"We had started out that morning with about 140 riflemen, a couple of medics,
three noncoms, four company officers, one attached artillery officer, and one
attached sergeant from H Company. We had lost all the medics, all the noncoms,
three of the four company officers, and the artillery observer. And we had lost
ninety riflemen. This was, and still is, the most terrible day of my life." Wilson,
173.
78.

#24 Breeze.

79.
One veteran had the duty of reporting and confirming those in his unit
who were killed or wounded. It was always necessary to have an "eyewitness"
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make a positive identification of a dead body. He stated, "that's what gets me
about ... these MIAs over in Vietnam. You take a vehicle going down the road
and you see that thing get hit right in front of you. If they were replacements you
wouldn't know who was in there. And you couldn't find out who it was. You can't,
it's impossible. That's what gets me. Even the dog tags would be burnt up, there
would be nothing left." #11 Mercer. Another veteran mentioned the same thing
about Vietnam and MIAs. Men who have seen combat firsthand understand what
the civilian cannot correctly imagine. #18 Hill.
80.

#15 Hott.

81.
For example, one man's friend was killed in front of him and he was
splattered with his friend's blood. This man was so repulsed and upset that he
broke down and vomited. Hoyt, 459. One soldier had a good friend mortally
wounded on May 2, 1945, six days before the German capitulation. He witnessed
his friend's death as he was powerless to help. As he tried to help his buddy the
flow of blood made him vomit and breakdown and cry. Giles, 344. It was not
uncommon for men to cry and unleash their emotions when close friends, and
other men in their unit were killed. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 160.
82.
The following men commented on how German artillery was the most
deadly weapon they had to contend with. #3 McKenna. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9
Kingery. #11 Mercer. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman.
Most veterans thought shelling was "combat at its absolute worst." Ambrose, 133.
Astor, 86-9. One GI wrote in his journal after a heavy barrage: "I hate artillery fire
. they mortally wear down your nerves." Giles, 53.
83.
These men mentioned incidents with small arms fire but were greatly
overshadowed by mention of artillery. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10
McKenna. #13 Breeze. #17 Hoenes. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer.
84.
There were no incidents of hand-to-hand combat in this sample. One
man saw where it occurred but that was a close as these veterans came. #8
Bowen. Other veterans sampled specifically spoke about the fear of getting close
enough to a German to have to fight him a knife or bayonet. #8 Bowen. #13
Breeze. #14 Brick. #18 Hill. Men would rather use grenades, or their rifles, to fend
off a close encounter. Those that cited experience with grenades. #5 Buser. #7
Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #18 Hill. #19
Everman. #21 Mercer.
85.

#8 Bowen. Every man sampled spoke of the 88 mm by name.

86.

#22 Everman.
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87.

#24 Breeze.

88.
Two men described the losses caused by German artillery and
treebursts by the exact same sentence. "It was demoralizing." It is no
coincidence that these two men fought in the Huertgen Forest. #15 Hott. #21
Mercer.
89.

#18 Hill.

90.
Men that experienced air attacks. #2 McCall. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery.
#1 O McKenna. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #19 Evermon. #21 Mercer.
91.

#22 Evermon.

92.

Dollard, 16-7.

93

#24 Breeze.

94.

#16 Curran.

95.

#8 Bowen. #21 Mercer.

96.
#25 Bowen. Three other men referred to experiences with the
distinctive sound of the "Screaming Meemee." #7 Brick. #12 Buser. #21 Mercer.
97.
Cawthon, 93. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #11 Mercer. #15
Hott. "They just went off." #18 Hill.
98.

Wilson, 111-12.

99.
The following men sampled noted casualties due to mines. However,
only one individual actually spoke of incidents with anti-personnel mines. #16
Curran. The other references to mines were to anti-tank mines which worked
effectively on all vehicles. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #11 Mercer. #16
Curran.
100.

#24 Breeze.

101.

Murphy, 172.

102. The following men commented on sniper fire. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott.
#16 Curran. Seeing a tank was even a rare experience to anti-tank companies
who were designed to counter them when they appeared. Only two of the four
men in anti-tank companies had encounters with tanks. #9 Kingery. #10

L
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McKenna. Only two other veterans, commented on encounters with German
tanks. #15 Hott. #21 Mercer.
103.

#20 Hill.

104. Men that recalled instances of short rounds, and friendly-fire, are as
follows. #1 Bowen. #5 Buser. #20 Hill. #24 Breeze. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 147.
McDonald, 235. Three men mentioned the fact that they were not surprised after
the recent Gulf War with the abundance of friendly fire accidents. #20 Hill. #21
Mercer. #24 Breeze.
105. #8 Bowen. The following situations are just examples of the different
types of accidents. In one situation combat engineers detonated some land mines
and the explosion knocked out a window and cut a man's face, but luckily not too
severe. #16 Curran. Another man said his company commander was shot by a
jittery GI because he did not say the password in time. #15 Hott. In another
situation a man saw another soldier accidentally shoot himself in the hand cleaning
a German pistol. #14 Brick. In one instance a captain had his first man killed in
action under his command due to a trigger happy comrade. McDonald, 81.
106.

#11 Mercer.

107. Wilson, 138. The following source cited men having to avoid falling
flak. Giles, 32.
108.

#15 Hott.

109.

#24 Breeze.

110.

#16 Curran.

111.

#8 Bowen.

112. All men noted instances of luck which is also reflected by the
literature. Close calls are similar to the following. "One guy was showing me
where a rifle slug or machine gun slug hit his helmet and put a spot on it and
glanced off. That's what you call getting awful close." #25 Bowen. Veterans
always brood over how "chance sorted life and death." Cawthon, 119.
113. #5 Buser. Another man made a similar statement. "A lot of it was
luck." #15 Hott.
114.

#13 Breeze.
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115.

#21 Mercer.

116.

#14 Brick.

117.

Ibid.

118.

#1 O McKenna.

119.

Ibid.

120.

#24 Breeze.

121. Ibid. In another incident a medic received a case of concussion
when the ambulance he was in drove by a 155mm howitzer just as it fired off a
round. The blast shook the ambulance and deafened him for a few days. #17
Hoen es.
122.

#8 Bowen.

123.

#9 Kingery.

124.

Fussell, 282.

125.

#18 Hill.

126. When the author asked one man if he felt he would ever get hit, he
replied, "Yes, I felt that a lot of times." #14 Brick. When another man was asked
the same question he answered, "Oh yeah, everybody did." #19 Everman.
Another man said, "Oh sure, ... you don't know one day to the next." #21 Mercer.
The following men also agreed with Fussell's realization process. #5 Buser. #8
Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #24 Breeze. This realization
was also prevalent in literature. One airborne soldier felt that the longer he was
in combat he "was living on borrowed time." Ambrose, 110. In combat Gls came
to determine that "death plays no favorites." Grey, 108. One GI was once
overheard to say, "I feel like a fugitive from the law of averages." Mauldin, 39.
Murphy, 263. The majority of combat veterans cited feeling that at one time in
their combat career that "it was just a matter of time before they were hit by enemy
fire and wounded or killed." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 88. There were also those men who
went into combat thinking they would not be killed, they ended up being very
wrong. One of the men had a brother that went off to fight in Italy in 1943 talking
about how he would "get it over with and come home." However, this nineteen
year old man never did make it home, as he was killed in action. #22 Everman.
This same situation occurred countless times as in the case of a GI who wrote
home, "as far as worrying about me getting killed, this is foolish. I have no
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intention of doing anything but returning. Most men get killed in battle because
they forget to take cover or make some such tactical mistake. I'll make no mistake
like that." This GI was killed in his first week on combat. Tappert, 141. This
illusion of immortality was also apparent in the letter starting Chapter One of this
paper.
127.

#1 O McKenna.

128. #24 Breeze. One man recalled it got so bad at one point that he
gave up all hope ever making back home alive. Atwell, 206. Sometimes soldiers
developed a fatalism when they knew they would be injured or killed. Ellis, 239.
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 90.
129.

Fussell, 282.

130.

This man never thought we would be killed. #9 Kingery.

131. #18 Hill. "You don't know one day from the next [if you would be
injured or killed]." #12 Buser.
132.

#16 Curran.

133.

Ibid.

134.

#23 Hott. "We only hoped our luck would not run out." Astor, 49.

135. A "million dollar wound" can be classified as follows. "A wound which
was a nice easy flesh wound with no complications." #16 Curran.
136.

#14 Brick.

137.

Ibid.

138. One man stated he thought about getting the million dollar wound to
get out. "The thought went through my mind after awhile. Well it's always there.
If you're going to get hit you hoped it's not particularly incapacitating." #18 Hill.
Another man said, "all of us thought that all the time. We thought if we ever get
hit at all, let's hope it's the million dollar wound. You get banged up in the legs
where you'll be taken back." #8 Bowen. One veteran recalled how the men did not
discuss the possibility of anyone being killed, but they did discuss the million dollar
wound. Astor, 51. One soldier was actually excited when he was wounded for all
he could say was, "I'm out. I got a million dollar wound. Boy am I lucky." Atwell,
47. When another man was hit, he cheerfully passed out his hoarded rations
because he knew he was going home. The soldier "rejoiced" when he had "finally

206
been hit." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 155. One soldier was hit but not seriously
wounded and his friends comforted him by saying, "you lucky dog." Kennett, 176.
Ellis, 254.
139.

#21 Mercer.

140. #24 Breeze. The Germans, usually being defenders, most always
had the advantage of fighting behind prepared positions where they knew the
ground. One veteran often used the phrase "when the Germans opened up on us"
to describe when his unit took casualties. Often fighting behind prepared
defensive positions the Germans went to great lengths to catch Gls in traps of
overlapping machine gun fire. #24 Breeze. Most Gls commented on taking fire
from prepared defensive positions. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #15 Hott. #18
Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer.
141. This same man said, "I didn't see many jumping out in front with
machine guns looking for Germans." #23 Hott. Kellett, 332. The "majority are
unwilling to take extraordinary risks and do not aspire for a hero's role, but they
are equally unwilling that they be considered the least worthy among those
present." Marshall, 148-9. A recollection of another man illustrates how men were
purposely protective. He was in an antitank unit, and since they replaced a truck
hit by a mine, the men put sandbags of the floorboard of their truck to help shield
any potential blast. #12 Buser. The medic in this sample, spoke of how they were
taught by the book in training, but in combat they were, "slam bang", to get in, and
get the wounded, and get out. #17 Hoenes.
142. #16 Curran. Another man commented on how his father told him
never to volunteer for anything. #18 Hill.
143.

#16 Curran.

144.

#20 Hill.

145.

#24 Breeze.

146.

#14 Brick.

147.

Kennett, 164.

148.

#15 Hott.

149. #24 Breeze. This attitude was exactly how another individual felt
after he was awarded the Silver Star. "I certainly did not consider myself any sort
of hero in any of this action. . . . Thoughts of a medal had never occurred to me,
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though I did appreciate it once it was awarded. My thoughts during the action
were very rudimentary. How in the hell do we get out of this mess?" Wilson, 2728.
150.

#13,24 Breeze.

151.

Ibid.

152.

Ibid.

153.

Ibid.

154.

Ibid.

155.

#23 Hott.

156.

#24 Breeze.

157.

#23 Hott.

158.

#24 Breeze.

159. One veteran returned to his unit after two different wounds he
received in combat, after his third wound he had to be hospitalized for the
remainder of the war. This man was first wounded by a ricochet machine gun
bullet in the shoulder in North Africa in the Spring of 1943. His second wound
came around Metz in the Fall of 1944 when he was stabbed in the back by a
bayonet. It was in the Spring of 1945 after he had crossed the Rhine that he was
severely wounded by shrapnel from an 88. #9 Kingery. Two men who authored
personal biographies experienced wounds and then went back to their former
units. Cawthon. McDonald.
160. In this sample only one man stated he had a hatred for the German
soldier. #16 Curran. This lack of hatred is also apparent in the following sources.
Astor, 175. Ellis, 317. Kennett, 156. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 156-7.
161.

#24 Breeze.

162.

#20 Hill.

163.

#8 Bowen. This man had a similar viewpoint. #21 Mercer.

164.

#14 Brick.
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165.

#15 Hott.

166.

#22 Everman.

167.

#16 Curran.

168.

#10 Mercer.

169.

#14 Brick.

170.

#24 Breeze.

171. #8 Bowen. Many men commented on how they would kill in selfdefense just to survive. "You felt sorry for being in such a situation, yet you knew
it had to be done." #12 Buser. "It didn't seem to bother us." #18 Hill. This was
the same for a man in a 57mm anti-tank gun crew. "By the time you got over
there it was either do that or get killed. That's the way you justified it. It made it
easier for us because there was some distance between them and us." #1 O
McKenna. Most men felt before combat that having to kill an enemy soldier was
"just part of the job." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 34.
172.

#9 Kingery.

173. Several men did not discuss any details surrounding the incidents
and were obviously uncomfortable talking of when they had to fire their weapon.
#8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #11 Mercer. #16 Curran. #24 Breeze. This is consistent
with veterans personal recollections. When one veteran was asked about the time
he had to kill a German, he replied, "it is not something I want to talk about."
Astor, 254.
174.

#24 Breeze.

175.

#8 Bowen.

176.

#24 Breeze.

177.

#20 Hill.

178.

#14 Brick.

179.

#20 Hill.

180.

#14 Brick.
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181.

#24 Breeze.

182. #8 Bowen. Another veteran made a similar statement. "You'd see
movement over there, it might not be necessary, but usually guys would squeeze
off a round or two . . . . You saw the movement and you'd see a figure. I can't
say that most of the time we couldn't really tell if it was an Italian farmer maybe
or a German soldier. But an Italian farmer had no business where he was so you
had to assume it was a German soldier. They were over there and if you thought
you could hit him why you took a shot at them." #18 Hill.
183. This man was never able to ask the loader of the bazooka if he failed
to arm the missiles correctly because he never saw him after that incident. He
might have been killed, but in the confusion he was never seen again. What
illustrates the mentality of survival was how this man discarded the bazooka and
picked up an M-1 at his closest opportunity. #22 Everman.
184.

Ibid.

185.

Ibid.

186.

#24 Breeze.

187.

#22 Everman.

188.

#3 McKenna.

189.

Ibid.

190.

#5 Buser.

191. One veteran who was a member of an anti-tank company, made the
following statement about the gun. "It was too small because the German tanks
had about five inches of armor in the front. But they were accurate." Like all Gls
he made sure to accentuate the positive. #9 Kingery. Another veteran had this to
say about the underpowered 57mm. "Supposedly, it could penetrate four or five
inches or armor plate. The German tanks had as much as seven inches of armor
plate. But the gun was capable of knocking off a track and disabling a tank."
Astor, 12. Another source said the "57mm guns in each American anti-tank
company were no more effective than peashooters against most German tanks in
1944." Balkosi, 116. The series the "U.S. Army in World War 11" did point this fact
out in The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge. The 57mm guns and their crews
were "simply tank fodder." Cole, 220. It would have been even more disillusioning
to discover the guns inadequacies in combat if one remembered what the training
pamphlet, I am a Doughboy, stated about the 57mm. The text described the gun
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as follows. "It's big enough to stop any enemy tank that's been developed, and
will do an excellent job on enemy fortifications as well." War Department, I am a
Doughboy, 26. Another irony of the war was how two sources had the foresight
to posit the need for better anti-tank weapons, unfortunately this heed was never
taken. In one instance an essay written in 1943 entitled "The Case for the AntiTank" pointed out the advantages of having an effective anti-tank weapon. "The
highest morale will be on the side that has the greatest confidence in its weapon.
And there is no good reason why that should not be the side with an effective antitank defense. . . . By all means let us concentrate on our own anti-tank defense
until we know that it is unbeatable by anything that moves on wheels or crawls on
tracks." Greene, Infantry Journal Reader, 83-4. The other example is found in
Hemingway's Men at War published in 1942. Some of his advice encouraged the
development of anti-tank weapons that could be "manufactured in larger caliber."
Hemingway, xxv.
192.

#1 O McKenna.

193.

#9 Kingery.

194.

#8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser.

195.

Lida Mayo, Ordinance: On the Beachhead and Battlefront.

196.

#8 Bowen.

197.

Ibid.

198.

George Patton, War as I Knew It, 197.

199.

#8 Bowen.

200. "Some critics since the war have said that enemy troops, especially
German troops, were far better soldiers than Gls, but this is a contention far from
proved." Spiller, 48.
201. #23 Hott. The majority agreed the Germans were "good soldiers."
#17 Hoenes. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. #16
Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. #25 Bowen. Gls always respected
and were often impressed with the German soldier's fighting ability. McDonald,
Mighty Endeavor, 14.
202.

#1 O McKenna.

203.

#3 McKenna.
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204. #14 Brick. Another source agreed. Giles, 319. One veteran stated
that the "front-line German soldier ... was professional and competent. I was
glad there was not more of them." Cawthon, 133. Fussell, 122.
205. One man sampled felt that later in the war, prisoners they accepted
were definitely "second rate." However, these were beaten men who were glad
to surrender. #8 Bowen. "Whenever they shot, they couldn't hit a dime. They
always shot low." From a man that was shot in the arm by a sniper a few hundred
yards range. #13 Breeze. It appeared that some men that respected the fighting
ability of the German soldiers, but were too proud over their victory to ever admit
the German soldier was better than the GI.
206.

#25 Bowen.

207.

#1 O McKenna.

208. Another irony of war was that this man was from the 4th Division who
hoped and believed before the war that Germany would collapse by the time they
reached Paris. However, this man was in the first American division to make it
into Paris, but the war was long from over. He still had to go through the fighting
in the Huertgen Forest in addition to the Battle of the Bulge. The men in his unit
talked about their misperception, but the still believed that Hitler would commit
suicide before he actually did; which was another lost hope. #21 Mercer.
209.

Transcript by Willis Bowen. December 15, 1944.

210.

Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945.

211. Men sampled that knew of the Malmedy incident. #5 Buser. #8
Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 Mercer. #16 Curran. #19 Everman. Men from different
divisions all across the American line heard of the incident and decided to gain
revenge. Astor, 175, 187, 287, 364, 470. One veteran said, "everybody got
pissed off. I just wanted to get down to Belgium and start killing Germans."
Another man said, "nobody was particularly anxious to take any prisoners."
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 131, 159. Several other sources cited no prisoners
being accepted after the Malmedy Massacre. Giles, 179. Hoyt 525. Kennett, 161.
212.

#19, 22 Everman.

213.

#8 Bowen.

214. Ibid. There are other instances in this sample that men felt similarly.
#13 Breeze. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. Astor, 472.

212
215.

#25 Bowen.

216.

Cole, Ardennes, 263.

217. One veteran not involved in the Bulge fighting nevertheless heard of
such atrocities through rumors. "What you hear and what you see are two
different things. I have never seen American troops kill prisoners. Now did I hear
of such instances? Yes." #16 Curran. As always, there will be those that different
from the norm. One man said he never knew of Malmedy and never heard of Gls
not taking prisoners. "I didn't know anything about that. I may be wrong, but I
thought they honored all people they captured." #21 Mercer. The most recent
account on the Battle of the Bulge is an oral history which documents several
examples of reprisals for the German act at Malmedy. In several situations units
were given expressed orders not to accept prisoners. Astor, 469. During the Bulge
fighting it was common to hear "the boys ain"t takin' any prisoners." Atwell, 154.
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 153. Giles, 200-1. McDonald, 173.
218. Sante Fe. The Divisional History of the 35th Division. No page
numbers, personal possession of Willis Bowen.
219. "Word spread of scattered executions of American prisoners. Some
Gls retaliated in kind. . . . We'd picked up rumors that the Germans were
shooting prisoners at random." Astor, 181, 287.
220.

#21 Mercer.

221. Astor, 367. "In the heat of battle, prisoners were sometimes killed."
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 133. Kennett, 160.
222.

Astor, 281.

223. Gray, 132. This was similar to the popular training phrase one man
referred to, "shoot first and ask questions later." #8 Bowen.
224.

#8 Bowen.

225. Sante Fe. In a little of two weeks the "35th took 1,034 prisoners and
killed and wounded as many more." No page number.
226. In this incident Gls committed large scale executions of German
troops after they discovered a Belgium town where the Germans had slaughtered
some of the civilians. "Two small children actually had their heads smashed in.
Men were dismembered and shot. One pregnant woman had been cut open and
left to die. This scene was viewed by hundreds of Gls. . . . [German] prisoners
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were rounded up . . . stripped of all American clothing . . . and marched, some
practically naked, most without shoes, to that particular cellar and forced to view
the awful scene in it. From there, they were marched through the town into a
wooded section, from whence shortly came the sounds of much shooting. I had
always read that Americans treated their prisoners justly, but I wonder which prison
camp these particular prisoners occupied. I have always been glad the 291 st had
no part in these executions." Giles, 200-1.
227.

#22 Everman.

228.

Stouffer, Vol. 2, 159.

229.

Astor, 367. Kellett, 160.

230.

#15 Hott.

231.

Ibid.

232. There were several isolated atrocities committed in the name of
revenge. Astor, 103. Balkosi, 243-4. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 58-9. Hoyt, 409.
233.

#16 Curran.

234.

#25 Bowen.

235.

Ambrose, 132.

236.

#24 Breeze.

237.

#9 Kingery.

238.

Ibid.

239. In one situation a platoon was under attack and they called the other
platoon for assistance, however, the other platoon had three prisoners. They could
not make it with the three Germans in tow because it was dangerous and would
deny freedom of movement. The prisoners were shot and the company
commander wrote, "Company G today committed a war crime. They are going to
win the war, however, so I don't suppose it really matters." McDonald, 212-5.
240. The following sources made no mention of any orders not to accept
prisoners in the initial Normandy landings. Eisenhower. The Great Crusade.
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack.
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241. A GI from the 115th Regiment of the 29th Division stated his unit had
orders not to accept prisoners during the initial assault. They were told they "were
to take no prisoners, to show no quarter." Hoyt, 367. Another soldier from the
101 st Airborne was ordered by the general of the division "don't take any
prisoners." In other cases in the 101 st, individual airplanes were told by ranking
officers to take "no prisoners. We are taking no prisoners." Ambrose, 63, 65.
242.

#24 Breeze.

243.

Ibid.

244.

Ibid.

245.

#16 Curran.

246. #18 Hill. One of the men sampled spoke of the most common
symptoms of this pervasive fear. "You always have something going around in the
middle of your stomach." #1 O McKenna. Another man who fought through North
Africa until past the Rhine, when he was wounded for the third and last time, said
he never got over his fears. "I wasn't brave now don't get me wrong. I was scared
to death a lot of times. I was scared bad enough one time I shit my pants. I didn't
know until an hour later." #9 Kingery. The following individuals stated their fear
never subsided. #11 Mercer. #16 Curran. #19 Everman. #20 Hill. #23 Hott. #24
Breeze. Veterans in literature cited the same experience. Atwell, 237. Ambrose,
207. Cawthon, 119. Dollard, 5. Another GI felt that "you don't ever get over being
afraid." Giles, 219. Ellis, 102. Kellett, 276. Marshall, 124. Every time one GI was
in action he stated how his "old fear swelled up again." McDonald, 74. Murphy, 39.
Another veteran said that whenever he was in combat he felt the "intestinal
stirrings of fear." Wilson, 9.
247.

#10 McKenna.

248.

#21 Mercer.

249.

#5 Buser. Other men felt similarly. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #18 Hill.

250. One veteran said the common feeling of "anxiety" and "fear of the
unknown" that was the most bothersome. #18 Hill. Another man said the
"apprehension" of knowing one could be killed at any moment was the worst. #1 O
McKenna. Another man said he was most bothered by the "mental attitude. You
didn't know what was going on or how to go about different things." #19 Everman.
Other men sampled that agreed. #8 Bowen. #10 Buser. #15 Hott. #17 Hoenes.
#21 Mercer.
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251.

Ellis, 10, 55.

252.

#18 Hill.

253. #8 Bowen. One man said he went on two patrols, and the one at
night was the "real scary one." #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #18 Hill.
254.

#21 Mercer.

255.

#8 Bowen.

256.

Ibid.

257. #20 Hill. One man commented on hatred and frustration that was
due to shelling, because there was no real way to fight back. #16 Curran. Astor,
89-90. Artillery could land anywhere, it was just "a matter of purest chance."
Atwell, 65. Ambrose, 133.
258. Some of the few cases of self-inflicted wounds that appear in
literature. Atwell, 166-7. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 106. Ellis, 242. Whiting, 45.
All men sampled had heard horror stories and rumors about cases, but they never
had any first hand experience.
259. This veteran found out that the deserter had made it all the way back
to a military hospital in Naples "hundreds of miles south. . . . I don't know how
he got back there, or why he wasn't sent back on the line. . . . Of course there
were rumors that went around .... He was a Jewish boy and we just kind of
figured he had some connections. Of course, I would make statements then I
wouldn't make now." The men would always bitterly joke and say, "somebody took
care of him . . . he had connections someplace to desert the line and then end
up with a cushy job as an orderly." #18, 20 Hill.
260. Charles Whiting, Hero: The Life and Death of Audie Murphy (New
York: Jove Books, 1990), xii.
261.

#8 Bowen.

262.

#1 O Mercer.

263. #18 Hill. One man recalled how he thought, "you kept going until
they were defeated." #24 Breeze. #16 Curran. #21 Mercer. #23 Hott.
264. The following men commented on the severe winter weather. #12
Buser. #26 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. One man's wife is the
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daughter of a banker and, therefore, he has a fond memory of burning worthless
German money in a fireplace just to keep warm. #1 O McKenna. Another man
commented on the weather in the Ardennes. "You had to fight that as much as
the enemy in that respect. It was a problem to keep warm you couldn't keep
warm. You had to keep moving . . . to keep from freezing to death. Trying to
keep warm that was a big chore." #25 Bowen. The cold was also a problem in
Italy. "You did whatever you could to keep from freezing . . . . It was more of a
battle with the elements than it was with the enemy." #18 Hill. G Is had to live
under conditions where there were "multiple physical discomforts." Stouffer, Vol.
2, 85.
265. #20 Hill.
266. #15 Hott. Combat is a "situation of stress." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 59, 86.
Kellett, 232.
267.

#10 McKenna.

268.

#12 Buser.

269. #25 Bowen. A GI who landed at Omaha Beach with the initial wave
of the 29th Division experienced what he described as "intense physical and
emotional strain" in his first twenty four hours of combat. Therefore, this strain
could build up in a short period of time. Cawthon, 71. As the war came closer to
the end men who had been in the line since August discussed that it was nerve
wracking to be waiting for the known victory and, at the same time, worrying about
being killed before the victory. These men worried that their luck would run out
because they knew the law of averages. This was a common way for the stress
and the nervousness to mount during the last months of the war when the victory
was in reach, but men were still being killed. Giles, 307, 315.
270.

#12 Buser.

271. "There is a limit to how long a man can function effectively in this
topsy-turvy world." Ambrose, 206. One veteran believed that all men have a
"breaking point." Atwell, 490. Another veteran also believed all men have a
"breaking point." Cawthon, 72. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 89. Kennett, 145.
Kellett, 275-6. McDonald, 128. "Every man has his breaking point." Stouffer, Vol.
2, 191. Spiller, 51. One veteran commented that he was once on the "black
edges" of a breakdown. Wilson, 42.
272. Some of the men sampled had no experience with so called "battle
fatigue." #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. The men who did know
of battle fatigue had different opinions of what it entailed. For example, when one
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man was asked about battle fatigue he recalled an instance where a fellow soldier
"just plain collapsed" due to fear. After the man revived he was fine and was able
to continue. "#1 O McKenna. Because every case was different, one veteran asked
the insightful question, "What constitutes battle fatigue? Is it not pressing forward
instead of hanging back. Is that battle fatigue? . . . I would suppose that a
number of people blew up over minor items . . . is that battle fatigue or just plain
fatigue?" This man equated battle fatigue with both fatigue and with a momentary
lapse of control like the man above. #16 Curran. Only one man commented on
the classical battle fatigue case where men became despondent succumbing to
the debilitating pressures. "Some of them just couldn't take it. . . . I saw a few
cases where they would just break down and start crying. I think they just needed
to rest." #15 Hott.
273.

Fussell, 281.

27 4. Without doubt there was a "final insufficiency of all the various
compulsions, incentives, and supports in the face of extreme stress beyond
individuals power of control. When all is said and done, no motivational structure
was adequate to sustain the average soldier in the stress of combat indefinitely."
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 191. "Even the sustenance of one's own comrades, today
understood by professionals as the essential cement of any combat unit, proved
to be unequal to the demands of combat." Spiller, 49.

Chapter Three Notes
1.

#9 Kingery.

2.
Ibid. All veterans in this sample commented on the motivation to get
the war over with so they could get home. All sources concur this was the same
for all Gls. Astor, 16. "To get home you had to end the war. To end the war was
the reason you fought it." Fussell, 141. Kellett, 127. "They were fighting mainly
so they could go home again." Kennett, 140. One GI wrote a letter to his wife
stating, "I will write when I can again, and perhaps the war will be much nearer its
end for this nights work." Another letter a man wrote to his wife read, "I've often
wondered what makes men go on the way they do, and then I think of myself and
I know that they too think the way I do with something and someone waiting for
them." Tappert, 241, 255. Terkel, 59. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 184.
3.

#9 Kingery.

4.

Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945.

5.

#25 Bowen.

6.

Transcript by Willis Bowen, April 14, 1945.

7.

#23 Everman.

8.

Ibid.

9.

Ibid.

10.
One of the several veterans to use the phrase "orders came down."
#13 Breeze. "Orders came down." #9 Kingery. Another man commented on how
the men were always "waiting for orders." #8 Bowen. One man, who was a
sergeant, commented on how he took his orders from the platoon lieutenant, and
then passed it down the line to his men. "The chain of command came on down.
Word came down." #18 Hill. Another man had a close friend who was the squad
leader, and being the assistant squad leader, he accompanied him to hear the
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day's orders from the lieutenant, the platoon leader. "He's the one who carried the
map." #14 Brick.
11.

#21 Mercer.

12.

#8 Bowen.

13.

#14 Brick.

14.
#21 Mercer. One man commented on how every town they took from
the enemy was pre-planned. "Each one [town they captured] was an individual
accomplishment." #9 Kingery. Gls always had an objective which kept them
focused on a short-term goal, the prerequisite to making it home. Campbell and
Leinbaugh, 27.
15.
Two men sampled were in combat a matter of days, and having
experienced the raw essence of combat they expressed their real motivation:
survival. One was in combat only ten days. #24 Breeze. THe other was in
combat only three days.#19 Everman. All Gls experienced the same motivation,
"the real war was about staying alive." Perkins, 565. "The desire to survive was
so intense that it might overshadow other and previous motivation." Stouffer, Vol.
2, 169. One GI wrote home, "If you could only see us kids killed at eighteen,
nineteen, and twenty fighting in a country that means nothing to us, fighting
because it means either kill or be killed, not because you're making the world safe
for democracy or destroying Nazism." Tappert, 260.
16.

#22 Everman.

17.

#21 Mercer.

18.
#22 Everman. The war correspondent Ernie Pyle once observed a
squad who had orders to attack a pillbox resting in their path. It was an
obstruction setting before the objective that had to be reached. Pyle commented
on the situation before the soldiers moved out. "They were afraid, but it was
beyond their power to quit. They had no choice." Nichols, 304.
19.

Cawthon, 78.

20.
#25 Bowen. This is similar to the so-called "absolutely fearless
soldier." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 116.
21.

Campbell and Leinbaugh, 230.

22.

#24 Breeze.
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23.

#15 Hott.

24.

#8 Bowen.

25.
In one incident a leader was shot and killed and it devastated the
men, many were crying at the occasion. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 160.
26.

#24 Breeze.

27.
One man spoke of the admiration he had for the captain of his
company. "He was right there with each and everyone of us. He was just like a
buddy. One of us." #24 Breeze. Another veteran said he had a "very good"
platoon leader, accordingly, "the guys respected him." #15 Hott. Another
commented on his good squad leader. "We admired him." #12 Buser.
28.

Balkosi, 221-8.

29.

#24 Breeze.

30.

Ibid.

31.

#21 Mercer.

32.

#20 Hill.

33.
#23 Hott. Griping "makes a hard life of a combat man a little more
tolerable; therefore, griping is a healthy positive sign." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 4. Atwell,
38. Cawthon, 14. Kennett, 87. Murphy, 142. Maudlin, 52. McDonald, 79.
34.
#18 Hill. When asked why he kept going on, one man replied: "what
else are you going to do. Most people will do what they have to do." #16 Curran.
When addressing why Gls fought on, one historian stated Gls had "habit working
against instinct." Marshall, 142.
35.

#12 Mercer.

36.

#16 Curran.

37.
The majority of men felt they were adequately supplied with the bare
essentials. However, there were some isolated problems due to heavy fighting
and severe weather, especially the winter of 1944-45. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna.
#14 Brick. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. #24 Breeze.
38.

#1 Bowen.
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39.
#12 Buser. Another GI also experienced Nazi concentration camps
and felt similar. #10 McKenna.
40.

Stouffer, Vol. 2, 156-7.

41.
Ambrose, 20, 45, 152. Astor, 510-2. Balkosi, 96. Campbell and
Leinbaugh, 109. Gray, 27, 39-40. Ellis, 314, 326, 340. Kennett, 65. Marshall, 42.
Nichols, xii. Spiller, 49. One GI commented on the great importance of the
"camaraderie with your fellow soldiers." #16 Curran.
42.
#18 Hill. "We just all got along." #12 Buser. In combat formalities
often ceased, for example, one man commented on how his unit did not salute
their officers on the line. This had practical considerations since officers often
drew sniper fire. #24 Breeze.
43.

#24 Breeze.

44.

#15 Hott.

45.

#9 Kingery.

46.

#10 Mercer.

47.

#14 Brick.

48.

#18 Hill.

49.

#13 Breeze.

50.

#18 Hill.

51.

#12 Buser.

52.

#1 O McKenna.

53.

#21 Mercer.

54.
McDonald, 26. One man held the common attitude, "the men of the
3rd squad were the best there was." Astor, 8. Another man though his unit
contained the "best bunch of boys ever." Cawthon, 6. Another was convinced his
was the "best damned outfit in the Army." Giles, 130. Maudlin, 1-2. Men in this
sample had great pride in their friendships and the men in their unit. "We were
just like brother." #9 Kingery. "They were a pretty good pretty good bunch of
boys." #12 Buser. "I had a lot of good buddies." #24 Breeze. One soldier's letter,
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who was a replacement, described his new friends as "pretty swell fellows."
Transcript by Willis Bowen, March 16, 1945.
55.

#23 Hott.

56.
#12 Buser. One veteran said, "some of the guys would argue around
about something sometime, but it didn't amount to a whole lot. They got along
pretty good." #14 Brick.
57.
#3 McKenna. Another man commented on how he became friends
with "all different types" of men. #11 Mercer.
58.
#23 Hott. Another man spoke of how the material differences
between men leveled out in combat, "experiences of combat has a tendency to
level that out a good deal." #16 Curran.
59.
Proof of how men let merit influence friendships, with less prejudice,
is found in the fact that one man was a good friend with a Sioux Indian. When
men were put together by necessity, in a trying situation, they learned to respect
each others abilities. #17 Hoenes. This was similar to a man who had a "very
sharp, and very talented" American born man of Chinese decent in his unit. He
recalled how he was a good soldier who, "really did his part." #15 Hott.
60.

Fussell, 143.

61.

#12 Buser.

62.
#24 Breeze. "You look out for the guy on your left and right, and
they do the same thing." #20 Hill. "You had to think about your friends next to
you. You all worked as a team .... That was a great thing the way we all worked
together. It was good teamwork." #8 Bowen. "We were all in it together. Each
one's life depended on what the other one did. With the group we were trying to
stick together for our own survival." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 186-7.
63.

#24 Breeze.

64.

Perkins, 566.

65.

#16 Curran.

66.
Men citing the motivation of not letting down their friends and unit are
as follows. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #16
Curran. #18 Hill. #21 Mercer. The literature reflects the same. "No one wanted
to let his unit down." Balkosi, 96. Cawthon, 47.
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67.

#16 Curran. There was a "security of belonging." Stouffer, Vol. 2,

142-3.
68.
Most all men experienced the "fear of shame." Fussell, 4. Ellis, 106,
260. Kellett, 99, 334. Spiller, 49. Terkel, 60. A captain stated on several instances
he was "scared as hell", but "too brave to admit it." McDonald, 41.
69.

Hoyt, 411.

70.

Perkins, 566.

71.
This came from Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier in WW II.
Charles Whiting, Hero: The Life and Death of Audie Murphy (New York: Jove
Books, 1990), 76. "Personal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by·
the majority of men." A man's reputation was "the one thing that he is likely to
value more highly than life." Marshall, 149-50, 153. Cawthon, 47.
72.
#14 Brick. Men struggled to be able to say "I've not let them down."
Gls held the collective attitude, "if they can stick it. I can stick it." Ellis, 352.
73.
#9 Kingery. Another man commented on how the fear of shame was
even more powerful for men with an ancestral history of soldiers on the family.
Astor, 7.
74.
The majority sampled cited self-determination as to how they kept
going. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #13 Breeze. #14 Brick. #16 Curran.
The G Is "motivation has to be internal." Ambrose, 157. The determination to keep
fighting had to be fueled by "innate pride." Cawthon, 119.
75.

#10 McKenna.

76.
#18 Hill. "One thing about combat is that it is emotionally exhausting .
. . . One time I just passed out I was so dead tired. Had a German walked in I
wouldn't be here this moment." #10 McKenna. Another man had a similar
experience and when he awoke he noticed a German grenade, apparently a dud,
only feet away from his head. He never knew if a German had thrown it there, or
if another GI was playing a trick. #24 Breeze.
77.

Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945. March 12, 1945.

78.
#20 Hill. Astor, 51. Ellis, 105. Prayer was regarded as a "very
important source of support." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 173.
79.

#9 Kingery.
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80.

Ibid.

81.
Beating the enemy always boosted soldiers' confidence. Campbell
and Leinbaugh, 181. After a small tactical victory, one captain's company was,
"elated ... tired but jubilant." McDonald, 215. It was common to feel "triumph and
elation" with successes over the enemy. Gray, 11. Murphy, 183. Kellett, 330.
Seeing the results, and the rewards of liberating the oppressed also raised Gls'
spirits. One veteran commented of such incidents in France. He remembered
how the people would come out and give them food and drink. "Welcoming us as
we came through. They were so glad to see us. The people were so
appreciative." #15 Hott.
82.
This man mentioned reading in Stars and Stripes the "good news all
the time that our troops were doing all right and the Germans were giving up
everywhere." #14 Brick. Other men commented on this and the news of the
Russian advance. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #18 Hill.
83.

#12 Buser.

84.
#24 Bowen. One man recalled the "marvelous air support" when the
weather cleared in the Ardennes. Hoyt, 485. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 133.
85.
McDonald, 254. Another GI commented on how the he always "got
a big bang" from listening to outgoing artillery fire off, and then whistle overhead,
and then explode in the German territory. #25 Bowen. Balkosi, 130.
86.

Fussell, 145.

87.

Gray, 28-9.

88.

#17 Hoenes.

89.

#9 Kingery.

90.
What the Soldier Thinks, May 1945, 10.
fears." McDonald, 19.
91.

#23 Hott.

92.

Ibid.

"I tried to laugh at my

93.
#14 Brick. "The rougher it was the bigger the joke." Astor, 379. A
good example of humor was the way men dealt with a man in their anti-tank unit
who passed in the process of an expected encounter with a German tank. "We
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kidded the socks off of him." #10 McKenna. "We naturally kidded each other."
#21 Mercer. All Gls looked forward to the laughs provided by the Willie and Joe
cartoons in the "Stars and Stripes." The work of Gls favorite cartoonist/humorist,
Bill Mauldin, is proof of Gls' contemptuous and sarcastic humor. Mauldin, Upfront.
94.

#20 Hill.

95.

Fussell, 251. McDonald, 218.

96.

#14 Brick.

97.
#24 Breeze. This was like the joke one veteran heard his sergeant
say to his lieutenant in the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge. "Do you think we'll
ever get out of here?" #21 Mercer. The following are two examples of GI humor.
In one man's unit a soldier suffered a minor cut to his face from broken glass,
which required no hospitalization only a bandage. Later it was determined this
man was awarded the Purple Heart for his wound. After that this man was riled
by the rest of the unit and referred to sarcastically as their "big war hero." #16
Curran. Another man was in the 5th Infantry Division which had a red diamond
insignia patch. The men in his unit pointed to the patch and informed German
civilians that they were "Roosevelt's SS" and they better beware. It was a
humorous way to pass the time. #12 Buser.
98.

#16 Curran.

99.

#23 Hott.

100. #25 Bowen. Like another veteran who also said, "it bothered you
at first." #18 Hill.
101.

#1 O McKenna.

102.

#17 Hoenes.

103.

#14 Brick.

104.

#1 O McKenna.

105.

#21 Mercer.

106.

#12 Buser.

107. #1, #8 Bowen. This was the same as all Gls who made this
adjustment to cope. Another veteran felt this change "came on gradually" in his
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case. #9 Kingery. One veteran wrote he had became "callous" to all the death that
had "become so much a part of our life." Atwell, 157. Sources that sight the
development of Gls emotional insensitivity. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 155. Giles,
245. "One becomes incredibly hardened ... [and] inured to cruelty." Grey, 9.
Hoyt, 378. Terkel, 61. Soldiers developed an "extraordinary callousness. I saw
two wounded Germans killed simply because their moans bothered a sergeant in
a foxhole nearby." This veteran termed this insensitivity the "glaze of war." A
state where soldiers "found it possible to separate themselves psychologically from
what was going on." Perkins, 565-6. As a result of this men were able to say,
"dead men, especially enemy dead bring no emotion whatsoever. I was a bit
shaken at first." Tappert, 167, 244-5.
108.

#21 Mrecer.

109.

Fussell, 116.

110. #24 Breeze. This type of attitude was very prevalent. One man
recalled this lack of concern for shooting the enemy, "it was like stepping on a
bug." Ambrose, 76. For one unit shooting German soldiers became "like shooting
ducks at a carnival." Astor, 123.
111.

#18Hill.

112.

Campbell and Leinbaugh, 149.

113.

Whiting, Operation Nordwind, 66.

114.

Cawthon, 47.

115. Several men commented on how they tried to get dead Gls off the
battlefield as soon as possible, it was not good for morale to have fellow soldiers
scattered around the area. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #16 Curran. #23
Hott. #24 Breeze.
116.

#24 Breeze.

117.

#1 O McKenna.

118. One GI never slept in anything other than a foxhole, in his ten days
in combat. In the Normandy hedgerow fighting houses were not available, this
came later in the war. #24 Breeze. Another veteran serving at the front from
August to October 1944, said they were very lucky to find houses to sleep in. If
they could find a house "that was really living." #23 Hott. Another veteran who
served from D-day to VE-day, commented on the shortage of houses until the
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spring of 1945 when they entered Germany. By that time it was still difficult to find
houses that were not destroyed. #21 Mercer. If men had the opportunity they
always chose a house or similar structure. #8 Bowen; #10 Mercer; #12 Buser;
#16 Curran. Nevertheless, one veteran of a rifle company said that his unit
expected to find a house every night. This was because he fought in the last
month and a half of the war, primarily in the Ruhr area. #14 Brick.
119.

#8, 25 Bowen.

120.

Ibid.

121.

#19 Everman.

122.

#8 Bowen.

123.

#14 Brick.

124.

#8 Bowen.

125.

#1 O McKenna.

126.

#1 Bowen.

127.

Giles, 239.

128.

Dollard, 30-1, 56.

129. Balkosi, 247. Sources that cite the same opinion. Fussell, 274.
Kellett, 287-9. Murphy, 209. The officers guide to leadership, What the Soldier
Thinks, advised the need of "getting the men's minds off of the danger ahead."
The best way to do this was to "keep them busy. Don't let them sit and brood."
What the Soldier Thinks, May, 1945, 9-10.
130.

#8 Bowen. The same is depicted in the following source. McDonald,

166.
131. #24 Breeze. Another man felt similarly, "we were on the go all the
time. We didn't have much time off." #14 Brick. When in the front line soldiers
were kept busy with their military routines and staying alive. What one man said
was true for all men, it essential to "take care of your equipment." #5 Buser.
Another man felt the same. When advancing, worrying about their equipment, and
tactical considerations took up most of their time. "We didn't have time to worry
about something to do." #9 Kingery. Several men talked of working so hard, and
being so busy that they di~n't have time to think of their problems. #16 Curran;
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#17 Hoenes. Giles, 100. McDonald, 166. One GI wrote home in March 1945, that
his unit was rapidly moving forward like a "steamroller." Accordingly he was
extremely "busy with routine matters." Tappert, 241.
132.

#20 Hill.

133. #17 Hoenes. Another GI saw a man killed directly next to him, and
he experienced a sudden feeling of "horror and pity", but it quickly passed under
fire because there was "no time to stop and think." McDonald, 170.
134. #23 Hott. This is like what one veteran believed. "Yes, there are
times when you think that it is possible you might get hit. ... [But) you don't dwell
on that sort of thing." #16 Curran.
135.

#9 Kingery.

136.

#24 Breeze.

137.

Ibid.

138.

#15 Hott.

139.

#1 O McKenna.

140.

What the Soldier Thinks, May, 1945, 9-10.

141. #25 Bowen. Other sources confirm this was an essential activity.
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 25. Giles, 42. To illustrate the concept, another
distraction in another situation would be bettering defensive positions, like digging
a deeper foxhole or strengthening a bunker. This both gave men something to do
and also made their positions stronger and safer. #18 Hill. Ellis, 45-6. McDonald,
39-40, 97.
142.

#16 Curran.

143.

#23 Hott.

144.

#8 Bowen.

Popular reading material were letters, hometown
145. #18 Hill.
newspapers, and also pocket sized magazines and books especially made for the
GI. Like many others, one man was always interested in Stars and Stripes
because of the "interesting cartoons." #5 Buser. Another veteran, who as an
educator thoroughly enjoyed reading, had his wife send him magazine and books
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"constantly." #1 O McKenna.
One man said he often read the Bible just for
something to read. #8 Bowen. This was like his fellow soldier who also read the
Bible, even under fire. #24 Breeze. One man said they always read the Stars and
Stripes even though it was often weeks old, but it was still new to them. He also
said they were interested in Willy and Joe cartoons. #20 Hill. Reading was a
prime source of "escapism" for the GI. Ellis, 299.
146. #20 Hill. One veteran commented on the "eternal letter writing" of
the GI. Atwell, 77. A company commander once pondered how the men found
so much time to write so many letters. McDonald, 58.
147. This man always appreciated getting baked "goodies" from home,
and packages of candy. #16 Curran. Another GI wrote home to his wife asking
her to write as often as she could. He told her that her "letters sure give men a
boost. ... They change my mood to a higher level." Transcript by Willis Bowen,
December 15, 1945. "A letter from home. That was always something to look
forward to." #24 Breeze. "The soldier's life revolves around his mail." Maudlin,
24.
148. #23 Hott. Another veteran said that, if they could, the man played
cards "every night." #1 Bowen. Another man said there were a "lot of poker
players." #1 O Mercer. Those that agreed. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #16 Curran.
#18 Hill. However, another man never played cards in his combat career, in his
situation the fighting was too intense. At this stage of the war, the Normandy
hedgerow fighting, men fought and slept, often with no time for play. #24 Breeze.
149.

#10 McKenna.

150.

#15 Hott.

151.

#1 O McKenna.

152.

#16 Curran.

153.

#23 Hott.

154.

Campbell and Leinbaugh, 144.

155. One of a number of veterans commented on how soldier's "values
became corrupted" while in combat. Gray, 9-10. Kellett, xviii. Another veteran
spoke of the "peculiar ethics of war." In war men had to lose their "civilian
conscience." Murphy, 41, 204. Ernie Pyle made the astute observation when he
noticed the "unsavory moral changes war thrusts upon young men." Nichols, xiv.
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Another source stated the existence of the "transmuted values of combat."
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 197.
156. #17 Hoenes.
157. Transcript by Willis Bowen, February 16, 1945. Luxuries became hot
food, an occasional shower, and change of fatigues to name a few.
158. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 124. Another veteran commented on the
same experience. He stated: "It is common in war for visitors from the rear to
report with wonder on the increasing cheerfulness they encounter on approaching
the front. I believe they are reporting this phenomenon of intensified life and are
experiencing it themselves." Cawthon, 77.
159. One GI wrote in his wartime journal that this change was influenced
by the fact soldiers could die any minute. "Your life expectancy is durned short.
Jinx, you might not come back." Therefore, all men were intent on making the
best of life. Accordingly three things went together "war, sex, [and] drinking."
Giles, 6. Knowing they could be killed at any moment men often adopted
"hedonistic drives." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 80.
160. This also illustrates how quickly the change came on considering this
occurred in this man's first week in combat. #8, 25 Bowen. Another veteran
commented on a distraction from boredom which again illustrates Gls insensitivity.
"Near the end of the war, when we were waiting for the Red Army to show up, I
directed artillery fire on the German city of Chemnitz ... for no purpose except to
have something to do." Perkins, 565.
161.

#10 McKenna.

162. #16 Curran. Humor "turned grisly" in combat. Balkosi, 73-4. Ellis,
108. Fussell, 35. Kennett, 87. "Gruesome jokes" were the norm. Mauldin, 33. Gls
from one unit found humor in defecating inside the German houses, vases, and,
especially, butter churns. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 112. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 190.
163.

#9 Kingery.

164.

Ibid.

165.

Patton, War as I knew it, 258-9.

166. Cawthon, 180. One man recalled, "I tore a swastika off of a German
uniform as a souvenir." #14 Brick. Other men that collected souvenirs are as
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follows. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #11 Mercer. #14 Brick. #15 Hott.
#16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. #24 Breeze.
167. #24 Breeze. Another man brought home two Nazi daggers and two
swords. #1 O McKenna.
168. #19 Everman. It was common for men to lose track of non-regulation
equipment after being wounded. Another man had a German pistol, but when he
was wounded and he never saw it again. "Somebody lifted it", he said. #15 Hott.
Another man had a Luger pistol, but gave to one of their cooks when he heard
rumors about G Is being shot if they were captured with German pistols. #14 Brick.
169.

#12 Buser.

170. Men sampled that brought home German pistols. #8 Bowen. #9
Kingery. #1 O Mercer. #12 Buser. #21 Mercer. Three of the other men had a
pistol at one time, but they never made it home with it. #14 Brick; #15 Hott; #19
Everman. The only man that did not have a German pistol was a medic and it
was prohibited that he carry any form of weapon. #17 Hoenes
171. This discerning individual had one each of the three popular types;
the P-38, the Luger, and a Baretta. #21 Mercer. Another man in an antitank
company said taking weapons out of knocked out vehicles along the roadside was
a common activity. The men would then give the weapons to the ordinance units
to destroy, however, they always had enough extra to sell to other units. #12
Buser.
172.

Transcript by Willis Bowen, March 12, 1945.

173. A veteran in a medical company in Italy, at this time in 1945 not the
enemy of the U.S., saw a farmer's wagon he thought they could put to good use.
Therefore, they "confiscated it, you might want to say .... You weren't supposed
to actually, but the captain was probably looking the other way that day." #17
Hoenes. Another man noticed the same tendency, the officers "overlooked a lot
of it." #10 McKenna. Another GI knew that officers were involved in looting,
especially those with access to the mail. #8 Bowen. Looting had a "powerful
group sanction." Ellis, 233.
174.

#14 Brick.

175. This GI spoke of a situation where the men made off with dozens of
radios from a small German radio shop. It was common when men entered new
towns to throw away the old items they looted, and then take the new and novel
items. #16 Curran. "There was quite a bit of looting." #10 McKenna. Another GI
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spoke of men lingering in towns and spreading out and looking for valuables. #15
Hott. One GI said that most men took just "trinkets", but the men took anything,
especially if it was "something you could use." #12 Buser. This was the case for
a man in a medical battalion who "confiscated" the Italian farmer's wagon to help
carry their gear behind their truck. This again illustrates the distinction between
rear-echelon units and rifle companies. Rear-echelon units were more prone to
looting because they had more time, it was less dangerous in their areas, and they
also had access to vehicles to carry objects. Riflemen had to carry everything
they wanted which limited them considerably. One man in an antitank company
was positive that looting happened more in rear-area units. He said riflemen
"didn't have much time for it." #10 McKenna. Other men in rear-area units agreed.
#12 Buser. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer.
176. Looting occurred in all areas, even on D-Day. Cawthon, 67. Hoyt,
369. Looting also occurred in Holland. Ambrose, 145. Gls also looted in
Luxembourg. Atwell, 186-7. It was not unheard of for German prisoners to be
robbed of valuables such as rings or watches. Atwell, 397. Hoyt, 404.
177. #5 Buser. One man in this sample encountered a bobby trapped
pistol. #13 Breeze. Another man recalled one instance where a candle was wired
to a grenade in a German home. #25 Bowen.
178.

#9 Kingery.

179.

#18 Hill.

180.

#10 McKenna.

181. #14 Brick. Another man knew the same, "the infantry soldier never
gets enough to eat." #18 Hill. One example of how hungry soldiers had to
supplement their rations occurred in the first week of the Normandy campaign.
This man was too far forward for two days to get any rations. He couldn't go back
to get them and nobody could get the rations up to him. Digging a foxhole in a
French farmer's garden he noticed a bunch of little potatoes. "Boy I was hungry
and I had to snag some of them." To eat the potatoes he put them into his mouth
to "wash it off and then spit the dirt out. . . . It was something to put in my
stomach." #24 Breeze.
182. On the norm rations sufficed, "you could survive on it", but anything
different was good "for a change." This man said his favorite was the "pickled
pork" the German civilians kept in big barrels. #12 Buser. Another veteran agreed
the food was "nutritionally good, but it wasn't all that good." #18 Hill. "We lived
on K-rations. It wasn't bad."#21 Mercer. The men looked for anything that "was
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different than K-rations you'd be eating all the time. You get a little tired of Krations." #23 Hott.
183. #14 Brick. Another veteran laughed about chasing chickens around
farm yards. #8 Bowen. Another man said his unit supplemented their rations "all
the time." He fondly recalled "capturing German chickens." #1 o McKenna.
Another GI had a unique experience while his squad was boiling a chicken on a
stove in a German home. Before the chicken was finished cooking they started
to take German shelling. Luckily, the men had time to run into the cellar. "The
house we were hit, they hit three times. It just about tore darn near all the roof off.
We came up after that, and that chicken was still on the stove with plaster in it.
It tasted more like plaster than anything else." #14 Brick. Another man recalled,
"at the edge of a town you'd usually get some eggs." #23 Hott.
184. One veteran recalled "a fishing expedition on the Meuse River....
Some guys went out fishing with hand grenades." #1 O McKenna. Another man's
unit did the same thing in another river somewhere in Germany. #8 Bowen.
185. One man went hunting for deer, but could not find one so he killed
a cow. Anbrose, 104. In another instance a GI shot and butchered a cow, with
all the different types of men there were sure to be butchers in the lot. Astor, 5.
One GI sarcastically recalled how a pig "met with a sudden accident" so the men
had to butcher it and eat it. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 153. Hoyt, 432.
186. Several veterans spoke of giving German children food, gum, and
candy; however the German children always asked for cigarettes. #8 Bowen. #1 O
Mercer. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. The individual in this sample who
was a medic was later made a cook in medical company. When they had excess
food he gave it to Italian civilians, who were often without food. #17 Hoenes.
Another man spoke of a time when his unit had extra sauerkraut and sausages
that they gave to some German civilians that gathered around them. However,
what made this man very angry, was that when higher ranking officers determined
they were giving the civilians food, the men were ordered to bury their excess in
pits dug in the ground. #8 Bowen.
187.

#21 Mercer.

188.

Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945.

189. Instances of men stuffing themselves with German civilian's food can
be found in the following sources. Atwell, 182. Fussell, 199, 291. One GI wrote
of the times when the men gorged themselves on the luxury of fresh eggs.
McDonald, 233, 315.
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190.

#1 O McKenna.

191.

#25 Bowen.

192.

#12 Buser.

193. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 216-7. Another GI said men were "always
on the hunt" for something to drink. Giles, 252. Another spoke of a persistent
searching for hidden bottles. There were typically good results when the men
found alcohol. McDonald, 219, 347.
194. One veteran considered "a good drink every now and then" good for
morale. #16 Curran. Another man recalled how his unit found a large wine cellar
and one of the men made a pledge to take a drink out of every bottle. The man
gave it all he could, but he became too intoxicated before he got half through. It
was a funny scene at the time, something to make men laugh. #1 O McKenna.
"We'd find wine in most of the houses, sometimes we'd find a little cognac .... I
never was to much of a drinker myself, but I did drink some of the stuff." #14 Brick.
After a group of Gls found some alcohol the through an "impromptu party." Atwell,
377. One soldier drank heavily one night to aid in forgetting the loss of a close
friend. Giles, 293. It was common for men to drink to temporarily forget their
problems. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 34. Fussell, 96. Gls in rear-echelon units
were the men who imbibed most often; again it was safer in their area and they
had more time to look for a steady supply. Once they found alcohol, they also
had vehicles to store large quantities while they traveled. Three of the six men in
rear area units commented on carrying five gallon "jerry cans" of alcohol on their
trucks. Two of the men said they kept red wine on hand to drink because of the
questionable water supplies. #1 O Mercer. #17 Hoenes. Another man in an antitank
company said they always tried to keep "stocked up" on indigenous "potato
schnapps." "That potato schnapps was made out of potato peelings and it was
kind of greasy, a kind of scum would float around in your cup, but it was pretty
potent. We drank a little glass, but not to excess." #12 Buser.
195.

#18 Hill.

196.

#9 Kingery.

197. #8 Bowen. Another veteran heard about Gls getting sick after they
had tried to drink anti-freeze. #19 Everman.
198.

Kennett, 207-8.

199.

#8 Bowen.
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200.
Eleven of the twelve men smoked in this sample. "You were a funny
freak if you didn't [smoke]." #8 Bowen. Another man said, "about everybody did
[smoke]." #14 Brick. Another man said he smoked and "practically everyone did."
#10 Mercer. "Most of us smoked." #9 Kingery. Fussell, 143-5. Gls were given
free cigarettes in their rations, and also supplied with free cartons. Ellis, 294.
Several men smoked during the war but had since quit. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery.
#10 McKenna. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #21 Mercer. Only three men interviewed
continue to smoke cigarettes. #12 Buser. #18 Hill. #19 Evermon.
201.

#13 Breeze.

202.

#14 Brick. This was a common experience. Ellis, 294.

203.

#9 Kingery.

204.

Hoyt, 553.

205. One man recalled how in Belgium the people "practically embraced
us." #1 O McKenna. "The people were so appreciative." #15 Hoyt. Another veteran
recalled how so many civilians gathered on a balcony in Belgium to see Gls pass
through town, that the balcony collapsed and the people fell to the ground,
fortunately unhurt. #25 Bowen.
206. One man who was in Italy replied, "non-fraternization, bullshit" when
asked about contact and conversations with civilians. #17 Hoenes. Several men
talked with German prisoners and civilians whenever they could, usually out of
curiosity. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #18 Hill. #21 Mercer.
207.

#1 o McKenna.

208.

#12 Buser.

209. However, the two men in this sample that were not infantrymen both
mentioned encounters with women. One man was in the Navy, and became
friendly with a French girl in Marseilles, France. #2 McCall. The other man was
in the air corps as a B-17 crewmember. He was based in England and he
mentioned him and his unit making trips into London, to "score" with the British
women. #6 Knott.
210. #18 Hill. Men that agreed. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #15 Hott.
For one man, the only woman he saw in his ten days in combat was a French
woman who after losing her German boyfriend, charged his unit firing a burp gun.
The men had no choice but to shoot and kill her, before she shot one of them.
#24 Breeze.
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211.

#16 Curran.

212.

#12 Buser.

213. One man was on the line seven months and had only two official
days R&R, and even then they only went back to a rest station. #1 O McKenna.
Another man was at the front for ten months and never had anything more than
a few days rest off the line in a cot in a building safe from artillery fire. "That was
a big thing." #18 Hill. Several men never had any R&R, usually because they
were not in combat long enough. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #12 Buser. #19 Everman.
#24 Breeze.
214.

#16 Curran.

215.

#14 Brick.

216.

#25 Bowen.

217. #25 Bowen. There were other instances of what would have been
rapes were stopped by other Gls. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 235. However, there
were also cases that when men found out about a rape, after the fact, they would
just do nothing about it. The men who knew others in his unit had committed rape
"just went on and never said anything." #14 Brick.
218.

Gray, 51.

219.

Ibid.

220.

#12 Buser.

221.

#20 Hill.

222.

#25 Bowen.

223.

#9 Kingery.

224.

Gray, 51.

225.

#12 Buser.

226.

#14 Brick.

227.

#10 Mercer.
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228.

#8 Bowen.

229.

Gray, 51.

230.

#1 O Mercer. #16 Curran.

231. #1 O McKenna. There was often extensive destruction in German
towns before Gls ever entered them, due to artillery and air attacks. Nevertheless,
Gls also added to the destruction. One man made a statement which illustrates
the common way towns were captured, with overwhelming firepower. "We would
shoot our way through." #14 Brick. Another man talked of Gls knocking down
doors with their rifle butts. "We did a hell of a lot of damage." #8 Bowen.
Another man in an antitank unit said driving the trucks over the fences behind
German homes to position their 57mm guns, was an everyday occurrence. #12
Buser. There were several cases of Gls getting "carried away" and shooting
indiscriminately when they captured towns. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 33. In other
situations men were even shooting pigs for no reason other than to do it. Hoyt,
409. Another veteran saw where a German house was ransacked and
demolished. Giles, 245.
232.

#15 Bowen.

233.

Gray, 51.

234.

#16 Curran.

235.

Ibid.

236.

#1 O McKenna.

237.

#16 Curran.

238.

Ibid.

239.

McDonald, The Seigfried Line Campaign, 503-6.

240.

Ambrose, 234.

241.

#16 Curran.

242.

Kennett, 159.

243.

Astor, 216.

238
244. Ambrose, 234. Another GI was in a "state of exhilaration" after he
shot a German soldier. Astor, 202. In another situation when Gls killed the
Germans that opposed them they were congratulated for killing the "kraut
bastards." McDonald, 26.
245.

Ambrose, 324. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 183.

246.

Cawthon, 113.

247.

#14 Brick.

248. The author of this source was a soldier who collected wounded Gls'
rifles when they came to the aid station. There were rifles with notches, also many
with names of loved ones. Atwell, 80. Instances of soldiers keeping count of the
number they shot. Hoyt, 389-492. One veteran made the comment that one man
in his squad had shot fifteen of the enemy. However, his own experience
illustrates how not all men kept count out of a sense of accomplishment. This man
said he had to shoot three enemy soldiers and he was "glad it was that few men."
The only reason he knew the number was that he could not forget the incidents.
#8 Bowen.
249. #23 Hott. Another example of the delight with survival occured when
a German tank assaulted a rifle company, and in response the captain called in
artillery on their target. As a result well placed rounds destroyed the German tank.
The captain who called in the artillery felt a "spine-tingling excitement", while
expressing his opinion that the "sonofabitch is burning like hell." McDonald, 43.
250.

#20 Hill.

251.

#24 Breeze.

252.

Ibid.

253.

Transcript by Willis Bowen. May 8, 1945.

254.

Giles, 353.

255.

#18 Hill.

256. #10 McKenna. "We celebrated, it was a great thing." #12 Buser.
Three other men made use of the word "celebration." #14 Brick. #18 Hill. #21
Mercer. "They had survived .... A part unequaled." Ambrose, 280. Another
veteran recalled, we "danced and drank the night away ... all of us celebrated on
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this happy occasion." Wilson, 257. "There was no defining our joy." McDonald,
367.
257. #16 Curran. One man said his unit was a "happy bunch" but they
had no liquor at the time. He said they would have had a "booze party" if they
would have found alcohol. Their drinking was delayed until they had the
opportunity in Hamburg when they stole a keg of beer with their lieutenant and
drank it on a troop train. "I thought that was pretty fun." #14 Brick. Soldiers in one
unit had a "treasured keg of cognac" for the special occasion. McDonald, 367.
258. "No black out that was a big deal in itself." #16 Curran. Another man
said it was odd not to hear the constant sound of shelling in the distance. #1 O
McKenna. Another man noticed the difference of being able to smoke a cigarette
in the dark. McDonald, 369.
259.

#1 O McKenna.

260.

#21 Mercer.

261.

#18 Hill.

262. This man stayed in Italy on occupation duty until he returned to the
U.S. in December, 1945. #20 Hill.
263. Eight men in this sample were able to serve in Japan, and the four
that were picked are as follows. This man was in the 95th Infantry Division. #1 O
McKenna. This man was in the 5th Infantry Division. #12 Buser. This man was
in the 8th Infantry Division. #14 Brick. This man was in the 104th Infantry
Division. #16 Curran.
264.

#1 O McKenna. #12 Buser.

265. #10 McKenna. Another veteran had the same feeling. Men in his
unit were "worried" and as such they kept a "wary eye" on the events in the Pacific
after VE-Day. Wilson, 261.
266.

#12 Buser.

267. #1 O McKenna. "Hiroshima filled us all with a sense of relief as well
as satisfaction." Perkins, 567.

CONCLUSION NOTES
1.
#24 Breeze. Another veteran felt similarly, "when you were convinced that
your body could stand no more . . . you found out it could." Astor, 202.
2.

#16 Curran.

3.

Nichols, xiv.

4.

Atwell, 367.

5.

#17 Hoenes.

6.
#19 Everman. Men that agreed with this change. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery.
#1 O McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #21 Mercer.
7.

Cawthon, 104. Spiller, 51.

8.

#24 Breeze.

9.

#25 Bowen.

10.

#23 Hott.

11.
A member of the initial assault wave at Omaha Beach remarked on the
feelings he will always have for the men in his unit that died on that dreadful day.
"I feel this void now in liking back upon friends gone on that 6 June . . . . For the
rest of us, what has been since has not been the same." Cawthon, 71
12.

#12 Buser.

13.
#9 Kingery. Another man said he felt "privileged" to see things in Italy he
only had read about in school.#18 Hill.
14.

#17 Hoenes.

15.
Two men who commented on the "good times." #9 Kingery. #17 Hoenes.
Another man termed his experience "wonderful. "#12 Buser.
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241
16.

#18 Hill.

17.
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 276-279. One veteran commented on how he
was fighting to "come home and then to forget it after that. "#8 Bowen. Another
man agreed that men experienced a readjustment stage after the war. "I guess
like they say 'time heals all wounds.' Fortunately I don't have any mental hangups
from the war. "#15 Hott. Literature also addressed the subject of readjustment.
Mauldlin, 28. Nichols, xv. Stouffer, vol. 2.
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